Continuation Part 11: Amanda Knox/Raffaele Sollecito

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Umbria

Numbers said:
And Perugia, in Umbria, the place where the pigment umber originated, has soil full of iron oxide and manganese oxide, ideal for setting off the luminol CL.
Click to expand...

You are quite right. The authors of this paper will be fully aware of this too - given that the lead author and two others work for the Carabinieri - and worked on the Kercher case last year.
 
An article on the Italian courts and their reaction to the Convention on Human Rights:

http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1598&context=lawreview

Brancaccio, Hon. Antonio* (2012) "The Protection of Human Rights in the Decisions of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 70: Iss. 1, Article 9.

*Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy

It should perhaps be mentioned that the decisions of the
Italian Court of Cassation' are not binding as precedent when
the question decided comes before other courts or is brought up
again before the Court itself.2 The authority of such decisions,
however, is such that it will undoubtedly have a guiding effect on
future decisions.3 This is a sufficient justification for limiting my
remarks to these decisions.
.....
As far as the Convention is concerned, the Court of Cassation
has been criticized for not addressing this question until
many years after the implementing legislation. Two reasons
have been articulated to account for this delay. First, it is due to
the slight and superficial knowledge of the Convention possessed
by lawyers and judges. Lawyers either did not invoke the application
of the Convention, or they sought to invoke the principles
of the Convention in such a vague manner that judges were hesitant
to apply them.

The second reason is the widely-held belief that Italian domestic
sources, the Italian Constitution and ordinary laws, substantially
exhaust the protection of human rights covered by the
Convention. This apprehension of domestic law preemption by
international laws is not unique to Italian jurisprudence. A
similar delay can be seen in the behavior of judges in other countries.
In France, for example, the Convention only began to be
applied in the second half of the 1970's. The question of the direct
application of the Covenant does not have the same history
as the Convention. Thus, what will be said about the latter is
equally valid for the former.
......
 
Numbers said:
An article on the Italian courts and their reaction to the Convention on Human Rights:

http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1598&context=lawreview

Brancaccio, Hon. Antonio* (2012) "The Protection of Human Rights in the Decisions of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 70: Iss. 1, Article 9.

*Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy

It should perhaps be mentioned that the decisions of the
Italian Court of Cassation' are not binding as precedent when
the question decided comes before other courts or is brought up
again before the Court itself.2 The authority of such decisions,
however, is such that it will undoubtedly have a guiding effect on
future decisions.3 This is a sufficient justification for limiting my
remarks to these decisions.
.....
As far as the Convention is concerned, the Court of Cassation
has been criticized for not addressing this question until
many years after the implementing legislation. Two reasons
have been articulated to account for this delay. First, it is due to
the slight and superficial knowledge of the Convention possessed
by lawyers and judges. Lawyers either did not invoke the application
of the Convention, or they sought to invoke the principles
of the Convention in such a vague manner that judges were hesitant
to apply them.

The second reason is the widely-held belief that Italian domestic
sources, the Italian Constitution and ordinary laws, substantially
exhaust the protection of human rights covered by the
Convention. This apprehension of domestic law preemption by
international laws is not unique to Italian jurisprudence. A
similar delay can be seen in the behavior of judges in other countries.
In France, for example, the Convention only began to be
applied in the second half of the 1970's. The question of the direct
application of the Covenant does not have the same history
as the Convention. Thus, what will be said about the latter is
equally valid for the former.
......
Click to expand...

"the slight and superficial knowledge of the Convention possessed by lawyers and judges" What a damning indictment of the whole rotten edifice!
 
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Chris_Halkides said:
Machiavelli,

All you did was prove that lemon juice interferes with the TMB test. We cited those studies and many others, which proved that your interpretation was hogwash. Luminol reacts to bleach, Draino, and probably Comet cleanser (which produces bleach when water is added) and other cleaning agents. We also cited evidence that HemaTrace is both more sensitive than luminol is and will not react to false positives the way that luminol does. Your claims are no better than feckless.
Click to expand...

The papers I cited determined that luminol is more sensitive and more specific than TMB.

Whatever you cite or claim, you can't do anything against these studies. These are findings that are not going to disappear.

As for the last study involving lemon juice, you perfectly know that you cannot limit even the validity of that one to lemon juice.

As for HemaTrace: 1) it is not a scientific study, and 2) there is no implication, it is irrelevant as long as it is not proven that's a HemaTrace test was ever performed; beyond this, it is still impossible to find a plausible alternative which is the only determinant element; bleaches that you cite above are obviously not plausible.
 
HemaTrace redux

Machiavelli said:
What they say is that it is possible, not that it is "safe"; it does not contradict any scientific knowledge. You can safely predict that if latent stains are highly diluted (which is somehow in the nature of latent stains) blood won't be detected by other tests.
Click to expand...
Machiavelli,

HemaTrace has an even lower limit of detection than luminol does, and it won't react to metal ions. It is antibody-based. There is no excuse not to use it.
 
Kauffer said:
As we know the Machiavelli account has claimed three scientists, Webb, Tobe and Barni from their published research can be cited in support of the conclusion that luminol reactions at the cottage are reliable proof of blood.

Here is an extract from:

"Forensic application of the luminol reaction as a presumptive test for latent blood detection" (Barni and others 2007)


"The most problematic chemicals for a correct interpretation of luminol test results are those which provoke intensification or a

Still waiting for the Machiavelli account to supply some relevant, contextual citation from either, Webb, Tobe or Barni indicating that luminol positive/TMB negative results can be relied on as proof of blood.
Click to expand...

Your demand is unjustified and wrong. You don't need to have a chemical proof of blood, in order to have evidence of blood.
Try to absorb the concept of circumstantial evidence, and quit asking for undue conditions.
 
Hematrace in the literature

Machiavelli said:
The papers I cited determined that luminol is more sensitive and more specific than TMB.

Whatever you cite or claim, you can't do anything against these studies. These are findings that are not going to disappear.

As for the last study involving lemon juice, you perfectly know that you cannot limit even the validity of that one to lemon juice.

As for HemaTrace: 1) it is not a scientific study, and 2) there is no implication, it is irrelevant as long as it is not proven that's a HemaTrace test was ever performed; beyond this, it is still impossible to find a plausible alternative which is the only determinant element; bleaches that you cite above are obviously not plausible.
Click to expand...
Machiavelli,

Wow, just wow. You just keep repeating the same words, as if they have not been refuted time and again. One, there is no reason to believe that the active ingredient in Comet cleanser deteriorates with time, as bleach does. Two, HemaTrace has been discussed in the forensic literature (for example, J Forensic Sci. 2014 Nov 18. doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.12663.). Moreover, the PG commenters here have been trying to argue that a crime scene is not the same as a scientific study; therefore, your line of attack would seem to be in contradiction to that line of thought. Three, I cited a study which gave a lower limit of TMB as 1 part in one million and luminol as one part in 5 million. Therefore, your claim is essentially that all of the stains fell into a narrow window between 1 and 5 million. What are the odds of that? And if that were the case, the luminol should have been barely visible, inasmuch as it is known that luminol give less chemiluminescence at higher dilutions.
 
Citation

Machiavelli said:
Your demand is unjustified and wrong. You don't need to have a chemical proof of blood, in order to have evidence of blood.
Try to absorb the concept of circumstantial evidence, and quit asking for undue conditions.
Click to expand...

I get that you don't feel a need to assert proof of blood.
I get that Stefanoni saying "it's not blood" doesn't bother you.
I get that you still think it's reasonable to conclude there was blood.

It's just not clear why.

But, Webb, Tobe and Barni help your argument how? Give me some citation that you believe is helpful to your case. What are they saying differently from the other scientists on this subject do you think?
 
Numbers said:
An article on the Italian courts and their reaction to the Convention on Human Rights:

http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1598&context=lawreview

Brancaccio, Hon. Antonio* (2012) "The Protection of Human Rights in the Decisions of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 70: Iss. 1, Article 9.

*Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy

It should perhaps be mentioned that the decisions of the
Italian Court of Cassation' are not binding as precedent when
the question decided comes before other courts or is brought up
again before the Court itself.2 The authority of such decisions,
however, is such that it will undoubtedly have a guiding effect on
future decisions.3 This is a sufficient justification for limiting my
remarks to these decisions.
.....
As far as the Convention is concerned, the Court of Cassation
has been criticized for not addressing this question until
many years after the implementing legislation. Two reasons
have been articulated to account for this delay. First, it is due to
the slight and superficial knowledge of the Convention possessed
by lawyers and judges. Lawyers either did not invoke the application
of the Convention, or they sought to invoke the principles
of the Convention in such a vague manner that judges were hesitant
to apply them.

The second reason is the widely-held belief that Italian domestic
sources, the Italian Constitution and ordinary laws, substantially
exhaust the protection of human rights covered by the
Convention. This apprehension of domestic law preemption by
international laws is not unique to Italian jurisprudence. A
similar delay can be seen in the behavior of judges in other countries.
In France, for example, the Convention only began to be
applied in the second half of the 1970's. The question of the direct
application of the Covenant does not have the same history
as the Convention. Thus, what will be said about the latter is
equally valid for the former.
......
Click to expand...

Kauffer said:
"the slight and superficial knowledge of the Convention possessed by lawyers and judges" What a damning indictment of the whole rotten edifice!
Click to expand...

The article is historical. The "slight and superficial knowledge" may or may not continue to the current era. Certain judges may be more familiar with the ECHR than others.

Some additional quotes from the article:

The question of the application of the Convention and the
Covenant has been dealt with primarily in decisions concerning
criminal cases. Therefore, it is on these cases that I will concentrate.
The Court's first reaction after becoming aware of the existence
of this question was to deny the direct effect of the Convention
within our legal system. Thus, the decisions of the Court
of Cassation affirmed that the provisions of the Convention bind
states only in their relationships with other states and do not affect
a state's relationship with individuals. These provisions
were held to be of a programmatic nature and therefore could not
modify domestic law."

This theory was justified using two arguments. First, it was
assumed that the Convention anticipates an exhaustive system
of protection for a violation of human rights through recourse to
two international bodies-the Commission 2 and the European
Court of Human Rights. 3 These fully enforceable rights cannot
directly benefit the individual before the courts of his own country
due to the particular conditions of this system.

Secondly, reference was made to Article 57 of the Convention,
which obliges every high contracting party, at the request of
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, to explain how
its internal law ensures the effective implementation of all the
provisions contained in the Convention." It was also assumed
that Article 57 excluded a provision stating that the protections
promulgated at the Convention were a direct part of domestic
law.

The opposite view was taken by the trial judges and certain
administrative judges who affirmed the norms of the Convention
not only as domestic law, but also as constitutional law. This
approach, however, was consistently rejected by the Court of
Cassation's decisions and by the Constitutional Court. 5 This
view will therefore not be further addressed but mention was
made of it to provide a brief glimpse into the extent of this debate.

At the beginning of the 1980's, after a rather extended period
of resistance to new ideas, some of the Court of Cassation's
decisions acknowledged that the norms of the Convention were
immediately and directly applicable to domestic cases. The exception
is those provisions whose contents are considered so
vague in their terms as to not indicate sufficiently clear situations.

Since other decisions continued to uphold the previous and
opposing view, a conflict came about which required the intervention
of the United Criminal Divisions of the Court (Sezioni
Unite Penali). This is the extended panel of the supreme court
which adjudicates the most important cases, or cases in which
there have been contrasting precedents of the individual divisions
of the court. 6 In 1988, the United Divisions passed judgment
on the appeal of Paolo Castro, accepting the immediate
applicability of the norms of the Convention in Italy.

In this respect, the court made three observations. First, it
observed that from a reading of Articles 1 and 13 of the Convention"
8 it is apparent that the high contracting parties must secure
a direct recognition of the rights and freedoms defined in the
Convention itself. Therefore, it is responsible for more than only
to "undertake to respect" these rights and freedoms, as was
stated in the first version of the draft Convention.19 Second, protection
at the international level does not exclude protection by
national judges, but serves to reinforce this protection by controlling
the way in which national judicial authorities ensure respect
for these rights. The opposing argument, drawn from the
protections afforded through recourse to the Commission of Human
Rights, has no foundation.2" Third, the domestic applicability
of the Convention flows from the principle that Italian law is
to be adapted to international treaty law. The writers agree that,
where the international legal instrument contains a model legal
procedure or action, complete in all the essential elements and
which may be directly adopted by the domestic system, the internal
implementation of the international model is automatic.
When the international instrument does not contain such a
model, however, it cannot be self-executing. To become effective,
the domestic legal implications imposed by the instrument require
state legislative action.

The Constitutional Court has agreed with the approach
taken by the United Divisions of the Court of Cassation.22 Subsequent
decisions in both criminal and civil matters have uniformly
proceeded in this same direction.
 
Luminol/hematrace

Chris_Halkides said:
Machiavelli,

Wow, just wow. You just keep repeating the same words, as if they have not been refuted time and again. One, there is no reason to believe that the active ingredient in Comet cleanser deteriorates with time, as bleach does. Two, HemaTrace has been discussed in the forensic literature (for example, J Forensic Sci. 2014 Nov 18. doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.12663.). Moreover, the PG commenters here have been trying to argue that a crime scene is not the same as a scientific study; therefore, your line of attack would seem to be in contradiction to that line of thought. Three, I cited a study which gave a lower limit of TMB as 1 part in one million and luminol as one part in 5 million. Therefore, your claim is essentially that all of the stains fell into a narrow window between 1 and 5 million. What are the odds of that? And if that were the case, the luminol should have been barely visible, inasmuch as it is known that luminol give less chemiluminescence at higher dilutions.
Click to expand...

On the question of chemiluminescence, Filippo Barni and Andrea Berti, the Caribinieri scientists also argue that because of the interfering effects from plant peroxidases, "the luminol test can produce false positive indications often showing undetectable differences in light emission characteristics from that seen with blood"
 
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Chris_Halkides said:
Machiavelli,

Wow, just wow. You just keep repeating the same words, as if they have not been refuted time and again. One, there is no reason to believe that the active ingredient in Comet cleanser deteriorates with time, as bleach does. Two, HemaTrace has been discussed in the forensic literature (for example, J Forensic Sci. 2014 Nov 18. doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.12663.). Moreover, the PG commenters here have been trying to argue that a crime scene is not the same as a scientific study; therefore, your line of attack would seem to be in contradiction to that line of thought. Three, I cited a study which gave a lower limit of TMB as 1 part in one million and luminol as one part in 5 million. Therefore, your claim is essentially that all of the stains fell into a narrow window between 1 and 5 million. What are the odds of that? And if that were the case, the luminol should have been barely visible, inasmuch as it is known that luminol give less chemiluminescence at higher dilutions.
Click to expand...

What you, a mere 'professor' of 'biochemistry' are missing is that when the science gets too difficult Mach can always fall back on the circumstantial case. AKA all the other evidence. 10,000 *********** pages, Halkides, plus another 350 of Nencini ramblings. So suck on that, loser.
 
Machiavelli said:
Your demand is unjustified and wrong. You don't need to have a chemical proof of blood, in order to have evidence of blood.
Try to absorb the concept of circumstantial evidence, and quit asking for undue conditions.
Click to expand...

It appears that 'approximate evidence' can be incorporated into an analysis supporting a judicial finding of guilt.

Absolute or certain proof is an unreasonable, and strictly speaking, non-judicially necessary request, nor is it a barrier to finding guilt, or even approximate guilt.

The benefit of scientific analysis can be valuable, but must also be seen as having approximate value, which cannot be said to restrain the findings of a judge in a case, lest there appear to be a conflict between the interests of justice, the interests of approximate justice, and/or the necessity of holding the guilty parties responsible for their crimes, or their approximate crimes.

Certainly if a defendant were guilty, they would not be charged with a crime in the first place. Therefore simply sitting at the defense table, one is already clearly of approximate guilt, even if one was not within the proximity of the actual crime.

And calling Ms Nadeau an "approximate reporter", is not necessarily not a compliment, as it can be used as circumstantial evidence that she is indeed a fine one.

Mach is starting to make sense to me. I think I'm getting it.
 
In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is.

Yogi Berra

Reminded me of M.'s posts here.
 
carbonjam72 said:
It appears that 'approximate evidence' can be incorporated into an analysis supporting a judicial finding of guilt.

Absolute or certain proof is an unreasonable, and strictly speaking, non-judicially necessary request, nor is it a barrier to finding guilt, or even approximate guilt.

The benefit of scientific analysis can be valuable, but must also be seen as having approximate value, which cannot be said to restrain the findings of a judge in a case, lest there appear to be a conflict between the interests of justice, the interests of approximate justice, and/or the necessity of holding the guilty parties responsible for their crimes, or their approximate crimes.

Certainly if a defendant were guilty, they would not be charged with a crime in the first place. Therefore simply sitting at the defense table, one is already clearly of approximate guilt, even if one was not within the proximity of the actual crime.

And calling Ms Nadeau an "approximate reporter", is not necessarily not a compliment, as it can be used as circumstantial evidence that she is indeed a fine one.

Mach is starting to make sense to me. I think I'm getting it.
Click to expand...

M.'s posts might pass a presumptive test, but not a confirmatory one.
 
The thing is, if luminol is indeed more specific than TMB, then there would be no purpose, and I mean none at all, for any forensic investigation to ever use TMB. And yet all of them do, and every single standard forensic procedure recommends following luminol with a more specific test like TMB.

Is Machiavelli lying, since he lies about everything, in order to spread his disinformation? Or did he just prove every forensic organization in the world wrong in one fell swoop? Machiavelli, where did you go buddy?
 
Tobe et al

I have posted extracts of papers by Webb et al and Barni et al, two of the three sources the Machiavelli account claims is supportive of his position on the luminol positive/TMB negative samples in the Kercher case - that the samples are blood. Here is an abstract of the paper, which is the final source he calls on for support, by Tobe et al. Yet there is nothing to support the position he takes:

"Evaluation of six presumptive tests for blood, their specificity, sensitivity, and effect on high molecular-weight DNA.

Authors
Tobe SS Watson N, Daéid NN.
Author information
Journal
J Forensic Sci. 2007 Jan;52(1):102-9.


Abstract

Luminol, leuchomalachite green, phenolphthalein, Hemastix, Hemident, and Bluestar are all used as presumptive tests for blood. In this study, the tests were subjected to dilute blood (from 1:10,000 to 1:10,000,000), many common household substance, and chemicals. Samples were tested for DNA to determine whether the presumptive tests damaged or destroyed DNA. The DNA loci tested were D2S1338 and D19S433. Leuchomalachite green had a sensitivity of 1:10,000, while the remaining tests were able to detect blood to a dilution of 1:100,000. Substances tested include saliva, semen, potato, tomato, tomato sauce, tomato sauce with meat, red onion, red kidney bean, horseradish, 0.1 M ascorbic acid, 5% bleach, 10% cupric sulfate, 10% ferric sulfate, and 10% nickel chloride. Of all the substances tested, not one of the household items reacted with every test; however, the chemicals did. DNA was recovered and amplified from luminol, phenolphthalein, Hemastix, and Bluestar, but not from leuchomalachite green or Hemident."

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/m/pubmed/17209919/

Perhaps there is something in the main body of the work that the Machiavelli account will refer to for support.....or perhaps not.

It looks like he's already fallen back on the judge's intuition as a justification for a finding of blood.
 
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Originally Posted by Machiavelli:

Your demand is unjustified and wrong. You don't need to have a chemical proof of blood, in order to have evidence of blood.
Try to absorb the concept of circumstantial evidence, and quit asking for undue conditions.

-------------------------------------------

Anyone (including Italian judges) arguing the efficacy of the knife DNA, the bra-clasp DNA, and the hallway footprints being tracked in blood has an agenda other than justice being served . . .
 
Bill Williams said:
Sometimes it is useful to track a sub-thread, so as to see how things follow.

Kauffer wants to know why others refuse to accept that whatever it was that luminol detected, it is proven as "not blood" by a further specific-confirmatory test.

Machiavelli presumably then sneaks a point in under the radar that the confirmatory itself is not 100% accurate - therefore it could be mistaken. All true (Why this reasoning then is not applied to the luminol, that it, too, could be mistaken, is beyond me. Then again, Machiavelli's purpose here is to Bewitch, Beguile, And Bewilder like Pal (...)
Click to expand...

I didn't say that confirmative blood test result can be "mistaken", I didn't use this wording. What I said is that under certain conditions (such as high dilution, as there is evidence about this substance, independently from what substance the luminol prints are made of) an assumption should be made that the antibody confirmatory test allegedly performed on this case would yield a negative result, that means: under assumed conditions (latent traces, highly diluted) , confirmatory test may only confirm but not disprove.
This doesn't mean the result is " mistaken". It means it might have only be considered a confirmative test, not a potential disproval.
 
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sept79 said:
Originally Posted by Machiavelli:

Your demand is unjustified and wrong. You don't need to have a chemical proof of blood, in order to have evidence of blood.
Try to absorb the concept of circumstantial evidence, and quit asking for undue conditions.

-------------------------------------------

Anyone (including Italian judges) arguing the efficacy of the knife DNA, the bra-clasp DNA, and the hallway footprints being tracked in blood has an agenda other than justice being served . . .
Click to expand...

The following was posted by pmop57 on IIP. It may be relevant to your post.

"Why are the Prosecution and the Judges in this and other cases not interested in the objectivisation of collected evidence?
Analyses is based on obtaining objective facts (objectively of probative value in the sense to permit to confirm or reject theoretical hypothesis established by the Judiciary)!
The Judiciary clearly tries to avoid by all means this analytical objectivisation under the cover of "judicial" truth who by dichotomy is different from the "real objectivable" truth based on facts. It is mainly a confrontation about who has the absolute "regalia" about what is the truth and what not, a question of "absolute" power. The Judges are declared the natural heirs of the truth having no bindings to any contradicting opinions formulated by whomever, he is last instance of decision."
 
Bill Williams said:
Sometimes it is useful to track a sub-thread, so as to see how things follow.

Kauffer wants to know why others refuse to accept that whatever it was that luminol detected, it is proven as "not blood" by a further specific-confirmatory test.

Machiavelli presumably then sneaks a point in under the radar that the confirmatory itself is not 100% accurate - therefore it could be mistaken. All true (Why this reasoning then is not applied to the luminol, that it, too, could be mistaken, is beyond me. Then again, Machiavelli's purpose here is to Bewitch, Beguile, And Bewilder like Pal (...)
Click to expand...
Machiavelli said:
I didn't say that confirmative blood test result can be "mistaken", I didn't use this wording. What I said is that under certain conditions (such as high dilution, as there is evidence about this substance, independently from what substance the luminol prints are made of) an assumption should be made that the antibody confirmatory test allegedly performed on this case would yield a negative result, that means: under assumed conditions (latent traces, highly diluted) , confirmatory test may only confirm but not disprove.
This doesn't mean the result is " mistaken". It means it might have only be considered a confirmative test, not a potential disproval.
Click to expand...

I realize you did not use that wording. You have in no way shape or form demonstrated at any level of probability that the conditions of "high dilution", or any or conditions existed at that crime scene.

So in essence, this is what you are meaning in the absence of the conditions you claim.

You keep trying to "nuance" this into your pre-assumed conclusion by bringing in conditions/situations which are possible, but not at all demonstrated.

If nothing else documents like the Nencini Motivations Report come into exposure, because this is in essence his method, too. In other words, his motivations report is crap.

It is incredibly useful to line up the subthreads as they develop. It shows how you connect dots which are not there - and it also lets posters see the things you avoid. I think we're up to about six, things you simply will not return to.

But I'll bet all the money in my pocket that in Continuation 12 of this thread, you simply reboot.
 
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Chris_Halkides; said:
Machiavelli,

Wow, just wow. You just keep repeating the same words, as if they have not been refuted time and again. One, there is no reason to believe that the active ingredient in Comet cleanser deteriorates with time, as bleach does. Two, HemaTrace has been discussed in the forensic literature (for example, J Forensic Sci. 2014 Nov 18. doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.12663.). Moreover, the PG commenters here have been trying to argue that a crime scene is not the same as a scientific study; therefore, your line of attack would seem to be in contradiction to that line of thought. Three, I cited a study which gave a lower limit of TMB as 1 part in one million and luminol as one part in 5 million. Therefore, your claim is essentially that all of the stains fell into a narrow window between 1 and 5 million. What are the odds of that? And if that were the case, the luminol should have been barely visible, inasmuch as it is known that luminol give less chemiluminescence at higher dilutions.
Click to expand...

Indeed: I say exactly the same thing on this point, that luminol was found by multiple studies to be far more sensitive and nor specific than TMB and having the same false positives, "as if it hadn't been refuted", I say this precisely because it was not refuted. And it can't be refuted. You can't refute, as a matter of facts, that authors like Webb et al. and Tobe et al. made these findings.
The fact thar Quickenden, Creamer et al. pr others set higher or narrower theoretical limits, doesn't change a iota about the validity of those researches.

The content of those alleged cleaners is bleach. It is implausible not only because no instance or trace of the presence of those products was found at the apartment, but also because it is implausible that people walk barefoot in bleach; and even if they did so, it would be unexplained why there are only isolated bare footprints, not in a trail, instead of for example a messy set made of many trails, maybe in negative prints on a cleaned luminescent floor, and why only in that area of the house; and then, that would also leave the bloody prints unexplained or commend their explanation to an inconsistent scenario. Another element too, is that luminescent reaction from oxidants like bleaches are distinguishable from blood since their luminescence lasts for a much shorter time.

As for the soils: first things to say, also true for bleaches, is that metal salts dilutions in soils are reactive to TMB as well, something that anyway would demolish the pro- Knox TMB argument.
Second thing, it would be extremely easy for the defence to prove that soils around the cottage have this property. They didn't bring in this simple evidence.
Third, if it's something so common as soil, instances of it would be found about everywhere in the house, the more external areas in particular, there is instead a very limited number of instances, only in a certain area of the house but with a so peculiar distribution.
Fourth, if it was soil containing metal salts, you would find a lot of shoe tracks, coming from the outside, instead of naked footprints (which normally come from bathrooms). If the tap water contained reactive iron you would find thus evidence about everywhere, and you would also see the traces of rusty water with naked eyes since iron content used repeatedly tends to form visible traces.
Fifth, it dies not explain why these metal salts have the shape of one if Guede's shoeprint (the missing part of it, near Meredith's door).
Sixth, if doesn't explain as a probable finding the presence of mixed DNA of victim+suspect where none of them was supposed to be found, and dies not respond to the analogy with the bloody bathmat print.

So none of the proposed alternatives is plausible or strong compared to the incriminating indication.
 
Bill Williams said:
I realize you did not use that wording. You have in no way shape or form demonstrated at any level of probability that the conditions of "high dilution", or any or conditions existed at that crime scene.

So in essence, this is what you are meaning in the absence of the conditions you claim.(...).
Click to expand...

I often use the term "logical" to refer about a kind of inference derived from the facts that certain options admit only two values., A or non-A.
Some questions tend to take the shape of a dichotomy, a polarization. Like, if you assume that there was a negative TMB test result, and if, at the same time, you assume that there was not a high dilution, this necessarily implies that you are postulating a substance that reacts with luminol by not with TMB. So, you would actually need to have thus substance in mind, while you draw such scenario.
Now, it is a fact that no such substance is ever mentioned, there is no plausible scenari for it, and actually such substance is not known to science.
The conclusion is that only the "dilution" scenario is plausible.
 
The problem is that you are in effect arguing "It is blood" when there are numerous likely other causes. You want to put two people in prison for twenty-five years based on that.

In a science experiment, when only results are on the line, this would not be acceptable and you think that it should be acceptable for a court case. If anything, the margin for acceptability should be higher.
 
Bill Williams said:
I realize you did not use that wording. You have in no way shape or form demonstrated at any level of probability that the conditions of "high dilution", or any or conditions existed at that crime scene.

So in essence, this is what you are meaning in the absence of the conditions you claim.(...).
Click to expand...

Machiavelli said:
I often use the term "logical" to refer about a kind of inference derived from the facts that certain options admit only two values., A or non-A.
Some questions tend to take the shape of a dichotomy, a polarization. Like, if you assume that there was a negative TMB test result, and if, at the same time, you assume that there was not a high dilution, this necessarily implies that you are postulating a substance that reacts with luminol by not with TMB. So, you would actually need to have thus substance in mind, while you draw such scenario.
Now, it is a fact that no such substance is ever mentioned, there is no plausible scenari for it, and actually such substance is not known to science.
The conclusion is that only the "dilution" scenario is plausible.
Click to expand...

:jaw-dropp

It's hard to know what to say. This reasoning above is so totally warped as to defy a response.

Once again, for lurkers out there, it is perhaps best to try to follow this thread. Because here Machiavelli makes the claim that only the dilution scenario is possible.... with no evidence at all to suggest it was remotely actual.

It is sincerely hard to know how to respond to such crap. You wouldn't think that people's freedom was on the line. And add to this, this is "reasoning" completely foreign to the Mignini/Comodi case as prosecutors, the Massei Motivations report, the Crini case as a prosecutor, and the Nencini motivations report.

Why is it that Machiavelli believes these people who are one step away from having their own peculiar lunacy affirmed by Cassation.... why does Machiavelli think they need this kind of (absurd) help?

Actually, that should read "help", because airquotes are what is needed....
 
Machiavelli said:
you are postulating a substance that reacts with luminol by not with TMB.
Click to expand...

If this is such a remote and/or abstract possibility, why do crime labs routinely use TMB as the next step after luminol?

Your dispute is not with us. It is with the protocols and technologies used by crime labs throughout the world. Write your textbook, lay out your expertise, and get it through the peer review process. Then you will be better positioned to lecture us on forensic serology.
 
Bill Williams said:
But I'll bet all the money in my pocket that in Continuation 12 of this thread, you simply reboot.
Click to expand...


You loose that bet because Machiavelli for the last several pages has been running on write protected media. An honest poster would acknowledge the many arguments that destroy his favored belief. Machiavelli is incapable of pointing to specific references that support his beliefe because each one is faulty and by this time he should know it. But he persists in presenting his claims like for instance that Luminol is more sensitive than TMB which in fact it can be -- in perfect laboratory conditions if you happen to be wearing light amplifying goggles. Machiavelli however isn't wearing light amplifying goggles, he is wearing blinders. The conditions reported in this case, a strong Luminol reaction followed by a negative TMB recation and negative detection of DNA says that at least some of the tracts cannot be blood.

What gets me is why the prosecution even bothered to present the Luminol results. The Italian judges are aparently so gullible, the prosecution could have used Machiavellian logic and claimed that since there was a room covered in blood nearby it is possible and therefore probable that there would be bloody footprints left in the hall. Therefore the suspects must be guilty otherwise how could the footprints be explained.
 
Machiavelli said:
I often use the term "logical" to refer about a kind of inference derived from the facts that certain options admit only two values., A or non-A.
Some questions tend to take the shape of a dichotomy, a polarization. Like, if you assume that there was a negative TMB test result, and if, at the same time, you assume that there was not a high dilution, this necessarily implies that you are postulating a substance that reacts with luminol by not with TMB. So, you would actually need to have thus substance in mind, while you draw such scenario.
Now, it is a fact that no such substance is ever mentioned, there is no plausible scenari for it, and actually such substance is not known to science.
The conclusion is that only the "dilution" scenario is plausible.
Click to expand...


This is Machiavelli's old rusty argument.
 
Dan O. said:
You loose that bet because Machiavelli for the last several pages has been running on write protected media. An honest poster would acknowledge the many arguments that destroy his favored belief. Machiavelli is incapable of pointing to specific references that support his beliefe because each one is faulty and by this time he should know it. But he persists in presenting his claims like for instance that Luminol is more sensitive than TMB which in fact it can be -- in perfect laboratory conditions if you happen to be wearing light amplifying goggles. Machiavelli however isn't wearing light amplifying goggles, he is wearing blinders. The conditions reported in this case, a strong Luminol reaction followed by a negative TMB recation and negative detection of DNA says that at least some of the tracts cannot be blood.

What gets me is why the prosecution even bothered to present the Luminol results. The Italian judges are aparently so gullible, the prosecution could have used Machiavellian logic and claimed that since there was a room covered in blood nearby it is possible and therefore probable that there would be bloody footprints left in the hall. Therefore the suspects must be guilty otherwise how could the footprints be explained.
Click to expand...

If I remember correctly, the luminol gave a strong reading. Even if there was a difference in the ability to detect blood, you should not get a strong reading yet no reaction from TMB. If you got a weak reading with luminol, it might be possible but I should would not put somebody in jail for 25 years for that.

The court case was never about the evidence though but politics.
 
Greetings to all interested in another meeting of the Remedial ECHR Law Course.

CASE OF NATUNEN v. FINLAND 21022/04 31/03/2009

This case concerns drugs, guns, and telephone recordings; there's a violation of Articles 6.1 with 6.3b. Relevance to the AK-RS case: the suppression of evidence by police and prosecutor in their case is parallel to the destruction of evidence by police in Natunen.

Failure of the police to turn over the EDFs, for example, would be considered "refusal of facilities to prepare a defense", Violation of Article 6.3b.

To anglo and others interested - Please comment.

{excerpts follow}

7. The applicant was suspected of an aggravated drugs offence. On an unspecified date the public prosecutor brought charges against him and two other persons, L.J. and J.J. According to the indictment, the defendants had decided to obtain a large amount of amphetamine from Estonia. Between 28 and 29 September 2001 the applicant and J.J. made a trip to Estonia to arrange the purchase, acting on instructions from L.J. On 15 October 2001 the drugs, hidden in a truck, were brought to Finland by a fourth person. During this period the applicant kept in contact with the Estonian supplier by telephone. On 16 October 2001 the truck driver handed over the drugs to L.J. and J.J., who then hid them. Later in the evening J.J. returned for the drugs, as agreed with L.J. While J.J. was driving back to town, the police stopped and detained him and seized the drugs from his possession. In the meantime, the applicant picked up L.J. from a nearby petrol station.

8. Subsequently, all the defendants contested the above charge. The applicant denied any knowledge of the matter. He maintained that his trip to Estonia had only been for pleasure and that he had not received any instructions from L.J. relating to it. Nor had he kept any contact with the supplier. He further denied any knowledge of what had happened at the petrol station on 16 October 2001. Apparently all the defendants asserted that their collective enterprise had concerned a plan to purchase weapons and not drugs. {Import of illegal guns perhaps a less serious offense?}

9. On 1 February 2002 the applicant’s counsel sent a letter to the police inquiring whether all the telephone calls made between the three defendants by mobile phone had been included in the pre-trial investigation material. He also requested the police to confirm in writing that it was not possible to disclose to the defence the telephone metering information in the possession of the police.

10. In their response of 8 February 2002 the police stated that all the telephone calls pertaining to the investigated offence had been included in the pre-trial investigation material. The police further confirmed that the telephone metering information in their possession could not be disclosed as it was confidential.

11. The evidence obtained through telephone surveillance and produced before the court included 21 recorded telephone conversations and 7 recorded text messages between the defendants between 25 September and 16 October 2001, apparently all pertaining to the different stages of the alleged drugs offence.

12. On 14 February 2002 the Espoo District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) found that the defendants had planned to purchase drugs and had carried out the plan together. It convicted them as charged and sentenced each of them to six and a half years’ imprisonment. As to the conviction of L.J. and J.J. the court relied mainly on the testimony of the truck driver and the fact that the drugs had been found in J.J.’s possession. As to its finding that all three defendants had acted in concert in committing the offence, the court relied on information obtained through telephone surveillance. According to the court, the numerous recordings of telephone conversations between the defendants consistently showed that there had been a common understanding about the plan to obtain the drugs several weeks before they were delivered. Their co-operation had begun on 28 September 2001, at the latest, when the applicant had made a trip to Estonia with J.J. Since that journey they had been showing concern about the delay in the delivery. The court found the defendants’ account of the plan to purchase weapons unsubstantiated. The court also relied on the recordings in concluding that the applicant had participated in the actual receiving of the drugs just as actively as the other defendants, even though he had not been there to receive them in person.

13. The applicant, along with the other parties, appealed against the judgment to the Helsinki Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). In his letter of appeal he claimed that all that had been established beyond dispute was that he had made a trip to Estonia and that he had been in contact with the other defendants by telephone, but that did not connect him to the offence of which he had been convicted. The District Court had failed to specify which telephone conversations proved that he had been an accomplice.

14. In his subsequent additional submission to the court the applicant also requested that the public prosecutor be ordered to produce all the recordings of the telephone conversations between the applicant and other defendants, as they would reveal that the dealings involving the defendants had related to matters other than drugs. The applicant contended that only a fraction of all these telephone conversations had been included in the pre-trial investigation material, thus giving a misleading impression of the nature of their association. If the court were to refuse this request, the defence should at least be granted access to all of the recordings. {Relevant parallel alert!}

15. The court requested the prosecutor to submit a reply regarding, inter alia, the above request. In his reply of 12 June 2002 the prosecutor stated that it was not disputed that the applicant had been in contact with J.L. and J.J. by telephone also concerning matters other than the purchase of drugs. These conversations had not, however, been included in the case material and had been destroyed, as was required under chapter 5a, section 13 of the Coercive Measures Act (pakkokeinolaki, tvångmedelslag, Act no. 450/1987). Nor did the conversations in question, according to the prosecutor, relate to any other offence which would have allowed the police to keep the recordings without breaching the law. All the conversations that pertained to the matter had been retained, included in the case file and produced to the court.

16. Having regard to the prosecutor’s reply, the Court of Appeal did not render a decision on the applicant’s request. On 13 December 2002, following an oral hearing, the court upheld the applicant’s conviction. It increased his prison sentence to seven years.

17. In its reasons the court stated, inter alia, that, apart from the testimonies given by the defendants, there was no evidence to support the allegations about purchasing weapons. Furthermore, the court found the defendants’ testimonies regarding those allegations not credible. It also found inconsistencies between the applicant’s testimony and some of the telephone conversations, which had been played back to the court.

18. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) maintaining that his conviction had been based mainly, and in practice, on the courts’ false interpretation of those telephone conversations which had been included in the case file. The defence had never been given access to a large number of recordings which had not been included therein, although a request to that end had been made during the pre-trial investigation. He submitted as evidence the response given by the police on 8 February 2002. As the recordings were subsequently destroyed, the applicant had been denied the right to assess their relevance for his defence. The applicant renewed his contention that the recordings which had not been included in the case file would have shown that he had been involved with the co-defendants in a transaction not related to the purchase of drugs.

19. On 19 December 2003 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

.......
23. Section 1 of the Act on Public Prosecutors (laki yleisistä syyttäjistä, lag om allmänna åklagare, Act no. 199/1997) provides, inter alia, that it is the duty of a prosecutor to see to the realisation of criminal liability in the consideration of a criminal case, the assessment of the charge and the trial in a manner consistent with the public interest and the legal safeguards of the parties.

24. The same principle applies to the conduct of the police, which has the duty, under section 7 (1) of the Criminal Investigations Act (esitutkintalaki, förundersökningslag, Act no. 449/1987) to investigate and take into consideration the facts both for and against the suspect.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 3 (b) OF THE CONVENTION

25. The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) of the Convention that the proceedings had been unfair. The destruction of a major part of the recordings by the police had not been in conformity with the principle of equality of arms and had deprived him of the right to have adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence.

Article 6 of the Convention reads, in relevant parts, as follows:

“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

...

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

...”

26. The Government contested those arguments.

A. Admissibility...The Court notes that those complaints are not manifestly ill-founded....they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

2. The Court's Assessment

37. The Court firstly notes that the applicant’s complaints, as submitted in his application, only concerned lack of access to the totality of recordings of telephone conversations between himself and the other defendants, and not the telephone metering information obtained through the secret surveillance. Rather than a fresh complaint, his subsequent submission of letters relating to the facts of the case may be regarded as a response to the Government’s contention that he had not pleaded the relevance of the destroyed recordings to his defence until having submitted the letter of appeal. For this reason the Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government’s argument set out in paragraph 36 above. As to the other submissions of the parties, the Court states the following.

38. The Court reiterates that the guarantees in paragraph 3 of Article 6 are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial set out in paragraph 1. In the circumstances of the case it finds it unnecessary to examine the applicant’s allegations separately from the standpoint of paragraph 3 (b), since they amount to a complaint that he did not receive a fair trial. It will therefore confine its examination to the question of whether the proceedings in their entirety were fair (see Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 16 December 1992, §§ 33-34, Series A no. 247‑B, and Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28901/95, § 59, ECHR 2000‑II).

39. It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal proceedings, including the elements of such proceedings which relate to procedure, should be adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution and defence. The right to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal case, that both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party. In addition Article 6 § 1 requires that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defence all material evidence in their possession for or against the accused (see, mutatis mutandis, Rowe and Davis, cited above, § 60, with further references).

40. However, the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right. In any criminal proceedings there may be competing interests, such as national security or the need to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or keep secret police methods of investigation of crime, which must be weighed against the rights of the accused. In some cases it may be necessary to withhold certain evidence from the defence so as to preserve the fundamental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important public interest. However, only such measures restricting the rights of the defence which are strictly necessary are permissible under Article 6 § 1. Moreover, in order to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, any difficulties caused to the defence by a limitation on its rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, Rowe and Davis, cited above, § 61, with further references).

41. In cases where evidence has been withheld from the defence on public interest grounds, it is not the role of this Court to decide whether or not such non-disclosure was strictly necessary since, as a general rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them. In any event, in many cases, such as the present one, where the evidence in question has never been revealed, it would not be possible for the Court to attempt to weigh the public interest in non-disclosure against that of the accused in having sight of the material. It must therefore scrutinise the decision-making procedure to ensure that, as far as possible, it complied with the requirements to provide adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the accused (see, mutatis mutandis, Rowe and Davis, cited above, § 62)

42. More specifically, Article 6 § 3 (b) guarantees the accused “adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence” and therefore implies that the substantive defence activity on his behalf may comprise everything which is “necessary” to prepare the main trial. The accused must have the opportunity to organise his defence in an appropriate way and without restriction as to the possibility to put all relevant defence arguments before the trial court and thus to influence the outcome of the proceedings (see Can v. Austria, no. 9300/81, § 53, Commission’s report of 12 July 1984, Series A no. 96, and Moiseyev v. Russia, no. 62936/00, § 220, 9 October 2008). Furthermore, the facilities which should be enjoyed by everyone charged with a criminal offence include the opportunity to acquaint himself, for the purposes of preparing his defence, with the results of investigations carried out throughout the proceedings (see C.G.P. v. the Netherlands, (dec.), no. 29835/96, 15 January 1997, and Galstyan v. Armenia, no. 26986/03, § 84, 15 November 2007). {NOTE: THIS MEANS NOT MERELY ITEMS IN THE CASE FILE.}

43. Failure to disclose to the defence material evidence, which contains such particulars which could enable the accused to exonerate himself or have his sentence reduced would constitute a refusal of facilities necessary for the preparation of the defence, and therefore a violation of the right guaranteed in Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention (see C.G.P., cited above). The accused may, however, be expected to give specific reasons for his request (see Bendenoun v. France, 24 February 1994, § 52, Series A no. 284) and the domestic courts are entitled to examine the validity of these reasons (see C.G.P., cited above).

44. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the number of the destroyed recordings, or the contents thereof, cannot be verified from the material submitted. The Government have not, however, contested the applicant’s submission that the amount of such recordings was of some significance. Nor have they been able to provide any specific information about their contents.

45. As to the Government’s contention that the applicant had only pleaded the relevance of the destroyed recordings after having submitted his letter of appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court notes that under domestic law the Court of Appeal was empowered to consider questions of both fact and law, and it was still open to the applicant to request new evidence to be produced at that stage. Moreover, the Government have not argued that the requested recordings would, in fact, have been available in the District Court proceedings, any more than in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. The Court notes in this connection that, although the actual time of destruction of the recordings in question remains unclear, it had presumably taken place in the course of the pre-trial investigation. In this respect the Court refers to the relevant provision of the Coercive Measures Act in force at the relevant time (see paragraph 21 above). As to the Government’s argument that the applicant could have described the contents of the destroyed recordings, the Court considers that the applicant could not have been expected to announce his alleged involvement in a different offence, punishable by law, prior to any charges having been brought against him.

46. The Court reiterates that the requirements of Article 6 presuppose that having given specific reasons for the request for disclosure of certain evidence which could enable the accused to exonerate himself, he should be entitled to have the validity of those reasons examined by a court. Although the applicant, in this case, must have known the contents of the destroyed recordings, as far as they involved him, and even if he had been able to put questions during the trial concerning all of the conversations with the other defendants, the Court points out that the national courts did not find the defendants’ allegations about the purchase of illegal weapons credible, for lack of other supporting evidence (see paragraphs 12 and 17 above). Furthermore, the Court of Appeal did not refuse to order the disclosure of the requested recordings on the ground that the applicant had not given specific and acceptable reasons for his request. Instead, it declined to render a decision in that respect, as the recordings had been destroyed and could thus not have been disclosed to the defence or produced to the court (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above).

47. Even though the police and the prosecutor were obliged by law to take into consideration both the facts for and against the suspect, a procedure whereby the investigating authority itself, even when co-operating with the prosecution, attempts to assess what may or may not be relevant to the case, cannot comply with the requirements of Article 6 § 1. Moreover, it is not clear to what extent the prosecutor was, in fact, involved in the decision to destroy those recordings which were not included in the case file. In this case, the destruction of certain material obtained through telephone surveillance made it impossible for the defence to verify its assumptions as to its relevance and to prove their correctness before the trial courts.

48. The Court finds that the present case is different from, inter alia, Fitt v. the United Kingdom [GC] (no. 29777/96, ECHR 2000‑II) and Jasper v. the United Kingdom [GC] (no. 27052/95, 16 February 2000) where the Court was satisfied that the defence were kept informed and were permitted to make submissions and participate in the decision-making process as far as possible and noted that the need for disclosure was at all times under the assessment of the trial judge, providing a further, important, safeguard. In those cases the Court found no violation under Article 6 § 1 (see Fitt, §§ 48-49, and Jasper, §§ 55-56). The Court recalls that, in this case, the decision regarding the undisclosed evidence was, presumably, made in the course of the pre-trial investigation without providing the defence with the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.

49. In the present case the Court further notes that the contested measure stemmed from a defect in the legislation, in that it failed to offer adequate protection to the defence, rather than any misconduct of the authorities, who were obliged by law, in force at the time, to destroy the impugned recordings (see paragraph 21 above). The Court observes that in the Government Bill for the amendment of the Coercive Measures Act it was considered problematic that information supporting the innocence of the suspect could be destroyed before the resolution of the case (see paragraph 22 above). The relevant provision was amended with effect from 1 January 2004 with a view to better safeguarding the rights of the defence. This amendment, however, came too late for the applicant.

50. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention taken together with Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention.
 
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I think we should more directly address Mach'ss points rather than dismissing him.
1) Mach is correct that the a priori probability (i.e. the presence of blood in the flat) does make a difference to how likely it is that a positive Luminol result is a true positive vs a false positive. That is it is more likely a Luminol positive result in Knox's flat is due to blood than a Luminol positive result in Sollecito's flat. Where I think Mach is wrong is adopting an all or nothing approach that is when Mach thinks it is likely it is blood then it becomes blood. This is especially problematic when adopting an osmotic approach and combining with other evidence.

A second error I think Mach makes and we have discussed this before is that the negative TMB test adds nothing to the assessment, therefore there was nothing wrong in not reporting the results of the TMB test. From a legal basis, it is the job of the court to decide on the significance of evidence not Stephanoni, so the evidence should have been presented. Second as has been pointed out if the TMB two part test was carried out then it does add information. A direct response positively says that there is a direct oxidising agent present, if this is negative but the second part was positive then it is more likely it is blood, if both are negative then it may be very dilute blood or very dilute other substance giving rise to a false positive.

It may help to consider how dilute. Say a dilution of around 1:1,000,000. One drop of blood is about 1/20 ml. So we are talking about a dilution of greater than 1 drop of blood in 10l of water (about 2 US gallons I think). I certainly think this is compatible with Knox treading on the blood stained bath mat with wet feet (or the other faint blood stains in the hall), so even if we assume that this is dilute blood I think it fits best with an innocent explanation. The dilution is too great to be explained by direct exposure cf the blood stained shoe prints of Guede in the hall which were TMB positive. Another alternative is that the shower had been cleaned and Knox's feet were contaminated with dilute cleaning agent from the shower, or bathroom floor. Are there any pictures of the bathroom tested for the presence of blood that might show the wide spread presence of an oxidising agent?

One should also remember that the sensitivity of TMB is of the same order as PCR typing of blood stains, if PCR positive then the stain should have been TMB positive for blood, because far more haemoglobin which is what Luminol and TMB look for is present in blood than DNA, one can get positive results for Luminol and TMB at a dilution that is below sensitivity for DNA testing.

Finally on cannot assume that the ill defined marks found elsewhere than the hall are necessarily made at the same time as the footprints in the hall, or by the same substance.
 
Machiavelli said:
The papers I cited determined that luminol is more sensitive and more specific than TMB.

Whatever you cite or claim, you can't do anything against these studies. These are findings that are not going to disappear.

As for the last study involving lemon juice, you perfectly know that you cannot limit even the validity of that one to lemon juice.

As for HemaTrace: 1) it is not a scientific study, and 2) there is no implication, it is irrelevant as long as it is not proven that's a HemaTrace test was ever performed; beyond this, it is still impossible to find a plausible alternative which is the only determinant element; bleaches that you cite above are obviously not plausible.
Click to expand...


AAAAGHHHHH!
For (hopefully, if perhaps over-optimistically) the last time, those papers are comparing Luminol against the Hemastix TMB test - not the proper two-part TMB test. The proper two-part TMB test is in fact vastly more specific for blood than is Luminol (and Hemastix).

And (once more with feeling) the TMB test that's relevant to this discussion is the two-part lab test, NOT the in-field quick-and-dirty Hemastix test. The Hemastix test is an alternative to Luminol for a quick way to check whether a mark at the crime scene might be (or contain) blood. It's totally irrelevant to the issue under discussion here.

I realise it might be hard for some to comprehend, but here once more is what should be done (and what should have been done in the Kercher case): firstly Luminol is applied*. If this test shows a positive, then one either moves directly to a confirmatory test for blood (and DNA), or (in a more cost-effective approach) one swabs the Luminol-positive surface and conducts a two-part TMB test. The reason for doing so is to increase the specificity for blood: Luminol shows a lot of false positives for blood, nearly all of which can be identified by using the two-part TMB test. In essence, if the substance gives a positive in part one of the test (the application of TMB chemical alone), then the substance is not blood and the Luminol positive was a false positive for blood; if the substance shows a negative in part one (the TMB chemical) but then shows a positive once part two (the peroxide) is applied, then the substance is presumptively blood.


* that is, Luminol is properly applied in a light spray, not over-applied in a drenching of the chemical as practised by the morons who comprised the "crack" forensics team in the Kercher case.....
 
Specificity

Machiavelli said:
Indeed: I say exactly the same thing on this point, that luminol was found by multiple studies to be far more sensitive and nor specific than TMB and having the same false positives, "as if it hadn't been refuted", I say this precisely because it was not refuted. And it can't be refuted. You can't refute, as a matter of facts, that authors like Webb et al. and Tobe et al. made these findings.
The fact thar Quickenden, Creamer et al. pr others set higher or narrower theoretical limits, doesn't change a iota about the validity of those researches.

The content of those alleged cleaners is bleach. It is implausible not only because no instance or trace of the presence of those products was found at the apartment, but also because it is implausible that people walk barefoot in bleach; and even if they did so, it would be unexplained why there are only isolated bare footprints, not in a trail, instead of for example a messy set made of many trails, maybe in negative prints on a cleaned luminescent floor, and why only in that area of the house; and then, that would also leave the bloody prints unexplained or commend their explanation to an inconsistent scenario. Another element too, is that luminescent reaction from oxidants like bleaches are distinguishable from blood since their luminescence lasts for a much shorter time.

As for the soils: first things to say, also true for bleaches, is that metal salts dilutions in soils are reactive to TMB as well, something that anyway would demolish the pro- Knox TMB argument.
Second thing, it would be extremely easy for the defence to prove that soils around the cottage have this property. They didn't bring in this simple evidence.
Third, if it's something so common as soil, instances of it would be found about everywhere in the house, the more external areas in particular, there is instead a very limited number of instances, only in a certain area of the house but with a so peculiar distribution.
Fourth, if it was soil containing metal salts, you would find a lot of shoe tracks, coming from the outside, instead of naked footprints (which normally come from bathrooms). If the tap water contained reactive iron you would find thus evidence about everywhere, and you would also see the traces of rusty water with naked eyes since iron content used repeatedly tends to form visible traces.
Fifth, it dies not explain why these metal salts have the shape of one if Guede's shoeprint (the missing part of it, near Meredith's door).
Sixth, if doesn't explain as a probable finding the presence of mixed DNA of victim+suspect where none of them was supposed to be found, and dies not respond to the analogy with the bloody bathmat print.

So none of the proposed alternatives is plausible or strong compared to the incriminating indication.
Click to expand...

Just as a matter of honest posting, if nothing else, would you please cite directly from at least one of the studies you reference on the question of the relative specificity of luminol and TMB?

Where does it say that TMB is LESS specific than luminol?

Is there any specific further citation you can make from these authors' works to demonstrate that TMB is in connection with this case or otherwise, a redundant or unnecessary or non probative test.

Am I correct to think that you are not now claiming from these authors any citable support for your view that a positive luminol, negative TMB, absent confirmatory test permits a reliable conclusion that blood had been detected?
 
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Blood tests

LondonJohn said:
AAAAGHHHHH!
For (hopefully, if perhaps over-optimistically) the last time, those papers are comparing Luminol against the Hemastix TMB test - not the proper two-part TMB test. The proper two-part TMB test is in fact vastly more specific for blood than is Luminol (and Hemastix).

And (once more with feeling) the TMB test that's relevant to this discussion is the two-part lab test, NOT the in-field quick-and-dirty Hemastix test. The Hemastix test is an alternative to Luminol for a quick way to check whether a mark at the crime scene might be (or contain) blood. It's totally irrelevant to the issue under discussion here.

I realise it might be hard for some to comprehend, but here once more is what should be done (and what should have been done in the Kercher case): firstly Luminol is applied*. If this test shows a positive, then one either moves directly to a confirmatory test for blood (and DNA), or (in a more cost-effective approach) one swabs the Luminol-positive surface and conducts a two-part TMB test. The reason for doing so is to increase the specificity for blood: Luminol shows a lot of false positives for blood, nearly all of which can be identified by using the two-part TMB test. In essence, if the substance gives a positive in part one of the test (the application of TMB chemical alone), then the substance is not blood and the Luminol positive was a false positive for blood; if the substance shows a negative in part one (the TMB chemical) but then shows a positive once part two (the peroxide) is applied, then the substance is presumptively blood.


* that is, Luminol is properly applied in a light spray, not over-applied in a drenching of the chemical as practised by the morons who comprised the "crack" forensics team in the Kercher case.....
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Just so that everybody is clear, LJ, will you kindly lay out what testing that we know of was carried out? Which type of TMB test was used in this case?
 
Kauffer said:
Just so that everybody is clear, LJ, will you kindly lay out what testing that we know of was carried out? Which type of TMB test was used in this case?
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As far as I can remember, it doesn't say which specific test was carried out. However, as it happens, either way Stefanoni and her "crack" team are damned: if they did a Hemastix TMB test and got a negative, they did the wrong test and they were incompetent; if they did the proper, required two-part TMB test and got a negative for blood (which they then tried to withhold), then they are liars and cheats.
 
Kauffer said:
Just as a matter of honest posting, if nothing else, would you please cite directly from at least one of the studies you reference on the question of the relative specificity of luminol and TMB?

Where does it say that TMB is LESS specific than luminol?
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I believe that the Hemastix combined TMB test may be marginally less specific for blood than Luminol (that's to say that it has a slightly higher rate of false positives), but there's certainly not an order-of-magnitude difference between the two. That's why either can be used as a first-run test in the field.

But the proper two-part TMB test is hugely more specific for blood than Luminol. That's because the splitting of the test into the two parts (firstly the application of the TMB chemical, then secondly the application of peroxide) allows for all the false positives to be identified as such (if they produce a positive in the first part). If you get a negative in the first part followed by a positive when the peroxide is applied, then you can say with high confidence that you have blood. But still a confirmatory test is mandatory.



Is there any specific further citation you can make from these authors' works to demonstrate that TMB is in connection with this case or otherwise, a redundant or unnecessary or non probative test.
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If one defines "TMB test" as "Hemastix TMB test", then indeed following a Luminol positive with such a TMB test would be redundant. But if one instead defines "TMB test" here as "two-part lab TMB test", then such a TMB test would make perfect sense following a Luminol positive, since it allows for pretty much all false positives to be ruled in or out.

And of course that's exactly why the globally-recognised protocols dictate that a Luminol positive should be followed by a two-part TMB test, precisely in order to increase specificity for blood before costlier confirmatory or DNA tests are carried out.



Am I correct to think that you are not now claiming from these authors any citable support for your view that a positive luminol, negative TMB, absent confirmatory test permits a reliable conclusion that blood had been detected?
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No cite will be found for this view because it's false and scientifically illogical. None, that is, unless one erroneously defines "TMB test" in this context as "Hemastix TMB test" - but of course to do so would be to demonstrate significant ignorance of the topic :)
 
LondonJohn said:
As far as I can remember, it doesn't say which specific test was carried out. However, as it happens, either way Stefanoni and her "crack" team are damned: if they did a Hemastix TMB test and got a negative, they did the wrong test and they were incompetent; if they did the proper, required two-part TMB test and got a negative for blood (which they then tried to withhold), then they are liars and cheats.
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Agree with all of that. Unfortunately, Machiavelli account is effectively using the the gaps in the work of investigators against Ms Knox - reversing the burden of proof. What he simply cannot seem to understand is that a failure to confirm blood by testing cannot be twisted to mean that the absence of blood has not been proved and that therefore there remains circumstantial evidence for the existence of blood upon which a court may reasonably rely. It is outrageous.

This is a burden of proof question. We already know that even Italian law does not permit the use of circumstantial evidence that is not precise - in this case, the alleged circumstantial evidence of Ms Knox having committed the murder being that Ms Kercher's blood found in Ms Knox's bare footprints outside the bedroom is supportive of a finding of guilt despite there being no evidence whatsoever that she tracked the blood from the bedroom into the hallway.

P.S - surely it is known by someone here which TMB test was used?!
 
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