That can easily be remedied. However it does not require a definition because whatever it is, it is well known* to every one of us.
No, it isn't.
Many people claim that it is. That is not the same thing.
Thus the question really is about whether such examples of brain malfunction are evidence that either it is not there, or that there is no such thing. In either case they only confirm that the apparatus are not working through which the soul would manifest if it were fully operational.
No, the question is whether or not there is any evidence
for it.
There isn't.
Im not referring to your example, but your reliance on the words rational
Logical.
Not self-contradictory and/or possessing an actual definition.
So it's just a coincidence that metabolic life is present when consciousness is observed?
No. But there's a difference between being the thing most likely to produce consciousness outside of a laboratory setting and being the only thing that can do it at all.
Again, there is no reason to think that life is a prerequisite for consciousness, since everything that we have points to
brains being that requirement, and there is nothing in the definition of "brain" that requires organic origins.
Joking aside, you are asserting here again that self is a result of computation alone.
It's either computation or it's magic. Take your pick.
We have evidence of the one. We do not have evidence of the other.
Yes, I hope it is acceptable for me to refer to the general meaning of consciousness as self-consciousness.
There is no evidence that organic life is a prerequisite for self-consciousness.
Well, we can conclude this, but the proof is in the knowledge that other people are metabolic clones*, identical(almost entirely) to ourselves and that it is by knowing the self-consciousness in ourselves that we can then conclude that it is the same in other people.
Which is not proof. Regardless of metabolic composition, if you were handed a human who did not behave as though they were conscious (if, for example, they were in a vegetative state), you would not decide that they were conscious (or, rather, you would be wrong if you did).
"I am conscious; therefore, others like me are conscious" is not proof. The proof is in looking at others and seeing that they are conscious.
Incorrect, it is rational if one defines ones personal experience of being alive, starting from what one knows beyond any doubt and works out from there, i.e. The only thing we know for certain about our existence is our personal experience of being. Anything else we come to know may only be circumstantial to this and we may either be mistaken, or not able to comprehend any other aspects of reality. Also that the reality other than our personal experience of being, may be a deliberate construct, illusory, or a confection.
Then we have the
first problem of idealism, addressed in the same post. The only way to argue for such a position is to deny all possibility of evidence, which is irrational and untenable, as it crumbles as soon as you have any functional definition of "is".
Idealism is still not rational.
This is an assertion, there is anequdotal evidence of idealism
Anecdotes are not evidence. And I was addressing the first form of idealism, as above, which rejects all notions of evidence.
and I see no reason why evidence might not be presented in the future.
Until such a time as it is presented, idealism is irrational.
A caricature, it is well known that leprechauns are a human fabrication with a fairytale origin.
No, an
analogy. The fact that it is leprechauns specifically is irrelevant. The point is that, if all you're doing is saying "it looks in every way exactly like X, and there can never be evidence, even in theory, of it being Y, but it really
is Y", then you are committing the special pleading fallacy.
Yes p-zombies would be alive, but technically they have no requirement for self consciousness, all the processing required to be equivalent to a human could be computed unconsciously by the
P -zombie. Likewise any kind of AI.
No. That is the point. An entity which behaves exactly in every circumstance as though it is conscious
is conscious.
Saying "oh but it could all be done unconsciously" is incoherent. It is the same problem that the definition has.
This is an
actual case of claiming A AND ~A.
Yes, it is not idealistic in nature. But this is besides the point, the universe, or existence may be idealistic with the appearance of being materialistic
In which case belief in idealism is irrational and will always be irrational.
or our own incomprehension may bias us towards materialism etc.
In which case belief in idealism is irrational and will remain irrational until some evidence of idealism is put forth.
I do understand, fully, P-zombies can perform everything a human can do, while not being self aware. To illustrate I refer to Star Trek, Officer Data is an interesting study of a P-zombie, albeit synthetic. Also the Borg. Both fully capable of performing all that humans do.
Neither of these entities are p-zombies, even in-universe. Data is explicitly self-aware, conscious, and in possession of his own mind. He simply isn't human and lacks social protocols - arguably, the entire point of his character is showing that he is conscious.
The Borg, on the other hand, are a hive mind and are explicitly
not individually self-aware, save for the Borg Queen, who is. The rest of the Borg are essentially her limbs.
But it's all moot anyway, since they are fictional characters. Even if they had been explicitly labeled p-zombies in-universe, all that would mean is that the show writers had attempted to make use of an incoherent concept.
