Join Date: Oct 2006
I guess it's time to trot out Mike Williams's explanation of this silly non-controversy for--what?--the sixth or seventh time:
<< Why did the commission discount Mineta's testimony to such an extent that it wasn't even deemed worthy of a mention in the book? >>
The CTs would say because they were covering it up. Others might say because they thought it was incorrect. I've not done a piece on this yet because I want to present something more definitive than an opinion, but if you want some debating thoughts then maybe I can offer a little help. For example:
CT: blah blah... Mineta... Cheney... must have been a shootdown order... smoking gun.
You: But consider this CNN story:
After the planes struck the twin towers, a third took a chunk out of the Pentagon. Cheney then heard a report that a plane over Pennsylvania was heading for Washington. A military assistant asked Cheney twice for authority to shoot it down.
"The vice president said yes again," remembered Josh Bolton, deputy White House chief of staff. "And the aide then asked a third time. He said, 'Just confirming, sir, authority to engage?' And the vice president -- his voice got a little annoyed then -- said, 'I said yes.'"
Sounds very like the story Mineta told, except they're talking about Flight 93.
CT: Ha! But Mineta said this was happening at 9:26! Are you saying he can't tell the time?
You: Well, let's see what he said happened before this.
While Mr. Flaherty was briefing me, I watched as a large commercial jet flew into the second tower of the World Trade Center. At this point things began to happen quickly. I once more returned to the conference room and informed the minister of what had happened and ended the meeting. I received a telephone call from the CEO of United Airlines, Jack Goodman, telling me that one of United's flights was missing. I then called Don Carty, the CEO of American Airlines, and asked him to see if American Airlines could account for all of its aircraft. Mr. Flaherty reported to me that Jane Garvey had phoned to report that the CEO of Delta Airlines had called the FAA and said it could not yet account for all of its aircraft.
During this time, my office activated the Department of Transportation's crisis management center, which was located on the 8th floor at that time of the Department of Transportation headquarters, and provides for senior DOT personnel to conduct surge operations in a coordinated manner.
By this time, my office had contacted the White House. A brief moment later, the White House called my chief of staff and asked if I could come to the White House and operate from that location. I decided that, given the nature of the attack and the request, that I should be at the White House directly providing the president and the vice president with information.
When I got to the White House, it was being evacuated. I met briefly with Richard Clark, a National Security Council staff member, who had no new information. Then the Secret Service escorted me down to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, otherwise known as the PEOC. I established contact on two lines, one with my chief of staff at the Department of Transportation, and the second with Monty Belger, the acting deputy administrator of the FAA, and Jane Garvey, both of whom were in the FAA operations center. And as the minutes passed, the developing picture from air traffic control towers and radar screens became increasingly more alarming. Some aircraft could not be contacted. While on a normal day that may be just a communications snafu, we were faced with trying to quickly sort out minor problems from significant threats. We did not know how many more attacks might be in progress.
So Mineta saw the second impact and presumably spent a moment or two taking that in.
Then he returned to the conference room, told his visitor what had happened and ended his meeting.
Then he received a call from United Airlines.
Then he made a call to American Airlines.
Then he received information from Mr Flaherty.
Then he heard he had to go to the White House.
Then he left his building, got into his car, drove to the White House, went through security.
Then he went to the situation room for a quick word with Richard Clarke.
Then he was escorted to the PEOC.
Then he established two phone links.
And all this between, what, 9:03 and 9:26? That's quick work.
CT: But still possible.
You: Yes, but take a closer look at the above story, especially this: "When I got to the White House, it was being evacuated". When was the White House evacuated?
You: Let me help you: it didn't happen until 9:45 am (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&day_of _9/11=aa77). Yet Mineta's timeline puts this around 9:20. How is that possible?
CT: Maybe he was mistaken.
You: So you believe him absolutely on the time, and you trust his word 100% on the identification of Flight 77 (even though it appears from the testimony that this was just an assumption made after the fact). But you ignore his word on the White House being evacuated when he arrived, which would put it later. And you ignore the similarities between his account and someone else's, also later, but where they're talking about Flight 93. How are you deciding what's true and what isn't? Just the bits that match up with what you want to believe?
....etc etc etc.
You get the picture. The "Pentagon being evacuated" comment alone is enough to raise a question over Mineta's timeline, and as soon as the CTs start making excuses for that, it looks like they're picking and choosing the bits of testimony they want.