Well, since you ask, it appears to me to be a string of non sequitur arguments:
I'll add my corresponding statements in blue before your comments (in red):A large proportion of your body's matter is regularly replaced. Your body as well as your feelings, thinking and behaviour change a lot in the course of your life. Your psychological properties which are accessible to empirical research would have had a different development under different circumstances. Nevertheless you probably are convinced that you yourself were the baby with your name and that you would still be you yourself, if you had been kidnapped as a baby and brought up in an exotic culture.
It begins by arguing that much of the physical matter in our bodies is regularly replaced, yet we "feel" we are the same person, therefore souls. Uh, why? If I replace every brick in my house, one at a time, it will always "feel" like my house. So what?
Your logical comparison is quite revealing. You assume- a constant person ("I", "my")
- to a changing house belonging to this person and
- to the person's body (changing from birth to death).
You haven't answered this question: Would you still be you yourself (i.e the same experiencing subject), if you had been kidnapped as a baby and brought up in an exotic culture, yes or no?
It has obviously been possible to transform the consciousness of 'you' as a child, to the consciousness of 'you' as an adult, by continuous (small) changes. Do you assume that it would in principle also be possible to transform 'you' as a conscious subject, to 'me' as a conscious subject, by continuous changes? (A continuous transformation of your body, to a body identical to my body, by gradual changes is logically conceivable.)
Trillions of egg cells have been successfully fertilized during the transition from ape-like ancestors to us. In principle all these fertilizations can be numbered and we can attribute the number n to one having led to a reductionist R. R believes that the currently accepted physical and chemical laws are enough to transform a fertilized egg cell into a self-conscious person.
Nevertheless, the fundamental distinction between the fertilization n (and the body emerging from it) and trillions other ones remains a complete mystery to R. A reductionist explanation is impossible, because it would have to deduce this distinction from a material difference in the fertilized egg cells and such a difference is incompatible with the fact that for every reductionist another fertilization distinguishes itself.
Nevertheless, the fundamental distinction between the fertilization n (and the body emerging from it) and trillions other ones remains a complete mystery to R. A reductionist explanation is impossible, because it would have to deduce this distinction from a material difference in the fertilized egg cells and such a difference is incompatible with the fact that for every reductionist another fertilization distinguishes itself.
Then it says the consciousness which emerges from each fertilised egg somehow distinguishes itself from all other near-identical fertilised eggs, therefore souls (at least I think it says so, it's rather long-winded). Again - why does this present any kind of puzzle needing souls to explain it?
Without understanding and accepting the puzzle, an explanation obviously seems superfluous.From a purely materialist point of view, it makes absolutely no sense that you experience the world from your body and not from one of the many other bodies of the present, past and future.
The attempt to deduce individual consciousness from the fertilized egg cell leads to further problems. What I show here in the case of DNA is by analogy valid for the whole fertilized egg cell. In principle the DNA of one person can be continuously transformed into the DNA of another by small changes. Individual consciousness, however, is descrete insofar as it is impossible to imagine that the consciousness of one person can be transformed by continuous changes into the one of another.
Also the example of monozygous twins shows that a fertilized egg cell cannot be enough to determine individual consciousness. The twins originate from the same cell, but they experience the world as separate individuals.
Also the example of monozygous twins shows that a fertilized egg cell cannot be enough to determine individual consciousness. The twins originate from the same cell, but they experience the world as separate individuals.
Next it declares that since identical twins are born as two different consciousnesses, but have genetically identical bodies, therefore souls. That makes no sense at all unless you assume that consciousness does not arise from a brain's function but directly from an individual's genes. Who thinks that?
Try to understand the fundamental difference between continuity and discreteness (discontinuity).You didn't comment on this:
A most impressive refutation of reductionism represents a thought experiment. We assume a machine capable of producing copies of everything which do not differ physically and chemically from the original. According to consequent reductionism such a copy of you would be capable of surviving, and more importantly, it would not be distinguishable from you at all. The copy would have all your memories and properties and would believe like you that it is you. Not even the question whether you are the original or the copy would make any sense.
If we created such a copy of you, who would be 'you', you or your copy?For what follows I assume that everyone of us remains independently of the circumstances of one's life the same experiencing subject. This subject I call soul. The concept 'soul' abstains from age and current physical and psychological states.
Then it declares the author's definition of soul = consciousness (as far as I can tell). Unhelpful added confusion.
Instead of - This subject I call soul
- For such individually experiencing subjects to be possible, I postulate the existence of discrete undivisible entities, which we can call 'souls' (or 'psychons'). To each individually experiencing subject corresponds one soul.
Wolfgang
