Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Bob, there is no way for a single moving reciever to track multiple moving transmitters.

You will get a bearing am ow that "somewhere on this line" is what transmitted, but that's it. DF'ing without a second reciever will get you a bearing, more than one can get you an approximate location and three or more and make it very precise, provided you know very accurately where your receivers are. While not familiar with radio DF I am familiar with map resections and also with artillery sound ranging.

A single ship without multiple recievers isn't going to be able to get a resection on a moving transmitter. At best you'd get a series of bearings along which at some point would be your transmitter. Add in the course of the receiving station and the errors inherent in plotting your location at sea, and your DF guy's intel is at best potentially interesting, but certainly not definitive proof that there was something out there.

Aside from the technical issues you should consider the source of the material:

A. What training did the radio operator have with radio DF;
B. What equipment was there on the vessel; and
C. Are either of these going to provide confidence in the source?
 
This is not a serious argument. So you're saying the task force did not stop on 12/2? Are you aware that Yamamoto's Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 5 ordered the task force to advance to a "standby point" by 12/2 (12/3 in Japan)? What do you think a "standby point" is?

But let's assume that the task force disobeyed orders and did not "stand by" on 12/2: Would you be willing to allow that the task force at least markedly reduced its speed on 12/2 and began to bunch up, which even an experienced radio operator using DF bearings would reasonably interpret as a halt?

Of course, I did not say the "entire fleet stopped their engines and just floated around." Obviously, outer patrol ships would have kept moving. The fleet as a whole, however, could be said to have "stopped" at the standby-point.

Ships can't just stop and remain in one place at sea, not without anchoring which they couldn't do in deep ocean. If the fleet stopped it's engines it would not be able to steer. the ships would drift about and hit each other, turn broadside to the sea etc. If they were supposed to holda position they still have to keep enough headway to have steerage and keep formation.

Refueling at sea is done between ships on the move either by a line and hose trailed astern from the tanker or one slung between the ships on derricks. Two ships stopped dead in the water will drift and roll, they can't keep station unless they moor up to each other which with any kind of swll is impossible.

A site about Replenishment at Sea.

Techniques haven't changed since the 1930s.

http://www.toysoutofthepram.com/Replenishment_at_Sea/replenishment_at_sea.html
 
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I have been involved in my share of RAS. Fuel, Ammunition, Food and personel.
 
Another powerful item of evidence that Grogan was tracking the task force is that he quickly figured out that the repeat-backs could not be coming from Japan because they were 375 kHz low-power LF signals. Grogan knew that such signals could only propagate at night, which in turn tipped him off that the signals could not be coming from Japan because by that time Tokyo was in daylight when the Japanese ships he was monitoring had to be in nighttime. The signals were broadcast each night from 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., Hawaii time. Grogan therefore knew that the signals had to be coming from a location in the North Pacific that was under darkness at the same time the SS Lurline was under darkness.

Timothy Wilford discusses this point in greater detail in "Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth intelligence before Pearl Harbor," Intelligence and National Security, 17:4, pp. 150-152.
 
I have been involved in my share of RAS. Fuel, Ammunition, Food and personel.

I think I still have dreams where I am conning officer telling the lee helmsmen to drop 1 revolution or add 2, and have the helmsmen come right or left a degree. I've also been at the fuel receiving station, standing ready to get the first sample bottle and run it down to the oil lab.
 
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If you were tracking a ship moving away from you at 90deg, and the next day it had the same bearing, how would you judge its speed, or its location?
 
You must be kidding. Or you must be bluffing in the hope that I'm bluffing. When you take numerous DF bearings over the course of several days, of course you most certainly can get a good idea of the target's speed. And it goes without saying to anyone who understands even the basic of DF triangulation that you can determine with a reasonable degree of accuracy the position and course of the target--again, if you take multiple DF bearings over the course of several days.

Do us all a favor, if you could. Show us the geometry that could have been used to perform the HF/DF triangulation given the readings available, and include their measurement uncertainties. You can perform this using charts (current ones would suffice) and the techniques as they were known or trained to those receiving the signals and processing them.
 
You must be kidding. Or you must be bluffing in the hope that I'm bluffing. When you take numerous DF bearings over the course of several days, of course you most certainly can get a good idea of the target's speed.

If and only if you also know the target's range or course.


And it goes without saying to anyone who understands even the basic of DF triangulation

Well, there's your problem. You're not triangulating. You're attempting to fit a pattern of very poor quality bearings with three unknown variables.

that you can determine with a reasonable degree of accuracy the position and course of the target--again, if you take multiple DF bearings over the course of several days.

Put your money where you mouth is: tell me the course, speed, and range of the target in this situation: a ship is steaming north at 15 knots and takes a bearing to a radio signal bearing 090°. Six hours later it bears 090°. Another six hours later it bears 090°.



Again, you must be kidding. Talk to anyone who has done DFing in a tactical environment using pre-satellite DF equipment.

I have talked to someone who did it: me.

There are tens of thousands of us around still. The size of the target most certainly does matter when you're trying to obtain the target's position and track when we're talking about a multiple-vehicle/ship target when more than one of the vehicles/ships is transmitting signals.

The task force stretched over 300 miles during the day and some 90 miles at night. It is a whole lot easier to get a reasonably accurate composite reading on the target's location when the target's components occupy such a large area.

That is the exact opposite of the truth. You want clean, uncluttered bearings if you want to glean any useful information about a fleet's position and movement; the last thing you want are bearings jumping around all over the place. Like I said before, what a bizarre notion.



When I first did DFing in the Army

Yeah, I had already figured if you really had any DF experience it would have been land-based. Your entire exerience is based on using multiple non-moving receivers and you are trying to extrapolate your experience to the naval sciences and failing miserably.

was still using very old DF equipment (such as the very early versions of the TRQ system), which was not even as good as the equipment that Grogan and Asplund used.

Citation needed that a cruise liner had anything other than commercial radio equipment that was capable of anything other than the most rudimetary accuracy.

This is not a serious argument. So you're saying the task force did not stop on 12/2? Are you aware that Yamamoto's Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 5 ordered the task force to advance to a "standby point" by 12/2 (12/3 in Japan)? What do you think a "standby point" is?

We both know what a standby point is but one of us has no clue
what a fleet does when it gets to it. Hint: it's you.


But let's assume that the task force disobeyed orders and did not "stand by" on 12/2: Would you be willing to allow that the task force at least markedly reduced its speed on 12/2

I would be wlling to admit they slowed down to no less than 10 knots and drove racetracks. You don't slow down to bare steerageway and you absolutely do not stop except under the most urgent circumstances. "Speed is your friend", says every CO I've ever had. I think they teach that at CO school.

and began to bunch up,

"bunch up"??? Your expectations of how ships operate borders on the quaint. Did you learn about formation steaming while you were driving on the freeway? One ship slows down so all the other ships behind move closer until they're bumper to bumper?

which even an experienced radio operator using DF bearings would reasonably interpret as a halt?

No. An experienced DF operator would interpret it as a "loiter". When someone has a poor grasp of the terminology you can be sure they also have a poor grasp of the subject matter.

Of course, I did not say the "entire fleet stopped their engines and just floated around." Obviously, outer patrol ships would have kept moving. The fleet as a whole, however, could be said to have "stopped" at the standby-point.

Bwahahaha!
 
Another powerful item of evidence that Grogan was tracking the task force is that he quickly figured out that the repeat-backs could not be coming from Japan because they were 375 kHz low-power LF signals. Grogan knew that such signals could only propagate at night, which in turn tipped him off that the signals could not be coming from Japan because by that time Tokyo was in daylight when the Japanese ships he was monitoring had to be in nighttime. The signals were broadcast each night from 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., Hawaii time. Grogan therefore knew that the signals had to be coming from a location in the North Pacific that was under darkness at the same time the SS Lurline was under darkness.

Timothy Wilford discusses this point in greater detail in "Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth intelligence before Pearl Harbor," Intelligence and National Security, 17:4, pp. 150-152.

Kido Butai didn't transmit. So Wilford is wrong.
 
Another powerful item of evidence that Grogan was tracking the task force is that he quickly figured out that the repeat-backs could not be coming from Japan because they were 375 kHz low-power LF signals.

When some guy can figure out the transmitting power of an antenna at an unknown distance based on the received signal strength the Nobel Prize Committee would like to meet him.

"20 years of DF experience" my rear-end.
 
How about we talk about the bomb plot messages? Someone seemed to suggest that there was no important or unique intelligence in those messages and that therefore the fact that they were not relayed to Kimmel and Short proves nothing.

In point of fact, as even the majority of the Joint Congressional Committee grudgingly admitted, in the bomb plot messages the Japanese were asking for information about Pearl Harbor that they did not request for any other port: the majority conceded that "it would appear that Tokyo was manifesting an unusual interest in the presence of our Pacific fleet and the detailed location thereof in Pearl Harbor."

Indeed, no other American harbor was divided into subareas on a grid map by the Japanese, and in no other area did the Japanese seek information on whether two or more ships were alongside the same wharf. Matthew Pettinger says the following about the initial bomb plot message:

"However, the message also requested specifics about which wharves, buoys, docks, and anchorages vessels were located at, and distinct reporting when there were two or more vessels alongside the same wharf. This was a very unusual instruction, since the Japanese had not requested this specific information for any other region. As Admiral Kimmel would later testify, this specific intelligence order pointed only to one thing: an attack upon ships in port. Otherwise, this information was pointless and lost all value when ships moved in and out of port." (Held to a Higher Standard: The Downfall of Admiral Kimmel, Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003, p. 40, available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416925)

MacArthur's staff recognized the significance of the bomb plot messages, reaching the fairly obvious conclusion that they signaled that Pearl Harbor was being targeted for a bombing attack:

"It was known that the Japanese counsel in Honolulu cabled Tokyo reports on general ship movements. In October his instructions were “sharpened.” Tokyo called for specific instead of general reports. In November the daily reports were on a grid system of the inner harbor with coordinate locations of American men of war [i.e., battleships]. This was no longer a case of diplomatic curiosity; coordinate grid is the classical method for pinpoint target designation. Our battleships had suddenly become targets." (Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, pp. 88-89)

Quite a few senior intelligence officers and others in Washington recognized the importance of the bomb plot messages and strongly urged that Kimmel and Short be informed about them. Yet, despite their efforts, Kimmel and Short were never told about them. The two people who were mainly responsible for the failure to warn Kimmel and Short about those messages were Marshall and Stark. Indeed, in one case Stark personally intervened to prevent Captain Kirk (chief of ONI) and Captain Bode (chief of ONI's Foreign Intelligence Branch) from sending Kimmel a warning about the bomb plot intercepts.

Now, we can believe basically one of two things here:

One, the repeated refusals to warn Kimmel and Short about the bomb plot messages were all just unfortunate, egregiously wrong-headed mistakes.

Two, the repeated refusals were the enforcement of a policy to prevent Kimmel and Short from receiving any substantive, meaningful indications that the Japanese were seriously considering an attack on Pearl Harbor.

In my view, there can be no rational, plausible doubt that Stark and Marshall understood the implication of the bomb plot intercepts. Nor, in my view, can there by any rational, plausible doubt that Stark and Marshall realized that of course Kimmel and Short should be told about those intercepts immediately.
 
Kido Butai didn't transmit. So Wilford is wrong.

Then what other group of ships was in the North Pacific at that time using repeat-backs on a low-power LF at a specific time each night?

What other group of ships in the North Pacific at that time was trying to conceal its movements?

What other group of ships halted on 12/2 for whatever reason--or at least slowed down markedly enough to give the impression from DF bearings that it had stopped on that day?

What other group of ships, meeting all of the above criteria, would Grogan and Asplund have DF'd--from numerous DF bearings taken over the course of several days--as being in the North Pacific not far NW of Hawaii and heading east (and using at least one Japanese callsign)?

Furthermore, the Kido Butai did transmit. We have copies of two messages that were transmitted from the task force while it was en route to Hawaii (George Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth, p. 38).
 
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How about you try answering the bearing problem I gave you instead of trying to Gish Gallop? It should be a snap for someone who claims to have 20 years of experience DFing and who repeatedly claims you can determine position, course, and speed from bearings only.
 
Then what other group of ships was in the North Pacific at that time using repeat-backs on a low-power LF at a specific time each night?

What other group of ships in the North Pacific at that time was trying to conceal its movements?

What other group of ships halted on 12/2 for whatever reason--or at least slowed down markedly enough to give the impression from DF bearings that it had stopped on that day?

What other group of ships, meeting all of the above criteria, would Grogan and Asplund have DF'd--from numerous DF bearings taken over the course of several days--as being in the North Pacific not far NW of Hawaii and heading east (and using at least one Japanese callsign)?

Furthermore, the Kido Butai did transmit. We have copies of two messages that were transmitted from the task force while it was en route to Hawaii (George Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth, p. 38).

Bob, when are you going to own up to your gaffe about the Japanese fleet being 270 miles SE of Dutch Harbor? I mean, even you must realize how stupid that is, right?
 

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