Probabilities are pictures of uncertainty. We picture them informally as a percentage of belief that a certain proposition reflects fact. Slightly less informally we picture them as a number between 0 and 1 (just a percentage in proper fractional or decimal form) to which we can apply an algebra and a calculus that allows us to express complex relationships among uncertain values. In the full vista of that realm, the pictures of uncertainty are functions of one or more variables and methods of convolving those functions to produce, in the end, hopefully meaningful advice for how to behave in the face of the uncertainty they represent. We cannot resolve the uncertainty, but we can combine them in ways that let us reason about whether more or less uncertainty results from the combination.
Jabba is correct in trying to tell us that probability is inherently uncertain. The responses that tell him probability is necessarily still based on fact or involve fact are correct. But the dance that's being performed here is not as coordinated as all that.
The Bayes approach to probability is different in that it relaxes the rigor of measurement or simulation that would ordinarily build up the picture of some given uncertainty. Such as in the classic example of Bayesian search, we are allowed to quantify our expertise in a more nebulous fashion in selecting places we believe are most likely to to produce results, and then use actual search results to refine that expert opinion for what to do next. (Or, conversely, use the expertise to evaluate the strength of the search results.) But expertise in this example is still fact -- just not very articulable or otherwise quantifiable fact.
Bayesian inference may be used to reason in the face of uncommon uncertainty, but Jabba is doing it wrong. His approach is entirely uncertain. There are far too many degrees of freedom in the approach he's taken, and he knows it. Which is why he is so desperately trying to beg agreement on one point or another so that he doesn't have to justify the numbers he's simply pulling out of thin air. He wants to constrain his unbridled problem by tricking his opponents into not contesting the constraints he's simply applied arbitrarily.
But the most egregious failure on Jabba's part, in my opinion, is not that he is simply making up numbers. It is that he is proffering an inference as if it were a proof. Jabba is telling us that probability is not absolute as a way of excusing that he has nothing absolute on his side, and that he therefore needs to resort to a handwaving probabilistic argument rather than a factual one, not because it's appropriate but because that's all that's available to him.