Cheetah
Master Poster
When I make the statement "I think" or "I experience" am I invoking anything?
Can I make that statement without it being true, can you?
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Split Thread Science cannot explain consciousness, therefore....
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When I make the statement "I think" or "I experience" am I invoking anything?
Can I make that statement without it being true, can you?
Porpoise of Life
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Yes, you are assuming two things: that you exist, and that you are thinking. So you can't use those assumptions to prove your conclusion that you exist, since you already needed to assume they were true to be able to make your argument in the first place.
You can't, but something that isn't you, but only thinks it is you could.
If you're assuming that it's possible for our senses and thoughts to betray us to such a degree that all our experiences could be simulated by a brain vat, and that we have no way of determining whether or not the world as we know it is actually real... then why not also extend that doubt to your own thought processes? Why are those observations exempt?
Cheetah
Master Poster
That makes no sense, even if it's not me but only something that thinks it's me, it is still thinking.
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I have a set of behaviours which (at least at the moment) are only accessible to me. From birth I have been observing how other people act, and they seem to act or rather behave as if they have the same behaviours (broadly at least) as I have, therefore I assume they also have the same behaviours, and we all seem to agree to use the label "thoughts" for those behaviours.
Cheetah
Master Poster
How about "Darat has a set of behaviors" would that be true?
Only in the sense that a sunrise exists.
Language forces us down certain paths "Darat" meaning "me" (or to you "you") is a convenient label, but the label itself doesn't tell us anything and isn't important in understanding what "me" is.
I would argue there is no "physical" "me" - the behaviours of thinking are a process that occur pretty much entirely within the bag of chemicals we both label "Darat", with the large majority occurring within the few pounds of chemicals in my skull.
Think of it like a "run", you can see a person running but you can't point to an actual "run" and say "there is the run", it is a process (or behaviour) you observe which we have attached a convenient label to.
Cheetah
Master Poster
It seems you are saying that "there is a process that results in Darat", is this true?
Edit:
I must ask, is there any statement about yourself that you would consider true?
I'm fishing to find one, I might be wasting my time if there is none.
You must realist this is a life or death situation, literally, your very existence is on the line.
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No, nearer in folklore infused English - "Darat is a process".
Cheetah
Master Poster
Thank you, that helps.
I edited my post before seeing your new one, sorry.
I'm glad to see you exist.
I edited my post before seeing your new one, sorry.
I'm glad to see you exist.
Cheetah
Master Poster
I think this has come down to whether we agree that a "process" exists or not.
A process implies change and I don't believe that there can be any change without something to do the changing, whatever that "something" might be, whether it be immaterial or physical.
I therefore conclude that you, Darat, exist.
(but you might be immaterial, or only "think" you are Darat, or only be something "acting" like Darat)
You might disagree.
This has boiled down to the statement:
"Darat changes" or "I change" which I hope is true, I like it.
The conclusion drawn from this statement is that "Darat exists"
It is as good a place as any to start a philosophy from.
What do you say Darat, do you exist yet, at least in some unknowable form or other?
A process implies change and I don't believe that there can be any change without something to do the changing, whatever that "something" might be, whether it be immaterial or physical.
I therefore conclude that you, Darat, exist.
(but you might be immaterial
, or only "think" you are Darat, or only be something "acting" like Darat)You might disagree.
This has boiled down to the statement:
"Darat changes" or "I change" which I hope is true, I like it.
The conclusion drawn from this statement is that "Darat exists"
It is as good a place as any to start a philosophy from.
What do you say Darat, do you exist yet, at least in some unknowable form or other?
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David Mo
Philosopher
Let us be clear: I don't assume anything. I affirm that the language that actually describes human behaviour and mental activities cannot be translated into the language of neurology and much less into that of physics or biology (natural sciences) at this moment.
Physics and biology don't study the human behaviour as a whole. Psychology does it. To do this, it uses categories that are specific. Some are the outcome of nervous system research; others depend on observing human behaviour; others involve mental actions that are not directly observable.
Psychologists know full well that the latter cannot be translated into a physicalistic language, that is, limited to concepts of biology, neurology and behavioural observation. I asked you to present some research in this regard and, of course, you were not able to provide any.
Instead, you provide a text from a philosopher, Daniel Dennett, who is an expert in philosophy of language and a disciple of another language philosopher I know well, Gilbert Ryle. All my respects to them, but by quoting them here you agree with me. The problem of the relations between mind and brain is a philosophical problem, not a scientific one.
To clarify my position, I bring you a text by Dennett. As you will see it is not written in the natural science format and includes concepts such as "rejected as irrelevant by the agent consciously" that would not fit into a physicalistic language.
The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined, produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision. (Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, MIT Press (1978) Drawn from Wikipedia)
This fragment supports my main idea: the description of mental processes cannot be made in terms of the natural sciences now, nor is it predictable in the short term. Difficulties can be either surmountable or insurmountable. I have never stated the latter!
Tassman
Graduate Poster
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I am not talking about “behaviour. I’m talking about explaining the existence of ‘consciousness’...as per the OP. And I repeat, science can reduce ’consciousness’ to the neurological function of the brain and nervous system, because that’s all ‘consciousness' is. ‘Consciousness' is a part of our biological system and accessible, at least in principle, to examination by the physical sciences. Why would you think it is more?
There is no problem between the mind and the brain; this is your claim, not mine. Mind is what the brain is doing. You are what the brain is doing. I.e. you are the behaviours and knowledge generated by your brain, and you cannot be separated from that. There is no place for the logical incoherence of dualism.
So what "language" would it fit into, the NON-physicalistic language?
What is your point? The argument is whether or not in principle, the description of mental processes can be made in terms of the natural sciences. And there is no reason to think that it cannot.
David Mo
Philosopher
I can not discuss with you if you limit yourself to dogmatic claims (yellow highlights). You don't discuss my arguments and make statements without any justification. If they are your dogmas I cannot follow you.I am not talking about “behaviour. I’m talking about explaining the existence of ‘consciousness’...as per the OP. And I repeat, science can reduce ’consciousness’ to the neurological function of the brain and nervous system, because that’s all ‘consciousness' is. ‘Consciousness' is a part of our biological system and accessible, at least in principle, to examination by the physical sciences. Why would you think it is more?
There is no problem between the mind and the brain; this is your claim, not mine. Mind is what the brain is doing. You are what the brain is doing. I.e. you are the behaviours and knowledge generated by your brain, and you cannot be separated from that. There is no place for the logical incoherence of dualism.
So what "language" would it fit into, the NON-physicalistic language?
What is your point? The argument is whether or not in principle, the description of mental processes can be made in terms of the natural sciences. And there is no reason to think that it cannot.
And even less if you order by decree what is the issue and how it has to be faced (underlined).
Excuse me but if there are a lot of books and articles and diverse theories about the relation between mind and brain there is a problem whether you want admit it or not.
Now your questions:
Brain research is not the only alternative to construct a scientific-empirical knowledge of mind. From the times of John B. Watson and before, behaviourism has tried to develop a scientific theory of human behaviour only on the basis of observation and experiment. The most qualified theorist of behaviourism, F.B. Skinner, rejected mental concepts and tried to explain the behaviour in terms of conditioned reflexes. Almost a century has past and this effort has revealed to be fruitful but impossible. Psychologist continue to use mental concepts that now are called by many “cognitive”.
The decade of 1990 was called “the brain decade” because of the strong impulse of brain research. This fostered the illusion that a complete description of human behaviour —mind included— was possible in terms of brain impulses in a few years. Almost forty years after the project has revealed to be fruitful but impossible. Even neuroscientists continue to use mental-cognitive concepts in their researches.
The reduction of mind to strict scientific concepts is nowadays factually impossible. Beliefs in a like natural sciences language in psychology are only a project without end date. The belief that someday what we call “problems of mind” would be solved in a scientific way is legitimate but it is only a belief in a project. Turning it into a certainty is a philosophical dogma. The dogma of positivism that you defend so dogmatically.
My own position:
The inclusion of non-experimental concepts in psychology is not a theory, it is a fact. You can test it if you read scholar articles on the issue. Materialists have to recognize it to avoid the positivist dogma. And this is not a simple problem of language. If you want to reduce mind to brain, you have to construct a language where mind-concepts were translated in mathematic-empirical concepts. This is the physicalist language. Even Dennett, that you quoted as an authority in the matter, was not able to do so.
In the perhaps provisional failure to construct a physicalist language maybe there are impossibilities by principle. I don’t know. But before to go to the metaphysical problem of mind, either to defend or attack it, we need to clarify what is the current situation and draw the correct conclusions. Claims of faith in a sense or another don’t clarify anything.
I never wrote a so long comment in this forum. I would like you appreciate my effort.
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Here is an interesting, if somewhat semantically convoluted, article/discussion, of what some modern-day philosophers say is wrong with the BIV argument … much of which turns out to be very similar to what I have argued throughout this thread -
http://www.iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
If anyone here troubles to read that link and finds the language impenetrable (as it in fact is … since imho it's dense concentration of semantics and philosophy-speak/babble risks a confusion of covering-up, hiding, or obscuring all sorts of problems with it's arguments, then the link below is essentially the exact same discussion but in much clearer language -
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-content-externalism/
One thing that people should notice from both articles, is just how often they have to say that the arguments are actually about semantics, the use of words and language, and actually arguments largely about the meaning of certain selective words and phrasing in different contexts/situations.
However, here is the concluding paragraph from the Stamford article -
Conclusion
The brain-in-a-vat hypotheses are crucial for the formulation of skeptical arguments concerning the possibility of knowledge of the external world that are modelled on the Cartesian Evil Genius argument. We have seen that the BIV hypothesis may well be refutable, given semantic/content externalism and given the assumption that one has a priori knowledge of some key semantic properties of one's language (or, alternatively, a priori knowledge of the contents of one's mental states). Even if Putnamian arguments fail to rule out all versions of the brain-in-a-vat hypotheses, their success against the radical BIV hypothesis would be significant. Further, these arguments highlight a novel view of the relations between mind, language, and the external world.
I am not saying that I agree with Putnam's way of “debunking” the BIV claim, because apart from anything else, as always in philosophy (it seems to me) it is made too opaque and at risk of mistaken and misunderstood confusions by it's highly semantic nature. However, the conclusion above is clear in saying that “the BIV argument may well be refutable” and that “Even if Putnamian arguments fail to rule out all versions of the brain-in-a-vat hypotheses, their success against the radical BIV hypothesis would be significant.”
IOW, far from being :”unassailable” and of “impeccable” logic or reasoning etc., the conclusion is that even modern-day philosophers themselves now accept that the BIV argument is probably quite seriously flawed and not nearly as sound as it was once claimed to be.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
If anyone here troubles to read that link and finds the language impenetrable (as it in fact is … since imho it's dense concentration of semantics and philosophy-speak/babble risks a confusion of covering-up, hiding, or obscuring all sorts of problems with it's arguments, then the link below is essentially the exact same discussion but in much clearer language -
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-content-externalism/
One thing that people should notice from both articles, is just how often they have to say that the arguments are actually about semantics, the use of words and language, and actually arguments largely about the meaning of certain selective words and phrasing in different contexts/situations.
However, here is the concluding paragraph from the Stamford article -
Conclusion
The brain-in-a-vat hypotheses are crucial for the formulation of skeptical arguments concerning the possibility of knowledge of the external world that are modelled on the Cartesian Evil Genius argument. We have seen that the BIV hypothesis may well be refutable, given semantic/content externalism and given the assumption that one has a priori knowledge of some key semantic properties of one's language (or, alternatively, a priori knowledge of the contents of one's mental states). Even if Putnamian arguments fail to rule out all versions of the brain-in-a-vat hypotheses, their success against the radical BIV hypothesis would be significant. Further, these arguments highlight a novel view of the relations between mind, language, and the external world.
I am not saying that I agree with Putnam's way of “debunking” the BIV claim, because apart from anything else, as always in philosophy (it seems to me) it is made too opaque and at risk of mistaken and misunderstood confusions by it's highly semantic nature. However, the conclusion above is clear in saying that “the BIV argument may well be refutable” and that “Even if Putnamian arguments fail to rule out all versions of the brain-in-a-vat hypotheses, their success against the radical BIV hypothesis would be significant.”
IOW, far from being :”unassailable” and of “impeccable” logic or reasoning etc., the conclusion is that even modern-day philosophers themselves now accept that the BIV argument is probably quite seriously flawed and not nearly as sound as it was once claimed to be.
Cheetah
Master Poster
Thanks Ian, I had a look.
A lot of "may be refuted" ans "apparently refuted".
I'll have to try again, but I don't understand.
I have to read everything 5 times to get it and by then I forgot the previous thing I was supposed to remember. I gave up, same reason I don't read philosophy books.
Can you give a summary of how BIV is possibly refuted? What is the angle of attack?
Just the basic concept.
Thanks
A lot of "may be refuted" ans "apparently refuted".
I'll have to try again, but I don't understand.
I have to read everything 5 times to get it and by then I forgot the previous thing I was supposed to remember. I gave up, same reason I don't read philosophy books.
Can you give a summary of how BIV is possibly refuted? What is the angle of attack?
Just the basic concept.
Thanks
David Mo
Philosopher
Excuse me, but Tony Brueckner (Univ. of California) is not "modern-day philosophers". You have quoted a particular assessment of the problem without understand his arguments.
Tassman
Graduate Poster
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My “dogma” as you put it, is that there is no distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘brain’. You insist on referring to them as separate entities. The argument is whether or not in principle, the description of mental processes can be made in terms of the natural sciences. There is no reason I can see to think that it cannot. But if, as you posit, it cannot, there is no other means of investigation open to us. Metaphysics cannot do it; it has no means of testing the truth of its premises.
I repeat, I’m not talking about behaviour, this is the province of psychology and the other social sciences. I’m talking about ‘consciousness’ i.e. the self-awareness of the higher creatures such as the primates...including humans...and certain other animals.
You continue to posit the ‘mind’, i.e. the process of thinking, feeling and perceiving, as a separate entity from the brain. It is not. This is dualism and dualism poses enormous problems at the level of the supposed nexus between the material brain and the hypothetical mind/soul. No matter what the problems, one needs to limit the investigation of the brain and its flowering of consciousness among some creatures, as a problem to be resolved by the physical sciences. There is no alternative.
Cheetah
Master Poster
IansS, that does not seem to have anything to do with what I was explaining, here is my logic:
Think of this as a "thought expariment"
Given: The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person.
Conclusion: It can't tell whether it's a BIV or a real person.
That is all I was talking about.
Find fault with my logic.
Would you pleas explain what your post has to do with my point.
Think of this as a "thought expariment"
Given: The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person.
Conclusion: It can't tell whether it's a BIV or a real person.
That is all I was talking about.
Find fault with my logic.
Would you pleas explain what your post has to do with my point.
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I can. But I do not think I should do that. Do you want an explanation as to why I think I should leave that to each reader themselves?
Incidentally re the complaint that Tony Bruekner (who apparently wrote that summarising BIV article that I linked from Stamford) quote “is not a modern-day philosopher”, he (Tony Brueckner) apparently died on 7th April 2014 … here is a brief statement about his death from the Chancellor of the Univ. of California -
https://chancellor.ucsb.edu/memos/?4.16.2014.Sad.News...Professor.Anthony.Brueckner
Opening extract (just to save one dissenter here from even the most minimal task of lifting his finger to click a link and check a few short sentences) -
April 16, 2014
TO THE CAMPUS COMMUNITY Office of the Chancellor University of California, Santa Barbara
Dear Colleagues:
It is with great sorrow that I write to share with you the regrettable news that our colleague Anthony Brueckner, professor of philosophy, passed away April 7 at home with his family.
Dr. Brueckner joined our campus as a visiting associate professor in 1987 after having taught at Yale University and, briefly, at the University of Arkansas. He was a tireless and admired colleague, and served as chair of our Department of Philosophy for four years.
….
…. etc,
Sincerely,
Henry Yang Chancellor
Disclaimer - I had never heard of Tony Bruckner, because I really have no interest in what philosophy academics may say.
https://chancellor.ucsb.edu/memos/?4.16.2014.Sad.News...Professor.Anthony.Brueckner
Opening extract (just to save one dissenter here from even the most minimal task of lifting his finger to click a link and check a few short sentences) -
April 16, 2014
TO THE CAMPUS COMMUNITY Office of the Chancellor University of California, Santa Barbara
Dear Colleagues:
It is with great sorrow that I write to share with you the regrettable news that our colleague Anthony Brueckner, professor of philosophy, passed away April 7 at home with his family.
Dr. Brueckner joined our campus as a visiting associate professor in 1987 after having taught at Yale University and, briefly, at the University of Arkansas. He was a tireless and admired colleague, and served as chair of our Department of Philosophy for four years.
….
…. etc,
Sincerely,
Henry Yang Chancellor
Disclaimer - I had never heard of Tony Bruckner, because I really have no interest in what philosophy academics may say.
Given: The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person.
Conclusion: No meaningful distinction can be made between the "vat" and its supporting equipment, and a real world. Of course the BIV can't tell whether it's a BIV or a "real person," because there's no difference between those two possibilities.
(To make such a distinction, we would have to add to the thought experiment some additional entity, which can observe the 'actual' situation 'objectively' and say e.g. "that's a brain in a vat!" But to posit those capabilities of that entity introduces a contradiction: how can that entity be certain it's observing anything real, if the BIV cannot be?)
Frank Newgent
Philosopher
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Cheetah
Master Poster
David Mo
Philosopher
It depends of the sense of “to test”. If you adopt the strong concept of the philosophical positivism I am afraid you will need some metaphysical concepts referred to subjective states of mind. If that comforts you, I will tell you that adopting certain "metaphysical" concepts does not imply to accept dualism or idealism.
Psychology also studies consciousness.
Your mistake: solipsism is not a dualism, it is a monist idealism. The solipsist doesn’t claim for two different and separate things. He is a monist. Only ideas in my mind exist. Terefore the problems of dualism do not affect him.
Do you mean to say that the article (links posted above) does not have anything to do with what your were saying? Is that what you say?
Well that would of course be wrong. It has everything to do very exactly with what you have assumed/claimed for a BIV … in particular, when you say “The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person”, the article explains how Putnam's “proofs” (these are what philosophy calls “proof”) show that the BIV cannot in fact have the same experience as a human brain functioning in a real body …
… but as I just said to you – you must read the article and understand it for yourself, rather than trying to get me explain it to you. Read the article (enough times until you know why it says that BIV is now widely agreed to be very probably, or at least quite likely, wrong).
Tassman
Graduate Poster
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“To test” in this context refers to being able to show the premise of a metaphysical argument to be true. Axioms, which often act as metaphysical premises, are assumed to be true but they cannot be shown to be true. Hence you cannot show that the conclusion of a metaphysical argument is true.
Psychology studies the behaviour of conscious entities, not consciousness itself.
So what’s all this talk about the “problem between mind and brain”? Either the mind is separate from the brain, which is dualism, OR the “mind” is reducible to the neurological function of the brain and nervous system as I’ve argued previously.
Cheetah
Master Poster
Yes IanS, that is what I'm saying, I was quite clear.
In the BIV I was explaining and linked to, the part you highlighted:
"The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person" is indeed a given, it is part of the thought experiment.
What is your problem with that exactly? It is a thought experiment after all?
In any case...
Putnam's argument.
You seem to say that you understand his argument and agree with it.
Here: BIV
That seems to be the consensus.
You might be one of few people who understand his argument and agree, I don't know.
I certainly don't understand it.*
What do you think it actually means?
I there really an experiment I can do to make sure I'm not a BIV?
How does the experiment work?
* Honestly I didn't really try. I just read enough to confirm that it does not pertain to what I was explaining.
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David Mo
Philosopher
All right. According you if you are unable to prove that impressions are caused by external world you are not saying the truth. You cannot prove it. Therefore you are not saying the truth.
I think it would be better to search for a less drastic criterion of truth. Perhaps your concept of truth is useful in natural sciences but it is not operational in the study of consciousness.
For example:
Truly? And what have to be done with all this?
https://philpapers.org/browse/attention-and-consciousness-in-psychology
It is amazing that you have not understand yet that solipsism is not a dualism.
I have not seen any “argument” of yours about the “reducible” mental features. You only announce your particular beliefs.
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Belz...
Fiend God
I'd say no, myself. I'd expect any simulation, dream or delusion to contain inconsistencies. If there are no inconsistencies, then it is indistinguishable from an external reality and therefore for all intents and purposes IS an external reality.
David Mo
Philosopher
Putnam's argument is a petitio principi made by a second-rate philosopher. Don't overstate his contribution.
David Mo
Philosopher
I correct your sentence:
If there are no inconsistencies between ideas and external facts, then external facts are indistinguishable from ideas and therefore for all intents and purposes external reality is an idea.
Do you see the difference? If you claim that an external reality is different from an idea you have to show what that difference is, which is impossible. Therefore external reality is just an idea.
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Belz...
Fiend God
That might fly in a first year philosophy class but you won't get that by me. You added a new element to the first bolded part and then pretended to make a point with it. But there is no point, since to me consistency IS the distinguishing factor. Your version makes no sense under that.
RecoveringYuppy
Penultimate Amazing
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But there is no difference in the consistency.
Belz...
Fiend God
Not sure what you're saying here but 1) Everything I know for a fact happens within my mind or is unreal is inconsistent, while everything that appears to be real and outside my mind is consistent. I consider that to be a reasonable standard for determining what's real and 2) If the simulation were entirely, 100% consistent, then there's no way to tell the difference anyway and thus it's entirely reasonable to treat it as if it were reality.
We've moved on from solipsism precisely because of this sort of thing.
There is no frame of reference where one can claim this occurred inside the mind, and that occurred outside the mind. Everything we've ever experienced and known has occurred in the mind . . . and even this expression is an artifact of language, who don't know any inside or outside the mind. This is not saying that reality is only in or of our limited mind . . . this would be solipsism.
Belz...
Fiend God
There absolutely is and I just provided it to you.
Are you saying the mind is the frame of reference for determining what is outside and inside the mind? It's impossible to know or experience anything outside the mind.
Frank Newgent
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Curious why you think this begs the question.
If we are brains in a vat, then the statement "we are brains in a vat" refers not to actual physical vats but vat-dream vats. The statement would be false.
Only if we are not brains in a vat would the statement "we are brains in a vat" refer to actual physical vats.
Cheetah
Master Poster
Yes.
I'd say, it depends on the technology sustaining the brain. A real brain in a real vat might well experience "glitches in the matrix."
But that is beside the point. If I said:
"If you hopped on a moonbeam all the way to TRAPPIST-1, spent a day sightseeing and then caught a moonbeam back home, you will only be a way for a day but on earth 80 years and a day will have passed"
What will be the value in pointing out "you can't hop on a moonbeam", "TRAPPIST-1 is 39.6 ly away, not 40" etc.
That is irrelevant to the point I was making (relativity), it's a thought experiment.
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