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Some observations on the problem of evil

OK, so as I suspected, you are defining "pleasure" as gratuitous pleasure
No, I am defining pleasure as pleasure. You are defining pleasure as "less suffering". So why don't you define suffering as "less pleasure"?

I don't know what could be meant by gratuitous pleasure. What would non-gratuitous pleasure be like?
... and you are definining "pain" as severe pain.
We are discussing the concept of "suffering" aren't we? No, I am not talking paper cuts or playful pinches. I would more likely refer to that as "a sting" rather than pain. What on earth would lead you to think that I was discussing mild discomfort?
In other words, you are defining the situation in such a way that the good will never outweigh the bad.
Absolutely not. I would have thought that in a discussion that it would be pretty obvious that pain does not mean "mild discomfort" and pleasure does not mean "less suffering". It is you that are trying to blur the lines.
If that's a condition of your question, then yes I agree that according to the moral code I've posted previously, ...
I missed the moral code you posted. All I saw was the bit about weighing up the foreseeable good and bad consequences. As I said a moral code must include the principles by which you determine whether a consequence is good or bad.
...it would never be acceptable for human pleasure to be the sole purpose of inflicting pain because the forseeable good could never outweigh the forseeable bad.
"human pleasure"? Thought you'd just sneak that one in did you? So you still think it is possible that God's pleasure might justify him inflicting suffering?
That said, I have never been starving myself, but I would guess that a person who hasn't eaten for several days would find eating to be extremely pleasurable.
The most I have gone without food was two days, I don't consider that starving but no, my first meal was not pleasureable - I don't think I tasted it.

I believe that starving people often have great trouble starting to eat again. I have heard that a lone yachtsman who was dismasted went without food for several days and when a fish landed on deck he ate it in one without remembering anything of the taste. I doubt a steak diane in that situation would be remembered either.
 
We can assume that God’s actions are always for the greater good, but why assume that God also ensures that our actions are for the greater good?

I didn't say that our actions are always for the greater good. I said that God can assure that our actions cannot undo the greater good that he does.

Why assume that God ensures that our actions cannot prevent the greater good?

You will have to justify this step.

No offence to your list, but my man can hardly take it for the infallible word of God can he?

I wouldn't expect your man to, but he must assume that an omnibenevolent God would ensure that any action that is taken must result in a greater good. That would preclude God from allowing anyone to undo that greater good by subsequent actions.

You would have to amend your list to include the possibility that the suffering does not concern anyone else but God and the sufferer. Otherwise you are only considering one case out of many.

The list was an example to answer your question of how God could achieve the greater good without bystanders being able to undo it by acting to help the sufferer. That would necessitate at least two people plus God being involved. The list wasn't meant to demonstrate every possibility, but only the specific one you asked about. If you wish to discuss some other example then we may do so, but first let's get past this one.

All his actions are based on logic derived from the definition of God.

He knows that the suffering is a greater good since it follows logically from the definition of omnibenevolence that God would not permit intense suffering unless by preventing it he would be preventing a greater good or permitting a greater evil.

I cannot parse this last sentence.

So he knows the suffering is a moral good, but he knows nothing else.

He also knows that if God is omnibenevolent that God would ensure that the greater good cannot be undone by him.

I will get it if you show the reasoning. I will not get it if you just assert it as a truth.

I have. It would follow that if God is omnibenevolent the greater good must be achieved. It would follow that if God is omnipotent, he can ensure that the greater good is achieved and preclude anyone from undoing the greater good.

Omnibenevolence does not imply that God will ensure that your actions will always lead to the greater good.

Correct, but it does imply that his actions will always lead to the greater good, which would mean that he must ensure that your actions cannot undo the greater good achieved by his actions. This concept really isn't that difficult to understand, so I blame myself for not being more clear when I explained it previously.

Our man has to know which action will help. If he sees one man with a knife trying to cut another man’s throat he might be seeing a murder happen or he might be seeing a doctor performing an emergency tracheotomy.

If he disarmed the man with the knife he might be helping or hindering depending on the situation.

If I see someone wrestle someone else to the floor and put him in a headlock, I don’t know whether I have seen an act of aggression or an act of self defense.

Absolutely. In order to determine any moral course of action, we have to weigh all possibilities when acting or not acting. This is a fascinating example of a moral dilemma, but has little to do with your question, and I'd prefer to wait to discuss it until we've finished with your initial one.

When he sees intense suffering he can conclude that it is a moral good sanctioned by God, but nothing else whatsoever. He cannot assume that the suffering concerns him in any way. He cannot assume that alleviating it is the good action.

Wrong. If God is omnibenevolent, then he can assume that alleviating the suffering (if he can) is the good action.

If one of the character building or redemptive theodicies were the case then maybe helping may well consist of allowing the suffering to continue.

You'd have to provide an example of when you think something that like would be morally right. I can't think of an example offhand.

If God inflicted 40 years in the desert on the Israelites as a character or soul building measure then you would not be helping by getting them a suite at a luxury resort. You would be helping them by letting God’s plan take it’s course.

You're assuming that the greater good achieved by the Israelites' 40 years of wandering in the desert must have had something to do with character or soul building, when it actually may have been something completely different. But it's certainly possible that you're right since there's no evidence that God was unable to ensure that nobody actually had the power to get the Israelites a suite at a luxery resort and undo the greater good being done.

So if he sees the man with the rocks fallen on his head he would have to know first why God allowed this before he could decide which action was helping and which was not.

Since he cannot know why he cannot make this call.

No, he would never have to know why in order to make the morally correct decision. If God meant for a greater good to be accomplished by the rock falling on the person's head, God would ensure that our man was unable to prevent it. If God meant for a greater good to be accomplished by the person continuing to suffer, God would ensure that our man was unable to alleviate the suffering. Therefore, our man should push the person out of the way of the falling rock if he can. Barring that, the man should help to alleviate the person's suffering if he can.

But as I have shown it is not wrong, unless he makes your extra assumptions, which the man is not logically entitled to do.

Simply declaring that you've shown it to be wrong doesn't make it so.

Well if the suffering was necessary to some greater good that did not concern you in any way and you prevent it, there are two choices:

1. You have prevented the greater good
2. The suffering was not necessary in the first place

There is no reason to believe that a God who is benevolent and omnipotent couldn't prevent this scenario from ever occurring. In fact, he would have to.

Well I can't imagine that an atheist would behave as though there were a God. So are you suggesting that a believer should behave morally as though he were an atheist?

Yes, moral behavior isn't dependent on knowing that God exists. Even theists don't know that God exists.

In any case you will have to conclur that if I fail to act in the face of suffering then the very, very worst real consequence that can befall is the greater good. I can do evil and no real evil will occur.

Remember that much suffering is caused by other people, so we are only talking about suffering that is not caused by other people. First, it would be impossible to know for certain the cause of suffering, but for the sake of argument let's limit our discussion only to suffering that is caused by God. Yes, a greater good would be achieved by God, but that is only the "better" of the list unless you also act in a morally right way (to help the sufferer). Only that will result in the "best" scenario. In other words, failing to act is not the morally correct choice.

As I said to start with, our moral choices in the face of suffering are trivial if there is no gratuitous suffering.

I agree, which is why most theists believe that an omnibenevolent God doesn't allow gratuitous suffering. It is possible that all suffering achieves a greater good.

-Bri
 
No, I am defining pleasure as pleasure. You are defining pleasure as "less suffering". So why don't you define suffering as "less pleasure"?

Actually, I think I did! Pleasure and pain are often considered two directions of a continuum -- like good and evil. Pleasure is simply less pain, and pain is simply less pleasure. But by all means, define them any way you like.

I don't know what could be meant by gratuitous pleasure. What would non-gratuitous pleasure be like?

I imagine that gratuitous pleasure would be pleasure that doesn't result in much good. Like scratching an itch or eating a donut. Non-gratuitous pleasure would be pleasure that results in a lot of good, like alleviation of suffering or eating chocolate. I don't wish to get into a semantic discussion, so by all means define your terms any way you like.

We are discussing the concept of "suffering" aren't we? No, I am not talking paper cuts or playful pinches. I would more likely refer to that as "a sting" rather than pain. What on earth would lead you to think that I was discussing mild discomfort?

Absolutely not. I would have thought that in a discussion that it would be pretty obvious that pain does not mean "mild discomfort" and pleasure does not mean "less suffering". It is you that are trying to blur the lines.

You don't think that pinches are painful? Sure, not as painful perhaps as having a limb severed, but you didn't specify the degree of pain. But please, define your terms however you want. I'm just trying to clarify exactly what your moral code entails. So, can you please rewrite your moral code so that the rules hold in every circumstance?

Here's one suggestion:

Deriving pleasure does not justify inflicting a lot of pain.​

Oh, but wait...childbirth is quite painful. It would be against your moral code for you to ask a family member to be a surrogate if your wife was unable to conceive because she would have to suffer labor pains solely for the purpose of your experiencing the pleasure of parenthood. So, how about:

Deriving insignificant pleasure does not justify inflicting unbearably excruciating pain. Most of the time. At least sometimes.​

Hmmm...Maybe we're onto something here!

I missed the moral code you posted. All I saw was the bit about weighing up the foreseeable good and bad consequences. As I said a moral code must include the principles by which you determine whether a consequence is good or bad.

Yes, that's the one. By all means, please specify exactly to which circumstances your principles above apply, because it definitely seems a bit unclear to me! That's the problem -- most principles you can come up with don't apply to all circumstances. I imagine that your moral code is going to get quite lengthy if you try to come up with principles to determine the consequences for every possible configuration of circumstances. I would suggest that you write them down in a book so you could remember all of them except that the book would be too heavy to carry around with you.

No, you seem to think that you can write moral rules that work under every possible circumstance. You can't. That's why you have to weigh the good and bad that are forseeable from a given choice in a given situation before determining what is moral rather than looking it up in your very heavy book.

"human pleasure"? Thought you'd just sneak that one in did you? So you still think it is possible that God's pleasure might justify him inflicting suffering?

I wouldn't think so, but I can't think of a reason why it isn't possible.

The most I have gone without food was two days, I don't consider that starving but no, my first meal was not pleasureable - I don't think I tasted it.

I've not eaten for two days before, and found it similar to your description, except that afterwards I found it quite pleasurable to no longer be hungry. To each his own. Webster defines pleasure as "a state of gratification" and I can tell you, I was gratified to have eaten!

-Bri
 
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Actually, I think I did! Pleasure and pain are often considered two directions of a continuum -- like good and evil. Pleasure is simply less pain, and pain is simply less pleasure. But by all means, define them any way you like.
The dictionary is fine for me. Show me the dictionary that defines pleasure as an alleviation of pain. That was definitely not Webster. Let me guess. It is in your handwriting. Yes?

So is suffering now alleviation of pleasure? That would help the problem of suffering no end. The problem of alleviation of pleasure.

God inflicts cancer on a kid to alleviate his pleasure.

Your word torturing certainly alleviates my pleasure.
You don't think that pinches are painful? Sure, not as painful perhaps as having a limb severed, but you didn't specify the degree of pain. But please, define your terms however you want. I'm just trying to clarify exactly what your moral code entails. So, can you please rewrite your moral code so that the rules hold in every circumstance?
I think it is perfectly clear when someone is suffering and when they are not. I have never had any problems in that respect. Most people never have problems in that respect.
Oh, but wait...childbirth is quite painful. It would be against your moral code for you to ask a family member to be a surrogate if your wife was unable to conceive because she would have to suffer labor pains solely for the purpose of your experiencing the pleasure of parenthood.
So now you are about to unilaterally alter the meaning of the word inflict?

Ok, I'll bite. What is your new meaning for 'inflict'?

Are you by any chance a lawyer? Let me get what you are saying here:

God didn’t make the kid suffer from cancer! He merely unilaterally volunteered them for a laterally negative repositioning on the pleasure continuum.

Any other words you want to redefine?

I agree it is impossible to define a code of ethics for someone who keeps redefining terms. I have never had a problem telling whether someone was suffering.

I can’t imagine what it is like to be in any doubt about this. People have a very consistent and distinctive way of communicating this.

Tell me, in all seriousness, are you suggesting that we cannot recognise suffering in others? If that is the case then there is no possible code of ethics.
Yes, that's the one. By all means, please specify exactly to which circumstances your principles above apply, because it definitely seems a bit unclear to me!
All circumstances. Do you want me to find a definition of “all”?
That's the problem -- most principles you can come up with don't apply to all circumstances.
Then it needs to be refined. There is no problem with that.
I imagine that your moral code is going to get quite lengthy if you try to come up with principles to determine the consequences for every possible configuration of circumstances.
No, “all circumstances” is fine. It is not moral to inflict suffering for no better purpose than to provide someone with the opportunity of preventing or alleviating that suffering.

Certainly the book would be longer in Bri newspeak.
No, you seem to think that you can write moral rules that work under every possible circumstance. You can't.
You have not managed to identify any circumstances in which the rules I have suggested do not hold. Except by altering the meaning of words like pain, .

Unlike you I do not have trouble in recognising the distinctive signs of suffering in others.

Give me a circumstance where it would be moral (or even logical) to inflict suffering on another for no better reason than to provide an opportunity for someone else to alleviate the suffering.
That's why you have to weigh the good and bad that are forseeable from a given choice in a given situation before determining what is moral rather than looking it up in your very heavy book.
So your position now is that you can foresee good and bad without any way of determining good and bad?

If you are intrinsically unable to recognise the outward signs of suffering in another human being, how do you foresee good and bad?

Or do you just semanticise your way out of that one too?
 
That's why you have to weigh the good and bad that are forseeable from a given choice in a given situation before determining what is moral
Now let's apply this to a given situation.

A conman decides whether or not to bilk a woman out of her life savings.

Go ahead
Good: He gets rich
Bad: He might go to jail
Indifferent: the woman loses all her money

Not go ahead:
Good: He does not go to jail
Bad: He does not get rich

Weigh up - it is better to risk jail than not to get rich

So has he acted morally? Are you seriously suggesting that a moral code does not need to contain some method of deciding good from bad?
 
So has he acted morally? Are you seriously suggesting that a moral code does not need to contain some method of deciding good from bad?

But then you get back into the whole circus of defining good and bad...
 
Here is a question -- Is purposefully preventing good, for nothing more than the sake of preventing good, tantamount to bad?
 
Here is a question -- Is purposefully preventing good, for nothing more than the sake of preventing good, tantamount to bad?
Of course. For example, you don't feed you baby and it dies. By not feeding it, you have prevented the "good" of keeping your baby alive, even though you haven't done anything.
 
Of course. For example, you don't feed you baby and it dies. By not feeding it, you have prevented the "good" of keeping your baby alive, even though you haven't done anything.

Here's one. Let's say you're at home and your kid is crying because he's hungry, but you don't feed him. He cries for the next 30 minutes, and then finally he walks to the cupboard and gets out some graham crackers and eats them.

You've prevented the *good* of immediately satisfying your kid's hunger so that he can feed himself, by himself, and learn some initiative!
 
You've prevented the *good* of immediately satisfying your kid's hunger so that he can feed himself, by himself, and learn some initiative!

But clearly in this situation the purposeful lack of action has resulted in a greater good -- your kid learns to feed himself.

There are, however, situations, where people purposefully deny others good yet nothing ever comes of it. A glaring example, for instance, is the insistance by most religions that mankind should never be happy without god. A consequence is that fundamentalists will often endeavour to actively prevent people from acquiring pleasure unless it is through sanctioned avenues. I have used this shift to argue that religion is in fact evil.
 
The dictionary is fine for me. Show me the dictionary that defines pleasure as an alleviation of pain. That was definitely not Webster. Let me guess. It is in your handwriting. Yes?

All I asked is that you clarify the severity of the pleasure/pain, otherwise your rules don't hold under every circumstance (they may not even if you specify the severity). But if you insist on a semantic discussion, fine.

I didn't say that pleasure was the alleviation of pain, although the alleviation of pain is probably pleasurable. I said that they were antonyms (opposites):

From WordNet ® 2.0, © 2003 Princeton University:
pleasure n 1: a fundamental feeling that is hard to define but that people desire to experience; "he was tingling with pleasure" [syn: pleasance] [ant: pain]

pain n 2: emotional distress; a fundamental feeling that people try to avoid; "the pain of loneliness" [syn: painfulness] [ant: pleasure]

Emphasis is mine.

So is suffering now alleviation of pleasure? That would help the problem of suffering no end. The problem of alleviation of pleasure.

God inflicts cancer on a kid to alleviate his pleasure.

Your word torturing certainly alleviates my pleasure.

As I said, I was using a definition of "pleasure" similar to Webster's "a state of gratification." But, please define it any way you like. I also said that if you define it in such a way that pleasure cannot possibly produce as much good as pain produces bad, then I'll agree with your rule. But I'm guessing there will be exceptions.

I think it is perfectly clear when someone is suffering and when they are not. I have never had any problems in that respect. Most people never have problems in that respect.

Suffering simply means "to endure death, pain, or distress" according to Webster, but you actually used the word "pain." I was using a definition similar to this one (also from Webster's): "a basic bodily sensation induced by a noxious stimulus, received by naked nerve endings, characterized by physical discomfort (as pricking, throbbing, or aching), and typically leading to evasive action." And I believe that pinching someone usually does result in pain as described above. Now, if you meant more pain, then please specify with a descriptive qualifier of the severity of pain you had in mind and I may agree with your rule.

So now you are about to unilaterally alter the meaning of the word inflict?

Ok, I'll bite. What is your new meaning for 'inflict'?

I was using it to mean "to cause (something unpleasant) to be endured" which would certainly apply. That's also from Webster's. Did you mean "force" perhaps?

Are you by any chance a lawyer? Let me get what you are saying here:

God didn’t make the kid suffer from cancer! He merely unilaterally volunteered them for a laterally negative repositioning on the pleasure continuum.

Any other words you want to redefine?

No idea what you're talking about there. You'll have to discuss it with Webster or else come up with your own definitions if the ones I was using aren't acceptable to you.

I can’t imagine what it is like to be in any doubt about this. People have a very consistent and distinctive way of communicating this.

Yes, usually if they mean "severe pain" they'll usually say "severe pain." If they mean any pain from minor to severe they'll say "pain" as you did.

All circumstances. Do you want me to find a definition of “all”?

You do seem to be deviating from the common usage of the term, since if you claim that your rule applies to all circumstances, that would generally indicate that there are no circumstances to which your rule doesn't apply. I've already shown that unless you clarify the level of pleasure and pain you're talking about, your rules don't seem to apply to all circumstances.

Then it needs to be refined. There is no problem with that.

Then please redefine your rule until you are satisfied that you have a moral rule that can never be broken under any circumstances as is necessary to back up your claims.

No, “all circumstances” is fine. It is not moral to inflict suffering for no better purpose than to provide someone with the opportunity of preventing or alleviating that suffering.

No idea where this statement came from. You seem to be changing the topic again.

Certainly the book would be longer in Bri newspeak.

Well, it would certainly be longer if you specified rules that could not be broken. If you believe that you can sufficiently qualify the pleasure and pain so that the bad would always outweigh the good, then I'll agree with you.

Give me a circumstance where it would be moral (or even logical) to inflict suffering on another for no better reason than to provide an opportunity for someone else to alleviate the suffering.

Oh...the straw man emerges. Did you really offer the pleasure/pain thing in order to slip in this old point again as if they are related? As I already said many times now, we could not be morally justified doing this unless we were omniscient. However, there are cases where we are justified inflicting minor pain in order to provide significant pleasure.

So your position now is that you can foresee good and bad without any way of determining good and bad?

If you are intrinsically unable to recognise the outward signs of suffering in another human being, how do you foresee good and bad?

Or do you just semanticise your way out of that one too?

Of course we can determine good and bad. There just aren't any cut-and-dry rules for doing so as you'd like to believe. Any rule you can come up with will probably have exceptions depending on the circumstances.

-Bri
 
Now let's apply this to a given situation.

A conman decides whether or not to bilk a woman out of her life savings.

Go ahead
Good: He gets rich
Bad: He might go to jail
Indifferent: the woman loses all her money

Not go ahead:
Good: He does not go to jail
Bad: He does not get rich

Weigh up - it is better to risk jail than not to get rich

So has he acted morally? Are you seriously suggesting that a moral code does not need to contain some method of deciding good from bad?

Wow! How egocentric of you to completely ignore the good/bad that might befall the victim(s)! Do you really think it indifferent that the woman loses all her money?

-Bri
 
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There are, however, situations, where people purposefully deny others good yet nothing ever comes of it. A glaring example, for instance, is the insistance by most religions that mankind should never be happy without god.

I'd say *could* never *truly* be happy without god. Should is a matter of opinion, and with free will we can disagree about should. Could, we suggest, and true happiness as well, are more in the realm of objective truth.

A consequence is that fundamentalists will often endeavour to actively prevent people from acquiring pleasure unless it is through sanctioned avenues. I have used this shift to argue that religion is in fact evil.

I see. Like banning marijuana? Something like that?

So you're equating pleasure with good. I don't know if everyone agrees with that. I think good goes beyond pleasure. Pleasure is sensory (at least the pleasure I think you're thinking about, I may be wrong)...good is a different thing entirely. Isn't it?

Not that pleasure can't be good. Can it be bad? Sure. I reckon heroin feels extremely good, but I don't hear very many...non-addicts I guess...extolling the virtue, the good, or heroin.

-Elliot
 
I see. Like banning marijuana? Something like that?

Yes, something like that, although marijuana is just the tip of the iceberg.

So you're equating pleasure with good. I don't know if everyone agrees with that. I think good goes beyond pleasure. Pleasure is sensory (at least the pleasure I think you're thinking about, I may be wrong)...good is a different thing entirely. Isn't it?

Yes, it is, but only if one adopts your worldview. Among other things, pleasure is something quite easily defined and depends entirely upon the person in question -- and they are pretty sure about it. On the other hand, "good" usually defined by the authorities (god) and used as an excuse to hurt people (because a "greater good" is occuring).

As a moral subjectivist, I consider pleasure to be equivalent to good at the individual level, and the individual level is all that matters.
 

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