The Matrix or brain in box theories are physical theories. They carry the assumption that someone, somewhere has a physical body and a working brain.
If I believed this I wouldn't be working on cognitive theory.
Language is an abstraction which is used for both communication and internal representation of information. I'm not sure why this would be hard to understand.
Thankyou, it is not often accepted around here that the mind is secondary(in our personal experience). And yet folk assert that conscious experience originates in the mental processes of the brain?(which is primary and secondary here?)
It is only naive interpretations of idealism which entertain notions of a world/consciousness independent of physical material at the human level.
It will have an experiential framework, presumably it would gauge things as close, or further away and its orientation, an equivalence to up and down.
Its not as simple as that, remember the physical and experiential world is identical under the materialist or idealist ontology. I am not making positive claims about the manifestation of idealism in our world. I simply make the observation the our primary experience of being is the primary fact in existence. This being the case, it's properties should be given primary consideration.
I am not pleading, I am doubting. I doubt that artificial mechanisms will exhibit consciousness, this is reasonable is it not. Especially in the absence of a working model.
Yes, I do not dispute these physical processes.
It depends specifically which mind one is considering. The human mind is a state in the brain, maintained by the correct functioning of the brain.What evidence is there for this mind?
I once worried about being attacked by a mountain lion I had seen and found its paw prints outside the cave I was sleeping in, in the Himalayas. After a fairly brief deliberation, I decided to hold a flower and show it to the lion when it approached. It worked, I didn't worry any more and the lion didn't attack.
I cannot speak for idealists as I am not one. My position is more akin to the spiritual one and from here, I see no contradiction on any level with the materialist interpretation of how the brain and mind work and most other physical processes. It is in the speculation about the unknown where we differ.
I'm not sure what you mean by this. Language is an abstract or symbolic representation of reality. It is one of the fundamental components of intelligence.
This is not actually true in humans or other organisms. An AI begins with materialism so there is no point in talking about that. I've already stated that there is no known basis for abstraction within an Idealistic framework so if you wanted to make this case you would have to show the basis.
I'm not sure what you are trying to say here. The mind is a function of the brain. Experience is part of the function of consciousness. Consciousness is one component of the mind. We don't tend to think about the rest of the parts unless they don't work such as with dyslexia or after a stroke.
That isn't the problem. Name the origin of abstract primitives that would allow general abstraction. For example, what is the origin of good and bad without resorting to a definition based on behavior?
If an Idealistic framework were possible then the experience of consciousness would be the same as in the materialistic framework. This does not carry the claim that the physical world is the same in both frameworks but only that based on experience you can't tell the difference. That is the claim anyway. The aspects of the claim depend on whether you include other minds or you don't.
If I'm understanding you then you are saying the same as my description above that based on experience, it is impossible to distinguish between materialistic and idealistic frameworks. And presumably we should therefore only study experiential phenomenon. I guess I disagree with this.
When I began working on cognitive theory I couldn't imagine how I could ever disprove a mechanical consciousness. I think I can disprove it now. I can't yet say about an electronic consciousness.
It is not. This is a misapplication of computational theory.
Watered down in what way?
Yes, although I would never suggest that the mind, even the "mind of God" is independent of material for its manifestation anyway.
There is no evidence, or rationale which favours materialism or idealism over the other. As I pointed out in my first few posts in this thread.