As to the merits of the application, it is clear that during the preliminary investigations, and particularly in the initial phase, Sollecito gave statements which were contradictory or untruthful, which contributed to the issuing and continuation of the cautionary custody order.
<snip>
On the evening of 5 November 2007, at 22:40, Sollecito instead told the police that having left her house at about 17:30 or 18:00, they remained together in the city centre until 20:30 or 21:00, but that then he had gone home alone while Knox went to the Le Chic pub (managed by Patrick Lumumba, whom the young woman, from that day on, falsely accused of being the murderer): [3 ->]
Sollecito remained alone at home all of the evening, receiving a phone call from his father at 23:00, but Knox had returned only at 01:00 and then together they slept. Sollecito justified the vast difference between this account and the account he had given before saying “I gave you a sacco di cazzate3 in the earlier statement” because he had been convinced by his friend Knox to agree with her statements, which she had already given to the police and which he knew about because “I heard the first statements she made to the Postal Police when they called at the house” (the phrases in quotation marks come from the questioning by the GIP4 on 8 November 2007, when the judge was questioning the differing accounts being told by the arrestee.)
<snip>
after the judge asked him to remember more accurately the rest of the evening added “I don't remember...and because anyway that evening I had smoked quite a lot of cannabis, other evenings, from the 31st onwards the evenings I had passed in much the same way, I did more or less the same things” and even, when asked if Knox had gone out, replied “I'm not sure...given that the evening before she had gone out and other evenings I don't remember exactly”. He then went on to recount details of a broken sink pipe, to have been helped by Knox to mop up the spill, and then they had both gone to bed, but he didn't remember at what time. He said that “For sure I worked on the computer” but when asked what he had been working at he said “I really can't remember because everyday I am on the computer. I don't remember what I did that day”.
In addition he said “I received a phone call from my father because he phones me every night before he goes to 3 literally, “a sack of crap”/ “a sack of ****”, meaning “a pack of lies” 4 the GIP is the investigations judge who oversees investigations, authorizes non-routine investigative procedures, and presides over proceedings involving arrestees at stages before the preliminary hearing. 3 bed...I don't remember if he phoned the landline or the cell phone that evening” (but the judge already knew, on that occasion, that no calls to either the landline nor the cell phone had been made).
The GIP, as noted above, questioned Sollecito about the differing statements he had made earlier, including that he had said on 5 November 2007 that he had spoken a “sacco di cazzate”, but above all, the fact that he had justified this conduct saying that it fitted in with what Knox, in his presence, had told the Postal Police, while having just told the GIP that he alone had spoken to the Postal Police and Knox only spoke when she understood.
<snip>
On the first occasion Sollecito (as far as is relevant to the present proceeding) repeated that he had remained at his computer for many hours on the evening of 1 November 2007 and he confirmed that he had received at 06:00, on 2 November 2007 when his cell phone was turned on, a good night message sent by his father the previous evening.
In the spontaneous declarations given during the first stage proceeding (the only trial of interest to us, since the second stage proceeding led to his definitive release from custody) Sollecito simply restated that he had nothing to do with the crimes or had responded to individual assertions made by some witnesses, without however providing further details of the behaviour of himself or Knox on the evening and night of the murder, and thus not modifying his earlier statements.
<snip>
At first he said he and Knox went to his house shortly after 17:30, after a short walk around the town, and that he remained at home with her for the rest of the evening and night. A few days later he described this story as a “sacco di cazzate”, recounted by him only because the girl had persuaded him to confirm her account, whereas the truth was that he had gone to his home alone at 20:30-21:00, and had remained at home alone until Knox returned, about 01:00, and she remained and slept with him.
Two days later, questioned by the GIP, he said that this story of 5 November 2007 was untrue, and that really Knox had gone to his house with him at 20:00-20:30, they ate together, and then he certainly had remained at his computer until midnight, though it was possible that the girl had gone out, even though he didn't remember well either if she went out or if she had later returned, excusing his lack of recall either because he had smoked cannabis that evening, or alternatively because every evening at that time was much like all the other evenings.
The poor memory of what he was doing on the evening and night of 1 November 2007 seems barely credible because if it is possible that he spent all of his evenings in the same way, certainly he had never before lived through a day like 2 November 2007. To discover in the morning of 2 November 5 2007 that in his girlfriend's house a murder had occurred, and that it was one of her flatmates who had been killed should have, logically, prompted the young man to have a precise memory of where Knox had passed the time during which all of this had presumably happened, at the very least to be thankful for the circumstances which had kept her away from the house, and thus would have been bound to encourage a precise recall of whether she was at home with him all evening or had been absent during that critical period. However all of the versions offered by Sollecito are untrue not only because they are contradictory, but also because many of them have been substantially disproved. For example, the witness Popovic disproves that Sollecito returned to his home alone at around 20:00/:30, although this is what he claimed in his last account which he never withdrew.
<snip> . Finally, it was disproved that Sollecito had received a phone call from his father at about 23:00 on 1 November 2007: the phone logs show that he received no calls on either the fixed or mobile line after about 20:40, [6 ->] and indeed his father explained that having established from this call that his son was with his girlfriend, getting ready to spend the evening together, he avoided telephoning again in order not to disturb them.
It is not for this court to investigate possible reasons for the lies, nor to decide to what extent they serve as evidence for the prosecution of Sollecito: what they do demonstrate is that they clearly constituted evidence from his own mouth, leading to the suspicion of a person then under investigation, capable of corroborating other facts, which according to the investigators, demonstrated his involvement in the murder and the other associated crimes, and to thus confirm the validity of the investigators’ theories, even if ambiguous or questionable, in a way unfavourable to the subject, to the extent to consider them in the period of initial investigation and during the first-stage trial to be proof sufficient for him to be found guilty.
<snip >
Many facts connected with the complete reconstruction of the event, exclude that Guede could have acted alone (Page 26 of the cited decision), and at the same time “as for the whereabouts of Amanda Knox, whose presence in the dwelling, site of the murder, is clearly certain in the case, consistent with her admissions, contained also in her hand-written account.” (Page 45 of the decision)
<snip> “The picture of the evidence which emerges from the impugned judgment is marked by intrinsic unresolved contradictions...It remains, nonetheless, a strong suspicion that he was actually present in the house at Via della Pergola on the night of the murder, but at a time, however, that cannot be determined. On the other hand, given the certainty of the presence of Knox in that house, it is hardly credible that he was not with her.” (Page 49 of the decision)
If therefore the fact that Knox was in the house 7 Via della Pergola at the time when young Meredith Kercher was killed constitutes a fact of absolute and indisputable certainty; it is evident that the statements made by Sollecito that she was with him all evening on 1 November 2007 are false, and that one cannot believe his statements that he couldn't remember what he and Knox were doing from the evening of 1 November 2007 until the following morning.
<snip>It is logical to assume that she, returning to her boyfriend immediately after having helped someone she knew (Guede) and others murder her flatmate, would have been greatly distraught, a circumstance which would have allowed Sollecito to remember well what happened that night even if he had never set foot in the house where the serious crime had happened. [7 ->]
We have established, therefore, that Sollecito gave, before and after he was taken 6 “Judicial truth” or “verità processuale” is a concept of law addressing the fact that court trials cannot divine absolute or objective truth. The Court can only evaluate conflicting narratives to get to a “limited truth”, the best truth that is humanly possible to extract from a proceeding, reflected in the final judgment. 7 into prison, completely untrue statements concerning his and Knox's movements on the evening of 1 November 2007 until the morning of 2 November 2007, and for the duration of the entire proceeding, and so for the whole period of detention he remained fixed on an untrue version of what happened during this period of time.
<snip>The Court of Review, in their decision of 30 November 2007 rejected the first request by Sollecito to lift the custody order, identifying “strong suspicions” towards him and stressing in first place the contradictions between his statement of 5 November 2007 and those made subsequently, and terming his stories “unpardonably implausible”. His assertion that he couldn't remember accurately was unbelievable.
He had lied in his declaration on 5 November 2007 (because disproved by Popovic, as discussed earlier). His claim to have been at his computer until 23:00 or 24:00 was not true (as shown by the lack of interaction between 21:10 and 05:32). He had lied about receiving a telephone call from his father at 23:00 (shown to be false by the phone logs), and that it was a lie that he had slept from about 01:00 until 10:00 (shown by the finding that the computer was used at 05:32, and that his cell phone was turned on at 06:00, receiving only then a message which his father had sent the previous evening).
The published decision of the Court of Review also mentions, as “a finishing touch” to add to the previous reasons, the clue of the shoe print compatible with his shoe, the finding in his house of a knife with a DNA trace of the victim (evidence that failed in later evaluations), and the significance of the phone call he 8 made to 112 on the morning of 2 November 2007, but after the arrival of the Postal Police at Via della Pergola, clearly to make it appear that he had reported the break in immediately it was discovered. [8 ->]
<snip>
considering the statements made by Knox, who also claimed that she had remained with Sollecito in his house from the evening of 1 November 2007 until 10:00 of 2 November 2007, the Court noted a lack of correspondence after 20:40, the time of the second visit of Popovic and the last call from Sollecito's father, (or anyway, later than 21:10, the time of the last computer interaction); the falseness of the girl's assertions that she had eaten in the house at 22:00 or 23:00 (because Sollecito's father at 20:40 was told that they had already eaten and that a leak had occurred under the sink while they were washing up); the untruthfulness of her statement that both had slept together all night until 10:00, given the evidence of human interaction with Sollecito's computer at 05:32 and the turning on of his cell phone at about 06:00.
The Court also described further behaviour of the young man which they considered incongruous and suspicious, particularly his behaviour on the morning of 2 November 2007 both because he seemed quite unworried by the apparent robbery and not at all interested in the strangeness of the young Kercher's door being locked, not even mentioning this to the Postal Police (unlike the other young people, who were sufficiently worried to break down the door themselves), and to have asserted in one of the calls to 112 when he reported the 10 robbery that nothing had been stolen, something he could not have known since he had not made any examination of the disturbed room.
<snip>
The silence maintained after 8 November 2007, without either modifying previous stories about his movements on the evening of 1 November 2007, or explaining their incompatibility with objective facts emerging from the phone logs or computer analysis, especially with the presence of Knox in the house which was the scene of the crime, a presence held to be certainly true and amply proved in the judgment of the Court of Cassation, and thus has become “the judicial truth”, had then without doubt contributed to Sollecito being found guilty by the [10 ->] Perugia Court of Assizes with the consequent maintenance of the cautionary measures in place.
No less than the judgment of acquittal of the Fifth Penal Section of the Court of Cassation thought, on Page 50, that “a strong element of suspicion” of Sollecito is formed by his confirmation (deduced only from his spontaneous statements made in various courts of merit, the Court not having been able to read the statements made during the preliminary investigations because they had never been incorporated in the record) of the affirmation of Knox that both had remained at his house for all of the evening and the night between 1 November 2007 and 2 November 2007, and that an “umpteenth element of suspicion lies in the substantial failure of the alibi connected to others with the claimed interactions with his computer”.
Even the judge who acquitted Sollecito thus recognised that the statements containing the elements described above, made in the early days of the investigation, were such as to engender a “strong” suspicion of him, and they were therefore adequate to weigh on the picture of the crime to the point that they justify the issuance of the custody order and its continuation.
<snip>
It does appear clear, in the light of the judicial truth established in the acquittal ruling concerning the indisputable presence of Knox in 7 Via della Pergola at the time of the murder, that if Sollecito had immediately said, without later changing his story, that the young woman had been far away from him during that time, and if he had told in a precise way the time at which she had arrived at his house and also her condition [11 ->] at that time – presumably upset or even extremely distraught, his legal situation would certainly have been different. It seems probable that he would not have even become a suspect, or even so, not seen as withholding information or lying in his statements.
If he did become a suspect, the need for preventive custody would have been absent or much less important, inducing the judges to apply, at the worst, a less restrictive custody order. Similarly, the need for custody would have been lesser if he hadn't tried making up a quickly disproved alibi, for example the claimed telephone call from his father, or if he had explained the incompatibility of his statements with objective facts revealed with certainty during the investigation, such as the use of his computer at 05:32 and of his cell phone at 06:00.
These early morning factors, in the order made by the Court of Review issued 24 days after the start of his detention, were considered by the judges to be symptomatic of a night spent not sleeping quietly, but of a sleepless night, indirectly demonstrating that extraordinary events had happened and which the suspect had, however, always wanted to keep quiet about. 12 If then, he himself had been present that night in the house at 7 Via della Pergola, as the acquittal judgment has conjectured, saying that “There remains, nevertheless, a strong suspicion that he was actually present in the house in Via della Pergola on the night of the murder, at a time, however, which is not possible to determine.
On the other hand, given the indisputable presence of Knox in that house, it is difficult to believe he wasn't there with her” (Page 49 of the decision) the impact on his request for a declaration by the court on the infliction of a penalty and the long time he was detained is still more obvious. In fact, if he had intervened only after the homicide, he should have told the investigators, and could have thus explained not only the lies in his statements, but above all the reasons, aside from having participated in the murder, for his traces found at the scene (although these are different traces from those initially attributed to him) which he could have left at a later date. He could then have become a suspect for the crime of aiding and abetting, but this would not have resulted in a custody order.
If, however, he was present in the house at the time of the murder, but had not participated in it, as is considered a possibility in the judgment of acquittal of 27 March 2015, we can't exclude a simple “collusion” charge arising in the light of the “complete absence of biological traces attributable to them in the murder room”.
Equally, an immediate admission that he was present but had nothing to do to the crime (necessarily accompanied by a full description of what had occurred) would have probably improved Sollecito's legal position. However, if we are to consider Sollecito as only a conspirator, an idea which the acquittal decision truly expresses without espousing it, leaving, however, doubt whether he was present at the time of the murder, the acknowledgement of the right to damages for unjust detention must be ruled out on the basis of the principle established by the Court of Cassation n. 15745 of 19 February 2015, which states “Concerning compensation for unjust detention, gross negligence, a barrier to the award of compensation, can be recognised in relation to shared passive responsibility when, in the alternative, 1) it [either] shows a lack of the fundamental obligations of social solidarity to prevent serious harm to persons or things; 2) [or] it occurs not as mere passive behaviour regarding the perpetration of a crime but allows the crime to be accomplished, provided that the person is in a position to prevent the criminal act from being carried out by reason of a special relationship; 3) [or] it is objectively established that the criminal will of the agent was strengthened, even though the conniver did not intend to pursue such effects and there is proof positive that he was aware of [12 ->] the criminal activity of the person”, Sollecito, having failed to prevent serious crime, caused harm to Meredith Kercher.
Therefore it must be concluded on analysis that there is a barrier to recognizing the right to compensation for unjust detention provided for by Article 314 c. 1 cpp.