There is No God (And You Know It)

Actually, I'm convinced that four dimensions are not enough. I lean towards a minimum of seven spatial dimensions and two time dimensions, but I would not be heartbroken to find that even more are required. Regardless, I believe that time as we experience it--linear time--is the last of howevermany dimensions are truly out there.

I don't see how this pertains to our discussion, here. Our beliefs are irrelevant. We're trying to make sense of various things to determine whether or not we can "prove" that there's a God or not.
 
I'm sorry if they seem like accusations. I'm merely reporting how things seem to me. If something seems like a fallacy, I'll call it. Besides, you keep doing that to me too. It's nothing personnal.

Fair enough, but it takes me much longer to respond to your posts since half of my response is going to be defending unsubstantiated accusations. I try not to throw out fallacies without demonstrating exactly how a person's argument fails logically because of the fallacy.

For example, I did claim that someone was appealing to emotion. This isn't necessarily a fallacy in that it doesn't necessarily mean that the argument in invalid, but in this case I pointed out that the example used was no different than other examples already discussed, with the exception that it used a child's suffering to show that human suffering can't be for the greater good, as if a child's suffering is somehow different than an adult's suffering in that regard.

-Bri
 
Absolute free will means being capable of making a decision or choice or having a thought that in no way, whatsoever, is constrained or caused by other conditions.

...

It is my opinion that, under a materialist monism, there is no such thing as absolute - i.e. unconstrained - free will. You don't just choose things without some determining factors involved.

OK, I think I might be able to agree that this might never occur in reality. Even choices made from free will can be influenced by other things which are caused.

But the fact that you do make choices whose constraints are, perhaps, subconscious allows you to act and react as if you had free will - a practical free will, that recognized as such, causes us each to be responsible for our behaviors. Even though, in the truest sense, we are no more responsible for those behaviors than our DNA or our environment are, by creating an environment where reward and punishment exist, we add compulsions and constraints to our behavior to make free will amenable to social survival and comfort.

Here is where I have trouble with your definition. Isn't there an in-between that is still libertarian free-will, but where choices aren't necessarily completely uninfluenced by external factors? Even choices which are influenced by outside factors aren't necessarily caused by those factors. The "ultimate source" of such a decision might still be within the agent making the decision, because a critical piece of the decision might not be caused by anything external to that agent. And the agent still could have "done otherwise" by making a different choice, even with the same exact external influences in place.

In your "chili vs. lasagna" decision, you might take all of those factors you listed into account, but it is possible that when it comes to actually making the decision, you do so without any external causes. In other words, you are still completely free to make the decision even taking into account all of the factors that might influence that decision. If you chose lasagna, you could have chosen chili or vice-versa, because the actual decision-making is influenced by -- but not caused by -- outside influences.

...the addition of factors such as fear, pressure, anticipation, etc. can effectively work to increase the potential for positive behavior while decreasing the potential for negative behavior.

I'm not sure what you mean by this.

I hope that clarifies the difference between 'absolute' and 'practical' free will, as I name them.

I'm not sure if you would classify a choice that is influenced but not caused by external factors as "absolute" or "practical" by your definitions.

-Bri
 
Actually, I'm convinced that four dimensions are not enough. I lean towards a minimum of seven spatial dimensions and two time dimensions, but I would not be heartbroken to find that even more are required. Regardless, I believe that time as we experience it--linear time--is the last of howevermany dimensions are truly out there.

Can I have some of whatever you're smoking?

-Bri
 
I'm not sure if you would classify a choice that is influenced but not caused by external factors as "absolute" or "practical" by your definitions.

I would classify such a choice as 'nonexistent', unless by 'external' you are referring to factors not within the brain.
 
Okay, how were my counter-arguments to your examples inadequate ?

OK, my suit of armor is on, and I'm ready to answer.

I said that you failed to show why God couldn't serve any of the functions I listed. So, to answer your question...

Short answer: Because you never showed that my examples were not possible functions of God.

Long answer: Off the top of my head, at your request, I gave six possible functions that God might serve:

1. He might be the creator of the universe. You said that current theory explain the origins of the universe without God. True enough, but that doesn't mean that the current theory is correct (which is why it's still called a "theory.") You have offered no evidence at all that God couldn't have created the universe.

2. He might judge us after we die. You didn't comment on this one at all.

3. He might be the catalyst for free will. You asked me to further explain, and I said that current scientific theory suggests that there is no free will because of determinism. God might exist in order to allow us to have free will, perhaps by providing an exception to determinism by allowing us to have free will in an otherwise deterministic universe. You then asked "By doing what that would be different from a godless universe ?" which wasn't an argument against God's purpose being to provide free will at all.

4. He might provide consciousness. You didn't comment on this one at all.

5. He might endow the raw materials for life with life. You claimed that science can explain life and that we know how cells and genes work and why. I pointed out that, no, science cannot fully explain life much less create life, and furthermore even if science could do either, that wouldn't preclude God from creating life (or having created life).

6. He might make tornados and earthquakes. You said that we know how tornadoes and earthquakes happen, implying that God couldn't possibly cause them. I pointed out that this is not true, that not only do we not know all the factors that cause tornadoes and earthquakes, we cannot prove that God isn't the cause of those factors.

So, no, you haven't provided any evidence that God couldn't serve any of those functions.

Of course, and I wouldn't claim that lack of forseeable function alone would prove that God cannot exist, but it's a step in that direction, which is why I'd like you to answer my above question.

I understand the purpose of your questioning, but it cannot be used to show that God cannot exist. You cannot prove that God has no function. Even if you somehow disproved all of the functions I listed (you didn't actually disprove even one of them) I could always make up more possible functions, or better yet say that we don't know his function but he might still have one. Even if you could somehow prove that God has no function, that doesn't mean that God doesn't exist (just that God is useless).

Again, if the existence of God goes against our knowledge of the laws of physics (or logic, of course,) and if we can't think of a function (cause or effect) that God could have in existence, then would you agree that we can say that God cannot exist within reasonable doubt unless further evidence is presented ?

Not at all. God's function has nothing to do with his existance. However, I will grant you that there is no reason to care about something that serves no function and doesn't affect us in any way, so if you can somehow prove that (you can't, but if you could) then I would agree that God is a useless concept. In other words, I would agree that a concept of God existing but not affecting us in any way at all is a useless concept (at least to us).

That has nothing to do with God going against the laws of physics/nature or logic. There is no reason to think that God wouldn't be able to disobey the laws of nature. To the contrary, I would say that a God that couldn't disobey the laws of nature might disprove some concepts of God (but perhaps not all). If you could only prove that God can't disobey the laws of logic, that might disprove certain other concepts of God (but definitely not all and probably not even most).

-Bri
 
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I would classify such a choice as 'nonexistent', unless by 'external' you are referring to factors not within the brain.

If the brain is part of the agent (which I assume it is) then by "external," I'm referring to factors not within the brain. An "external" cause would be causes that are entirely external to the agent, or that are internal to the agent but entirely caused by external causes outside of the agent.

A dualist theory in short states that we (or part of us such as our brain) is more than the sum of its parts. In this theory, some as-yet-undiscovered part of us (the "ghost in the machine" as you put it, although some might just consider it our "mind") can produce effects that are completely independent of causes. That doesn't mean that all or even any of our choices have to be made without influence from outside factors. It simply means that a critical piece of the choice is made internally without external causes (i.e. we are the "ultimate source" of our choices). This implies that when we make a choice, we were free to have made a different choice in the exact same situation, with the exact same external influences.

Although scientific evidence currently suggests otherwise, this is entirely possible and might be the case. So, presuming for a moment that this is the case, that we are able to make free choices that are influenced but not determined by external factors, would this be "absolute" or "practical" free will by your definition?

-Bri
 
If the brain is part of the agent (which I assume it is) then by "external," I'm referring to factors not within the brain. An "external" cause would be causes that are entirely external to the agent, or that are internal to the agent but entirely caused by external causes outside of the agent.

A dualist theory in short states that we (or part of us such as our brain) is more than the sum of its parts. In this theory, some as-yet-undiscovered part of us (the "ghost in the machine" as you put it, although some might just consider it our "mind") can produce effects that are completely independent of causes. -Bri


I would love to hear an example of the mind producing effects completely independent of causes.
 
If the brain is part of the agent (which I assume it is) then by "external," I'm referring to factors not within the brain. An "external" cause would be causes that are entirely external to the agent, or that are internal to the agent but entirely caused by external causes outside of the agent.

A dualist theory in short states that we (or part of us such as our brain) is more than the sum of its parts. In this theory, some as-yet-undiscovered part of us (the "ghost in the machine" as you put it, although some might just consider it our "mind") can produce effects that are completely independent of causes. That doesn't mean that all or even any of our choices have to be made without influence from outside factors. It simply means that a critical piece of the choice is made internally without external causes (i.e. we are the "ultimate source" of our choices). This implies that when we make a choice, we were free to have made a different choice in the exact same situation, with the exact same external influences.

Although scientific evidence currently suggests otherwise, this is entirely possible and might be the case. So, presuming for a moment that this is the case, that we are able to make free choices that are influenced but not determined by external factors, would this be "absolute" or "practical" free will by your definition?

-Bri

Then I would define this as 'practical' free will. This is because the very condition and nature of the brain is determined by the history and environment of that brain. Hence, in my opinion, even the brain itself acts as a constraining influence upon 'choice' - and is itself influenced (even determined) by external factors. Only in a dualist proposition, where there is some immaterial factor in the 'mind' [...is the 'mind'...] could free will said to truly exist.

Heck, it's possible that God exists and still has no free will... Scary thought, ain't it, that God had no choice but to make the world exactly as God made the world... :D
 
I would love to hear an example of the mind producing effects completely independent of causes.

Again, I never said that the dualist theory is fact, only that it is possible and we cannot prove otherwise.

I would like to hear of an example of a choice made by a person that cannot be anything but the result of only external causes, much less evidence that all choices are the result of only external causes.

-Bri
 
Only in a dualist proposition, where there is some immaterial factor in the 'mind' [...is the 'mind'...] could free will said to truly exist.

The proposition I provided was a dualist proposition. This immaterial factor in the mind is considered internal, so I view this as truly free will, even if external factors influence that decision. In other words, even with "absolute" free will, there is no reason to think that outside factors aren't taken into consideration when making a choice, only that these outside factors do not comprise the entirety of that choice, thus reducing the person to only one possible choice (which isn't really choice at all).

Heck, it's possible that God exists and still has no free will... Scary thought, ain't it, that God had no choice but to make the world exactly as God made the world... :D

Yes, since it's possible that there is no free will, then if there is in fact no free will, it is still possible that a creator of the universe exists. By some definitions, this creator couldn't be called "God" but by many it certainly could. I'm not sure that a God without free will can be considered omnibenevolent though (since it seems that true benevolence might require free will).

-Bri
 
I have other arguments against 'omnibenevolent' anyway. I think it's just a concept to allow people to feel good about their god.

Frankly, I think 'good' and 'evil' are just human definitions, and 'free will' a convenient illusion.
 
Zaaydragon: Free will can exists in a theism if and only if the involved deity lacks omniscience or is subordinate to time and/or nature.
Bri:I think that has been shown to be far from certain by the links previously provided.

But your links were for a number of incompatible theories, some of which posit that God is necessarily subordinate to time, others which suggest that libertarian free will does not exist. Can you point to even one that you think satisfactorily answers the problem?

OK, here is the way I understand it:

Definitions:
Free will: A person has free will at time t if he has more than one option open to him and makes a choice at t and his choice among those options cannot be predicted by any means before time t.

Omniscience: A being is omniscient at time t if he knows all propositions that are true at t and also know all propositions that will be true after t

Argument:

Since he knows all propositions that will be true, an omniscient would be capable of seeing John's life in it's entirety and creating a book with a minute by minute description of what he will be doing every day in unambiguous detail - then placing this book in an uncrackable safe the day before John is conceived so that it can never be read by anybody at least until John dies.

John is approaching two roads and his choices are left and right (assume for some reason he cannot stop or go off road). The book has predicted he will go right. If he had free will then before reaching the fork the possibility that he might go left would exist. If that possibility existed then the prediction in the book would be wrong and God would not be omniscient. If the possibility did not exist then John would not have free will.

Since an omniscient being would be capable of doing this for any being then the existence of omniscience rules out the existence of free will and vice versa.

This seems clear to me and I don't see how you can get round it. Certainly none of the arguments provided so far.

...............

Of course a different and more interesting question arises when on John's birthday he receives a card with the words "Act Surprised" on it and inside :

12 right 30 left 4 right 17 left
 
I haven't seen an argument yet that supports free will. Middle knowledge, in fact, buries it as much as determinism does.
In the post wherein I mentioned middle knowledge, I was really addressing where we stand if middle knowledge truly can't exist, that is, if propositions regarding what free agents might do under never-actualized circumstances have zero intrinsic truth-value.

My conjecture is as follows: in that case, omniscience obviously does not imply middle knowledge. An omniscient creator, naturally, could make highly educated guesses about how free agents would affect events in hypothetical universes. Yet he could only visualize the complete timeline of the universe he actually creates (simple foreknowledge), not of universes he doesn't create - it would be logically impossible for him to know more than that (barring completely mechanistic universes with no free agents).

In this scenario, even though the omniscient creator knows everything you will do before you are born, it's much more difficult to characterize your choices as having been intentionally predetermined. In the initial moment of creation, when an infinitude of inherently uncertain counterfactuals of freedom are replaced by a finite number of true propositions about "future" (from our perspective) events, God could be - in a loose sense - surprised by human choices.
 
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Can you point to even one that you think satisfactorily answers the problem?

ceo_esq has already described one solution, namely that God knows what you will choose because he knows everything about you (so-called "middle knowledge" which was named because its conceivers believed it is the second of three types of knowledge possessed by God). That doesn't preclude you from choosing freely, it simply means that he knows what you will choose under any situation.

The Stanford article is interesting not for its overviews of the various solutions to the problem, but because of its final section where the author indicates that there is a bigger problem with our very understanding of the nature and logic of time that has nothing to do with the problem of free will at all. In essence, if we were to figure out the problem with our understanding, many arguments that rely on the past indicating certain truths about the future might prove to be untrue.

-Bri
 
In the post wherein I mentioned middle knowledge, I was really addressing where we stand if middle knowledge really can't exist, that is, if propositions regarding what free agents might do under never-actualized circumstances have zero intrinsic truth-value.

My conjecture is as follows: in that case, omniscience obviously does not imply middle knowledge. An omniscient creator, naturally, could make highly educated guesses about how free agents would affect events in hypothetical universes. Yet he could only visualize the complete timeline of the universe he actually creates (simple foreknowledge), not of universes he doesn't create - it would be logically impossible for him to know more than that (barring completely mechanistic universes with no free agents).

In this scenario, even though the omniscient creator knows everything you will do before you are born, it's much more difficult to characterize your choices as having been intentionally predetermined. In the initial moment of creation, when an infinitude of inherently uncertain counterfactuals of freedom are replaced by a finite number of true propositions about "future" (from our perspective) events, God could be - in a loose sense - surprised by human choices.

"In a loose sense"...

"(from our perspective)"...

In other words - omniscience precludes free will. Thank you.

Also: Robin: very good statement - I don't see how you can get around it, either.

Bri: If God knows what you will choose under any given situation, and God created both you and every situation, then the inescapable conclusion is that free will absolutely does not exist. If, however, God can only predict with a high probability what you might do, God is not omniscient. The two ideologies simply aren't compatible.
 
How you managed to draw this conclusion from what I wrote, only an omniscient being could say.

OK, let me spell it out for you:

in that case, omniscience obviously does not imply middle knowledge. An omniscient creator, naturally, could make highly educated guesses about how free agents would affect events in hypothetical universes. Yet he could only visualize the complete timeline of the universe he actually creates (simple foreknowledge), not of universes he doesn't create - it would be logically impossible for him to know more than that (barring completely mechanistic universes with no free agents).

Assuming that middle knowledge does not exist, which is a fair assumption, you say that 'an omniscient creator, naturally, could make highly educated guesses...' This means, naturally, that this creator is not actually omniscient. There would be no guesswork with omniscient - guesswork implies the possibility of being wrong, and therefore, of not being omniscient.

"he could only visualize the complete timeline of the universe he actually creates..." This means, naturally, that he knows every action of every person past, present, and future, since he is creating the universe in its entirety (all dimensions simultaneously) and since he is both omnipotent and omniscient. Hence, no free will.

As I said before, to suggest otherwise would imply that this creator has to work with something over which he has no control - meaning this creator is not omnipotent; or there are things this creator could not know, which means this creator is not omniscient; or free will cannot exist. That's what you basically said, though I see you seem to have missed that.
 
Beilby, Wykstra and Alston (quoted by ceo_esq) claim:

"The atheist, in claiming that there is at least one instance of evil which has no justifying good, is undertaking an exceptionally difficult task."

I am interested - do they have a particular atheist in mind, or is it just a straw man?
Beilby makes clear elsewhere that he has William Rowe in mind specifically, but it is obviously equally applicable to any atheist who has subscribed to logical or probabilistic arguments for the non-existence of God based on the apparent existence of gratuitous evil. I certainly wouldn't call it a straw man.
 
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Assuming that middle knowledge does not exist, which is a fair assumption, you say that 'an omniscient creator, naturally, could make highly educated guesses...' This means, naturally, that this creator is not actually omniscient. There would be no guesswork with omniscient - guesswork implies the possibility of being wrong, and therefore, of not being omniscient.
My reference to "educated guesses" was, of course, simply shorthand for the fact that God would have exhaustive knowledge of the truth of deterministic counterfactuals, but not counterfactuals of freedom (because if no middle knowledge exists, such counterfactuals have no inherent truth or falsity for God to know). In retrospect, "guesswork" might have been a misleading description here. But the fact remains that such a God is indeed omniscient, because for every possible proposition with truth-value, he knows whether it is true. The fact that counterfactuals of freedom (by definition in this case) are neither true nor false simply means that they are logically excluded from omniscience in the same way we earlier argued that the "power" to create married bachelors is excluded from omnipotence. God would still know everything capable of being known.

"he could only visualize the complete timeline of the universe he actually creates..." This means, naturally, that he knows every action of every person past, present, and future, since he is creating the universe in its entirety (all dimensions simultaneously) and since he is both omnipotent and omniscient. Hence, no free will.
In the case I outlined, it seems to me that God would know the complete timeline of the actual universe once he created it. It would not be possible for God to have absolute knowledge of never-actualized timelines (that would constituted middle knowledge). It would be logically impossible, in the absence of middle knowledge, for God to hand-pick your timeline for actualization based on having previewed your free choices in every conceivable circumstance.

At that point, God would perceive your future in a manner not unlike the way in which I perceive your present - i.e. without such perception implying control.

As I said before, to suggest otherwise would imply that this creator has to work with something over which he has no control - meaning this creator is not omnipotent; or there are things this creator could not know, which means this creator is not omniscient; or free will cannot exist. That's what you basically said, though I see you seem to have missed that.
I feel we are slipping back into the "square circle" quagmire. A being who possesses all possible power and all possible knowledge is omnipotent and omniscient. The supposed limitations to God's knowledge which you identify in my hypothetical basically flow, as far as I can tell, from the fact that the hypothetical explicitly assumes the impossibility of middle knowledge. If you object to that assumption, say so (after all, I'm not sure whether I myself believe it). Don't go along with it and then suggest that its natural consequences pose definitional problems for you.
 

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