There is No God (And You Know It)

Beilby makes clear elsewhere that he has William Rowe in mind specifically, but it is obviously equally applicable to any atheist who has subscribed to logical or probabilistic arguments for the non-existence of God based on the apparent existence of gratuitous evil. I certainly wouldn't call it a straw man.
It is not obvious at all. It sounds a lot more like what a theist would like the atheists to be saying so that they could easily dismiss it.

I am sure any atheologist (is there such a thing?) worth listening to would not make such an assertion on the basis that it could be tested by attempting to find just such a natural evil. It is more likely they would assume the negative conclusion and see if that resulted in any absurd or unacceptable conclusion. But Beilby et al do not seem to have considered that a claim might be tested in this way.
 
In the case I outlined, it seems to me that God would know the complete timeline of the actual universe once he created it. It would not be possible for God to have absolute knowledge of never-actualized timelines (that would constituted middle knowledge). It would be logically impossible, in the absence of middle knowledge, for God to hand-pick your timeline for actualization based on having previewed your free choices in every conceivable circumstance.

At that point, God would perceive your future in a manner not unlike the way in which I perceive your present - i.e. without such perception implying control.
The problem is that you have to find some definition of libertarian free will and a version of God that is satisfied by this answer. Would such a God be able to intervene, for example answer prayers? Most people would like to think of God as being able to interact with his creation in a personal way. But if he can he can certainly create the book-in-a-safe of my earlier example. Remember that in order for libertarian free will to exist, if I have two choices then there must be the possibility that I might select either at any time before the choice is instantiated. But if such a book is capable of existing this version of free will is impossible.

And of course the possibility of John receiving the combination of the safe makes it even more complicated.

In this example free will might be possible with a non-interactive God but not with an interactive God.
 
My reference to "educated guesses" was, of course, simply shorthand for the fact that God would have exhaustive knowledge of the truth of deterministic counterfactuals, but not counterfactuals of freedom (because if no middle knowledge exists, such counterfactuals have no inherent truth or falsity for God to know).

So what you are implying is that foreknowledge regarding the choices made by a 'free agent' would be logically excempt from omniscience? In other words, no matter what else God knows, God can never, ever be certain of the outcome of what choices a free agent makes?

This further implies that 'future' must remain unknown to God as well - and further, that God remains constrained by spacetime.

Otherwise, there is know 'fore-', 'middle-', or 'aft-'knowledge - only knowledge. This is one of the conceptualizations of omniscience which has always bothered me - the idea of 'knows everything that can be known' for the creator of 'All-That-Is' instantly means, by definition of all terms used, that this creator knows past, present, and future of 'All-That-Is' instantly upon creation. WE think of creating a thing in a moment of time - or in several, actually - and then imagine this thing progressing in an orderly fashion down the currents of time; but for this Creator, time is yet another aspect of the whole of the thing, to be created ex-nihilo. Hence, whereas we might build a boat and send it floating gently downstream over a few minutes, God has at the same 'time' (for lack of a better term) grown the tree, done the carpentry, built the boat, sailed it on the river, picked it up at the end of its course, hacked it into firewood, and toasted marshmallows over its burning embers. Temporal aspect of a given object is no different than any other aspect, if we are referring to a deity who has created time as well as all other things.

In retrospect, "guesswork" might have been a misleading description here. But the fact remains that such a God is indeed omniscient, because for every possible proposition with truth-value, he knows whether it is true. The fact that counterfactuals of freedom (by definition in this case) are neither true nor false simply means that they are logically excluded from omniscience in the same way we earlier argued that the "power" to create married bachelors is excluded from omnipotence. God would still know everything capable of being known.

Again, I disagree... as well as disagreeing with the 'married bachelor' argument. However, under the constraints of our universe, we must agree that 'married bachelor' is a logical possibility and that God, apparently bound by rules of logic, could not be expected to create one.

However, if God is omniscient, does this not automatically mean God has awareness of past, present, and future simultaneously? If not, this means God cannot have created 'time' and is not in control of future events (is not omnipotent). If so, then it is logically impossible for these 'counterfactuals of freedom' to be neither true nor false, as, for the omniscient being, they are already resolved variables.

Think back to Ian's rant about the probability of his birth, and his rave against the idea that this probability was 1. This is what I'm getting at here - for a truly omnipotent, omniscient creator God, all probabilities are resolved at either 1 or 0. Why? Because they have already happened, within God's awareness. So free will becomes logically impossible, in this case.

In the case I outlined, it seems to me that God would know the complete timeline of the actual universe once he created it. It would not be possible for God to have absolute knowledge of never-actualized timelines (that would constituted middle knowledge). It would be logically impossible, in the absence of middle knowledge, for God to hand-pick your timeline for actualization based on having previewed your free choices in every conceivable circumstance.

Then God could not be omniscient, now could he?

At that point, God would perceive your future in a manner not unlike the way in which I perceive your present - i.e. without such perception implying control.

Then God could not be omnipotent, now could he?

I feel we are slipping back into the "square circle" quagmire. A being who possesses all possible power and all possible knowledge is omnipotent and omniscient. The supposed limitations to God's knowledge which you identify in my hypothetical basically flow, as far as I can tell, from the fact that the hypothetical explicitly assumes the impossibility of middle knowledge. If you object to that assumption, say so (after all, I'm not sure whether I myself believe it). Don't go along with it and then suggest that its natural consequences pose definitional problems for you.

What poses a problem for me is the idea that, somehow, 'middle knowledge' implies 'free will' - I have no problem for the existence itself of 'middle knowledge'; from a deific point of view, this makes perfect sense; but to say that 'middle knowledge' allows God to force a choice without affecting free will is moronic at best.

And if God does NOT have 'middle knowledge', then God is not omniscient. It's really that simple.

My argument wasn't against 'middle knowledge' as an aspect of omniscience; my argument was that 'middle knowledge' is automatically incompatible with 'free will', as well.

So, once again, it boils down to: either God is not omniscient; Free Will does not exist; or God did not create Time (and, as such, is also not omniscient).
 
It is not obvious at all. It sounds a lot more like what a theist would like the atheists to be saying so that they could easily dismiss it.

As far as I can see - and here I am open to correction - the usual formulations of the problem of evil, which many nonbelievers (myself included) have invoked at one time or another, involve at some stage advancing the claim that there exists or has existed at least one evil for which there is no justifying good.

I am sure any atheologist (is there such a thing?) worth listening to would not make such an assertion on the basis that it could be tested by attempting to find just such a natural evil. It is more likely they would assume the negative conclusion and see if that resulted in any absurd or unacceptable conclusion. But Beilby et al do not seem to have considered that a claim might be tested in this way.
Could you elaborate?

By the way, I do sometimes see the term atheologian used to describe atheist philosophers of religion.
 
So what you are implying is that foreknowledge regarding the choices made by a 'free agent' would be logically excempt from omniscience? In other words, no matter what else God knows, God can never, ever be certain of the outcome of what choices a free agent makes?
I am suggesting that if middle knowledge does not exist - which, for purposes of the hypothetical, is true - then God can know the outcome of the choices an actual free agent makes (or, if you prefer, the choices a free agent makes in circumstances that actually come to pass), but not the outcome of choices a non-actual free agent (a hypothetical one with no real timeline) would make, because those outcomes are intrinsically uncertain. Propositions about them have no truth-value for God or anyone else to know. If they did, then by definition middle knowledge would exist and we would have contradicted the premise that it doesn't!

To me, it makes no more sense to say that omniscience requires knowing the truth of propositions which have no truth-value, than it does to say that omnipotence requires the ability to actualize things which cannot meaningfully be described as states of affairs.

This further implies that 'future' must remain unknown to God as well - and further, that God remains constrained by spacetime.
I can't see why. In my hypothetical, God has complete knowledge of the created timeline once he creates it.

If so, then it is logically impossible for these 'counterfactuals of freedom' to be neither true nor false, as, for the omniscient being, they are already resolved variables.
This amounts to saying that middle knowledge necessarily exists, which is problematic enough even if it didn't violate the terms of the hypothetical, which it does. It is also an unneeded conclusion; remember that (in my hypothetical) once God actualizes the initial conditions of the universe, its future is not counterfactual. It is factual, and God can perceive it directly.

Then God could not be omniscient, now could he?
Insofar as he possessed all possible knowledge, which in the hypothetical he does, then of course he would be.

Then God could not be omnipotent, now could he?
Insofar as he possessed all possible power, which in the hypothetical he does, then of course he would be.
 
Last edited:
What poses a problem for me is the idea that, somehow, 'middle knowledge' implies 'free will' - I have no problem for the existence itself of 'middle knowledge'; from a deific point of view, this makes perfect sense; but to say that 'middle knowledge' allows God to force a choice without affecting free will is moronic at best.

And if God does NOT have 'middle knowledge', then God is not omniscient. It's really that simple.

My argument wasn't against 'middle knowledge' as an aspect of omniscience; my argument was that 'middle knowledge' is automatically incompatible with 'free will', as well.
Are we speaking at cross-purposes here? My hypothetical did not suggest that middle knowledge allows God to force a choice without affecting free will. In fact, the reason I excluded middle knowledge from the hypothetical is because I suspect that if it could exist, it might very well be incompatible with free will (although I am not certain). To that extent, at least for the purposes of the argument as it currently stands, we are basically in agreement. So why do you keep bringing up the hypothetical existence of middle knowledge, when I am clearly trying to explore the hypothetical consequences for free will of the non-existence of middle knowledge?
 
As far as I can see - and here I am open to correction - the usual formulations of the problem of evil, which many nonbelievers (myself included) have invoked at one time or another, involve at some stage advancing the claim that there exists or has existed at least one evil for which there is no justifying good.
The question is how they justify this statement. The article refers to data, complexity, metaphysical knowledge etc as though the atheologist was going to do a brute search for this evil attempting to track down every single consequence for every act until they hit paydirt. As I said the easier way would be to simply assume the negative, which is presumably the positive that Beilby etc are asserting.
Could you elaborate?
I thought I did, but I will recap. I am no philosopher so I hope a professional might make a better fist of it than I do.

First assume that every single case of natural evil is specifically necessary to some consequent justifying good. In addition it would have to be the least worst means to that good.

Assume I am a believer in an impeccable God. A man is dying from a severe asthmatic attack and I am in a position to help by reaching his medicine. I reason that this natural evil is necessary to some consequent and justifying good and so I should just stand back and do nothing and that good will ensue. I don't need to know what this good is, I only need to know that God is impeccable and know that some good will ensue.

I am of course perfectly right in my reasoning since we have just assumed that there is no case of natural evil that is not justified by some consequent good.

Of course it occurs to me that the greater good may be the opportunity for me to help my fellow man. But I know this cannot be the case because I have free will and an impeccable God cannot even allow the possibility of a case of natural evil that did not have a consequent good, which is of course impossible. So not helping is still the rational course.

So I will sit idly by and allow an innocent man to die an unpleasant death and I will not have done anything wrong. Extrapolate from this to all the opportunities to alleviate suffering due to natural evil and it is clearly an unacceptable position - our choices need to have real moral consequences.

But there is the problem, if our choices have real moral consequences it requires that at least some natural evil does not have a happy ending. And with free will there is always the possibility that someone will not do their part

So either there is some instance of natural evil that is not justified by a consequent good or our moral choices in the face of natural evil are meaningless.

The alternative is of course that while a greater good does not accrue to each individual instance of natural evil - the fact of natural evil itself may lead to a greater good. It does not specifically require that Timmy suffers, Jimmy would do as well.

But this still leaves a problem since God has the same moral obligations as us given the same knowledge and God has at least the same knowledge as us.

If a natural evil has no specific justifying good then we have a real moral obligation to help, but so does God. But God is powerless to help since if he helps one he must help all and all suffering would end and the greater good would disappear.

So God is obliged to commit net acts of evil.
 
Are we speaking at cross-purposes here? My hypothetical did not suggest that middle knowledge allows God to force a choice without affecting free will. In fact, the reason I excluded middle knowledge from the hypothetical is because I suspect that if it could exist, it might very well be incompatible with free will (although I am not certain). To that extent, at least for the purposes of the argument as it currently stands, we are basically in agreement. So why do you keep bringing up the hypothetical existence of middle knowledge, when I am clearly trying to explore the hypothetical consequences for free will of the non-existence of middle knowledge?

Without middle knowledge, God could not be said to be omniscient. "To know all that it is possible to know" is not omniscience; "to know everything" is.

Look at it this way:

Interviewer: "So, God, let's talk about free will, for a moment."
GOD: "Sure, Johnny."
Interviewer: "It's awful nice that you've given us the ability to make our own choices."
GOD: "Well, Johnny, I'm a nice Deity; go fig."
Interviewer: "Say, what will Ed over there answer his girlfriend about getting married tonight?"
--scenario 1--
GOD: "Ed has free will - I cannot possibly know what Ed will decide."
Interviewer: "But aren't you omniscient?"
GOD: "I can only know what it is possible to know. Since Ed is a free agent, I cannot know what choices he will make in every scenario."
Interviewer: "But don't you know the future, too? Didn't you create time itself?"
GOD: "I'm sorry, Johnny, could you rephrase the question?"
Interviewer: "God, your followers believe that you created time and space itself. If you don't know what Ed over there is going to say tonight, that means you don't have intimate knowledge of future events?"
GOD: "Yes, Johnny, that's right..."
--conclusion--
God is either non-omniscient, or is not the creator of time itself and, therefore, non-omnipotent.
--scenario 2--
GOD: "Ed's going to agree to marry her tonight."
Interviewer: "Oh, that's great! Because her family was really getting antsy on the subject... Old Italian 'Family', if you know what I mean..."
GOD: "Of course I know what you mean."
Interviewer: "Really? Say, tell us what would happen if Ed refused the marriage proposal?"
GOD: "Don't be ridiculous - Ed is going to marry that girl."
Interviewer: "But he COULD choose not to... right?"
GOD: "He could, but he won't. There is no reason to consider any alternatives."
Interviewer: "Wait a minute... he could but he won't? Um... am I missing something here, Ed?"
Ed: (off camera) "Hyuk hyuk hyuk... Maybe I'll refuse just to exercise my 'free will'."
GOD: "Don't be a putz, Edward. I am the Lord thy God, and I have said you will accept that marriage proposal."
Interviewer: "Then Ed really doesn't have free will, does he?"
GOD: "What? No, I... er... well, he could choose otherwise, but he WON'T."
--conclusion: free will is just an illusion--

These are the only two scenarios I can imagine, try as I might, where so-called 'middle knowledge' is excluded, and as far as I can tell, doing so either precludes free will or precludes certain deific qualities.

As for using depleted definitions of omni____, such a depleted definition further requires a supreme being to be subordinate to or bound by one of its creations. This is the opposing extreme to lifegazer's view that omni____ must necessarily include the ability to generate and actualize paradox, but it should be noted that there is something to what ol' singularity had to say about omni_____ - his use of the term was more conceptually coherent for what we should expect of a deific creator than one that limits and warps this deity to fit within the boundaries and rules of his creation. Of course, his use of the term also means that meaningful logical discussion of God becomes next to impossible, but them's the breaks.
 
OK, my suit of armor is on, and I'm ready to answer.

Make sure your AC is at least 60.

1. He might be the creator of the universe. You said that current theory explain the origins of the universe without God. True enough, but that doesn't mean that the current theory is correct (which is why it's still called a "theory.") You have offered no evidence at all that God couldn't have created the universe.

? In the presence of a simpler, more parsimonous and supported theory, musn't we abandon the OTHER theories until someone comes up with more evidence in their favor ?

2. He might judge us after we die. You didn't comment on this one at all.

Yes I did. I said that this requires the existence of the soul, which itself is suspect. No souls, no judgment, unless you contend that we physically appear before him.

3. He might be the catalyst for free will. You asked me to further explain, and I said that current scientific theory suggests that there is no free will because of determinism. God might exist in order to allow us to have free will, perhaps by providing an exception to determinism by allowing us to have free will in an otherwise deterministic universe. You then asked "By doing what that would be different from a godless universe ?" which wasn't an argument against God's purpose being to provide free will at all.

I'm just trying to understand your position, here. And my first question was, how could we tell the difference between a universe where God exists and allows free will, and a universe where he doesn't exist and there still IS free will. Or even a universe where he doesn't exist and there's NO free will ? The point of this question is, again, if we can't tell the difference between the two (or three,) its hard to believe in any of them, unless, of course, further evidence is given. I think we have that evidence.

4. He might provide consciousness. You didn't comment on this one at all.

Again, we have every reason to believe consciousness is a function of the brain. There would have to be some fundamental aspect of the human mind that we simply are boggled by. I don't think this is the case.

5. He might endow the raw materials for life with life. You claimed that science can explain life and that we know how cells and genes work and why. I pointed out that, no, science cannot fully explain life much less create life, and furthermore even if science could do either, that wouldn't preclude God from creating life (or having created life).

Of course, but why posit a function to God for which he's not required ? I also pointed out that beign able to create life isn't important for science at this point. All we must have is a good understanding of how it forms and how it is different from "non-life". Again, I think we have a good model for that.

6. He might make tornados and earthquakes. You said that we know how tornadoes and earthquakes happen, implying that God couldn't possibly cause them. I pointed out that this is not true, that not only do we not know all the factors that cause tornadoes and earthquakes, we cannot prove that God isn't the cause of those factors.

Well, could you elaborate on what we don't know about these phenomena ?

Even if you somehow disproved all of the functions I listed (you didn't actually disprove even one of them) I could always make up more possible functions, or better yet say that we don't know his function but he might still have one. Even if you could somehow prove that God has no function, that doesn't mean that God doesn't exist (just that God is useless).

That's the point. Nothing is useless. Everything is a cause or an effect of something else (and though the universe, according to quantum physics, doesn't have a cause per se, it still is a "result" of "physical" processes. I'm using quotation marks because I'm not sure if I can use these words in this context.) If God doesn't serve a function at all, we have no reason to believe he exists. That's why I'm saying that, we know, beyond reasonable (not absolute, see) doubt (that is, according to everything else we know) that he doesn't exist. Sure enough, there's always a bare possibility that he does, but I'm rarely interested in bare possibilities.

That has nothing to do with God going against the laws of physics/nature or logic. There is no reason to think that God wouldn't be able to disobey the laws of nature. To the contrary, I would say that a God that couldn't disobey the laws of nature might disprove some concepts of God (but perhaps not all). If you could only prove that God can't disobey the laws of logic, that might disprove certain other concepts of God (but definitely not all and probably not even most).

Well, it all depends on your definition of God. If someone says that he is omnipotent in the sense that he can do the logically impossible, that would do it right there, but then that's part of the definition, so it all depends on how you want to see God.
 
Last edited:
I would like to hear of an example of a choice made by a person that cannot be anything but the result of only external causes, much less evidence that all choices are the result of only external causes.

"External" causes include biological/chemical reactions within the body, I assume ?

It's interesting, because I'm yet to see anything that indicates that every decision we make ISN'T the result of those causes only.
 
ceo_esq
What it reveals is that no one has yet been able clearly to demonstrate that foreknowledge and freedom are mutually exclusive. Saying that this question has been resolved doesn't make it so.
Want a logical proof?

Bri
Again, you asked what purpose God might serve, and I said that he might serve the purpose of creating life. I also said that science has yet to create life, and possibly never will. I don't see the fallacy there. Please don't cry "fallacy" unless you can at least identify the fallacy.
Argument from ignorance.

I claimed no such thing. Belz asked for possible purposes for God's existance. I never claimed it to be true, only that it was possibly true.
Yet it remains a claim set forth by yourself. Which places the burden of proof squarely on your shoulders.
Just claiming a possibility is tantamount to just shrugging your shoulders and going ‘I don’t know.’

Again, the burden of proof was on Belz to provide evidence that the deist God doesn't exist as he claimed could be done. He might choose to do so by disproving the existance of the human soul, but the burden of proof would be on him to disprove it, not on me to prove it.
No it wouldn’t be on Belz. Since you can’t disprove a general negative, only specifics it is up to the ones proclaiming the existence of a soul to define it. (Actually it’s up to them to provide evidence for it’s existence as well.)

Damn I’m behind – I’ll try and catch up later

Ossai
 
Ossai, I for one would like to see a logical proof that foreknowledge and free will (freedom) are mutually exclusive. :)

Because as I see it, having foreknowledge of an event may or may not change the behavior (successful or otherwise) of those involved based on their individual preferences and decisions; therefore foreknowledge of an event doesn't preclude free will.

In my experience, most people argue the issue by using an example where there's a monumental, personal life-or-death decision to be made, and where someone is forced by foreknowledge to act in self-preservation. That's only one possible situation, though.

As opposed to a situation where personal self-preservation comes into play, let's try this example:

Someone has a vision that flight 123 of XYZ airlines, departing Oshkosh on October 2 at 10 AM and arriving in Shangra-La on October 2 at 11 PM is going to crash into the mountains. They see the whole thing from start to finish; the passengers boarding, some happy, some quiet, some dealing with fussy children, etc... right up to the last few seconds when the fireball blooms in the night. They know exactly what's going to happen, why it happens and when it happens.

Assuming they accept this vision as true, they decide they're going to try and prevent the disaster. they try their best; contact the authorities; the authorities tell them to "Get lost, nutcase!"

They then decide to show up at the airport and try to get people to listen to them. Everyone ignores them; they're arrested, taken away - and the plane crashes, just as predicted.

Regardless of their success or failure, their free will came into play; they made several decisions along the way. Decisions that they weren't compelled to make, in fact.

Alternatively, someone could have the same vision and dismiss it - and do nothing. Well, almost nothing; they might be a bit freaked out by the dream, and so they might watch the news on October 2 for any announcements of a plane crash. To their horror, they find out that the dream wasn't just a dream, but a warning. One which they chose to ignore, in fact.

Again, they've exercised their free will - they chose to believe that the vision was a dream; they also chose to watch the news to confirm your belief.

Want a third example?

They have the vision; they believe it's true; but being a heartless sociopath, they do nothing but stock up on junk food and watch the TV eagerly for the announcement of the crash.

Sick, but still an example of free will.

A fourth example? Sure. They have the vision; think it's a dream, and do absolutely nothing... and they remain ignorant that the plane crash actually happened because they don't bother watching the news that day.

Foreknowledge may dictate an appropriate series of actions to achieve a desired goal or effect... however, people are not under the compulsion to act accordingly. I see that every day when people indulge themselves in self-destructive behavior, knowing exactly what the results will end up being. They don't have to act that way; they choose to act that way. :)

OK - that's my perspective. Let's debate; it's certainly possible I could be wrong. :)
 
Last edited:
Remember that in order for libertarian free will to exist, if I have two choices then there must be the possibility that I might select either at any time before the choice is instantiated. But if such a book is capable of existing this version of free will is impossible.

And of course the possibility of John receiving the combination of the safe makes it even more complicated.

In this example free will might be possible with a non-interactive God but not with an interactive God.

There are several possible answers. One is middle knowledge, but I don't find that the most satisfying for two reasons. One, it does limit God's foreknowledge to a very good guess based on a knowledge of all variables. The only way he could know what we would actually choose is perhaps by some knowledge of the mechanism that produces the free will, but we would never be able to understand how such a mechanism can be known beforehand and still be free. At the same time, it means that God doesn't really know the future, only that he can predict it. In this case, God would "guess" what John would do, and perhaps his guesses would always be accurate if he understood the free will mechanism in a way that we cannot.

A better explanation is the belief that God is omni-temporal. In other words, since God created time, he is timeless. This meshes well with other explanations that rely on God being "outside" of logic, nature, space, etc. In other words, God is everywhen at once. In this scenario, God simply directly observes John's future as he writes it down.

A third explanation is that "omniscience" means "to know all that can be known" and God simply doesn't know that which is caused by free will. He can, of course, force someone to do something and know the future, but cannot know the future where someone does something of their own free will. Even a truly omnipotent/omniscient God may be able to limit his own power in this way in order to provide free will (he still has the power if he chooses, but simply chooses not to use it in order to provide free will). To say that he should be able to do both is a logic paradox and has no meaning.

To answer the question about John discovering the combination...in all cases God would know that John would discover the combination beforehand since that too would be part of the future (perhaps determined) and could avoid the situation all together by not allowing it, or could make the words on the page perhaps change to match John's current state of mind.

All of these "dilemmas" could simply be the result of our lack of understanding of the logic of time, as suggested by the Stanford article.

-Bri
 
As far as I can see - and here I am open to correction - the usual formulations of the problem of evil, which many nonbelievers (myself included) have invoked at one time or another, involve at some stage advancing the claim that there exists or has existed at least one evil for which there is no justifying good.

That seems to have been the case in this discussion.

-Bri
 
Of course it occurs to me that the greater good may be the opportunity for me to help my fellow man. But I know this cannot be the case because I have free will and an impeccable God cannot even allow the possibility of a case of natural evil that did not have a consequent good, which is of course impossible. So not helping is still the rational course.

Here is the flaw in your logic. The "consequent good" is that you have the choice, not that you will make one decision or the other. In other words, it doesn't matter as far as that consequent good whether you choose to help him or not, it will still be for the consequent good because you have been given the choice. At this point, it is NOT for the good that you choose not to help him, and your logic breaks down. One can therefore assume that to try to second-guess that the "consequent good" actually is would not be for the "consequent good" in many cases.

-Bri
 
jmercer, I hate to say this: but not a single one of your examples deals with free will. The freedom of their choices is never once discussed in your examples. In fact, you specifically mention one of them is a 'sociopath' - meaning, that they are compelled to behave as you mentioned and are not 'free' to choose in this way.

Furthermore, this is not an adequate example of what we mean when we discuss foreknowledge versus free will - in none of these cases is the person with the foreknowledge foreseeing his own or others' choices, and acting to alter those choices (except in the first example, where we might observe that those involved were constrained to stay their course and fulfill the vision - thereby demonstrating an apparent lack of 'free will').
 
jmercer, I hate to say this: but not a single one of your examples deals with free will. The freedom of their choices is never once discussed in your examples. In fact, you specifically mention one of them is a 'sociopath' - meaning, that they are compelled to behave as you mentioned and are not 'free' to choose in this way.

Hi, Zaay. Long time, no discuss. ;)

In the case of the sociopath, you're quite correct, of course - and I withdraw it as an example, but will actually use it for contrast later on.

Let's continue with the other examples...

In the first example, the individual in question chooses to act and get involved; their initial effort fails to achieve the results they desire, so they act again by showing up at the airport, attempting to directly intervene. I would think that the alternative choices would be obvious, but perhaps not... they could have decided to not get involved. That would be one choice. Another choice would have been to drop the entire thing after the initial contact failed, and so forth. A discussion of free will doesn't require the outlining of all possible choices - all that's required is a single alternative choice.

I could have postulated that the individual with the vision could have been insanely rich - say, Bill Gates rich - immediately bought out all remaining seats on the flight and then offered to buy the other passenger's tickets at 10 times their value, plus a free flight on another airline to the destination of their choice. Or they could have chosen to pay the airline an insane amount of money to charter that particular flight as a private flight, bumping all the passengers off, another choice. The list goes on, and the choices are only limited by the resources of the "seer".

The second and fourth examples are alternative choices to each other... and the first.

And I didn't list other possible choices; the individual with the "vision" could appeal to the press, the government, could have made up some kind of story that would force the airline to delay the flight (or if it was a mechanical failure that caused the crash, to examine the component), etc.

However rediculous or clever the various choices available are, the ability to choose between them exists. The only time choice doesn't exist is when individuals are compelled to act, such as the sociopath example that you so rightly called me on.

For which I thank you, because that's a perfect example of a lack of free will. :)

Furthermore, this is not an adequate example of what we mean when we discuss foreknowledge versus free will - in none of these cases is the person with the foreknowledge foreseeing his own or others' choices, and acting to alter those choices (except in the first example, where we might observe that those involved were constrained to stay their course and fulfill the vision - thereby demonstrating an apparent lack of 'free will').

Free will doesn't require one person to affect another's choices. It merely requires the ability for each individual to make choices without compulsion.

Looking forward to continuing the debate... :)

ETA the following:

Zaay, you mentioned forseeing one's own choices as part of the criteria for discussion. However, this merely creates a paradox that cites by seeing one's future choice, one is compelled to make a different one. This paradox exists only because forseeing the future is paradoxical in and of itself. :)

Further, the choices made by others that led them to board that flight is irrelevant to the question of free will. For each person on the flight, there are certainly a number of people who chose not to fly that day. :)
 
Last edited:
In the presence of a simpler, more parsimonous and supported theory, musn't we abandon the OTHER theories until someone comes up with more evidence in their favor ?

Occam's Razor states that when two theories are equal we should choose the simpler. In practice, Occam's Razor is often wrong (the more complex theory is often the correct one). In this case, the two theories are not equal anyway.

Yes I did. I said that this requires the existence of the soul, which itself is suspect. No souls, no judgment, unless you contend that we physically appear before him.

Oh yes, you did later comment on that one, but it was not in response to this discussion (it was in response to a discussion specifically about the classic deist God). Even if we take your premise to be true that no souls means no judgement, you cannot prove that there are no souls. Unless you can provide evidence that we have no souls you are not any closer to disproving that God's purpose is to judge us.

I'm just trying to understand your position, here. And my first question was, how could we tell the difference between a universe where God exists and allows free will, and a universe where he doesn't exist and there still IS free will. Or even a universe where he doesn't exist and there's NO free will ? The point of this question is, again, if we can't tell the difference between the two (or three,) its hard to believe in any of them, unless, of course, further evidence is given. I think we have that evidence.

There are four possibilities: a universe in which there is no God but there is free will, a universe in which there is a God and there is free will, a universe in which there is no God and no free will, and a universe in which there is a God but no free will. You claim that these might actually all be the same, or at least we don't know what the differences would be. If I agree that this is true, then any of the four possibilities could be true, there is no way for us to know which is true, and you have successfully proven my point that it is possible that God's purpose is to provide free will.

Again, we have every reason to believe consciousness is a function of the brain. There would have to be some fundamental aspect of the human mind that we simply are boggled by. I don't think this is the case.

We don't really know what consciousness is, much less what causes it. Perhaps God causes it. Even if it is a function of the brain, until we understand how the brain functions to produce consciousness, it might be caused by God. Incidentally, we are boggled by many, many aspects of the human brain (some people's brains more than others)!

Of course, but why posit a function to God for which he's not required ? I also pointed out that beign able to create life isn't important for science at this point. All we must have is a good understanding of how it forms and how it is different from "non-life". Again, I think we have a good model for that.

Three answers. First, a God that isn't required might be useless, but that doesn't mean that he doesn't exist. Second, you are incorrect if you believe that we have a good understanding of how life forms and how it is different from non-life. Third, and more importantly, God's purpose might have been to create the first humans, and might still be to create life (until we humans learn how to do it). God would perhaps become useless if and when we actually do create life, but you cannot prove that we ever will. Even if he becomes useless in the future, he isn't useless now.

Well, could you elaborate on what we don't know about these phenomena ?

Actually, you should elaborate on what we DO know about them. We actually know surprisingly little about the causes of these kinds of phenomena. If we knew all the factors that create them, we would be able to predict them with certainty. You might say that earthquakes are caused by the plates of the earth causing friction against one another, but we don't know what causes the plates to move as they do when they do. Perhaps God causes it. You might say that a tornado is caused by specific patterns of air and temperature, but we don't know what causes those pattens of air and temperature. Perhaps God causes them.

If God doesn't serve a function at all, we have no reason to believe he exists.

Again, I have listed several possible functions, none of which can be disproven. Furthermore, the conclusion "we have no reason to believe he exists" does not logically follow from the premise "If God doesn't serve a function at all." It is possible that God did serve a function at one time, but doesn't any longer (in which case he may still exist), and it is possible that he doesn't currently serve a function, but he may serve a function in the future (perhaps he currently chooses not to interact with the world, but may bring about the end of the world at some point).

That's why I'm saying that, we know, beyond reasonable (not absolute, see) doubt (that is, according to everything else we know) that he doesn't exist. Sure enough, there's always a bare possibility that he does, but I'm rarely interested in bare possibilities.

I don't agree with your definition of "reasonable doubt" in this case. You haven't provided a shred of evidence that God doesn't exist, much less that it is impossible for God to exist.

Well, it all depends on your definition of God. If someone says that he is omnipotent in the sense that he can do the logically impossible, that would do it right there, but then that's part of the definition, so it all depends on how you want to see God.

Actually, the God that you are least likely to be able to disprove is the one who is beyond logic. You simply cannot touch that definition of God at all since all arguments you can make are limited by logic. The best you can hope for is to try to disprove the notions of God that are limited by logic, but you have yet to do that either.

-Bri
 
Last edited:
"External" causes include biological/chemical reactions within the body, I assume ?

Your definition of "external" vs. "internal" would all depend on what you consider to be part of the "agent" (whether the agent is just the brain/mind or whether the agent is the whole body). In this case, it doesn't actually matter because "external causes" would include internal states that are completely caused by external factors.

It's interesting, because I'm yet to see anything that indicates that every decision we make ISN'T the result of those causes only.

The best evidence of free will is that most of us "feel" that we have it and act as though we have it. We get angry at people for harming us (even though if they didn't have free will they would have had no choice but to harm us). Our judicial system also assumes that we have free will. Of course, this isn't proof that we have free will, and there is little scientific evidence in support of free will. That doesn't mean we don't have it though.

-Bri
 
Someone has a vision that flight 123 of XYZ airlines, departing Oshkosh on October 2 at 10 AM and arriving in Shangra-La on October 2 at 11 PM is going to crash into the mountains. They see the whole thing from start to finish; the passengers boarding, some happy, some quiet, some dealing with fussy children, etc... right up to the last few seconds when the fireball blooms in the night. They know exactly what's going to happen, why it happens and when it happens.

Assuming they accept this vision as true, they decide they're going to try and prevent the disaster. they try their best; contact the authorities; the authorities tell them to "Get lost, nutcase!"

They then decide to show up at the airport and try to get people to listen to them. Everyone ignores them; they're arrested, taken away - and the plane crashes, just as predicted.

This doesn't demonstrate free will or not - it says nothing about why they made the choice to intervene at all. In this situation, they probably had 'a very strong feeling' that this vision was true. This feeling compelled them, as well as their apparently moral nature, their stubbornness, etc. These factors all came into play - unless you are claiming these factors did not exist at all.

In other words, not enough info provided to judge whether or not this was an act of 'free will'.

Regardless of their success or failure, their free will came into play; they made several decisions along the way. Decisions that they weren't compelled to make, in fact.

You failed to demonstrate whether they were compelled to make these decisions or not.

Alternatively, someone could have the same vision and dismiss it - and do nothing. Well, almost nothing; they might be a bit freaked out by the dream, and so they might watch the news on October 2 for any announcements of a plane crash. To their horror, they find out that the dream wasn't just a dream, but a warning. One which they chose to ignore, in fact.

Again, they've exercised their free will - they chose to believe that the vision was a dream; they also chose to watch the news to confirm your belief.

Did they choose this? Or has their life's experience taught them that such 'visions' are merely dreams? Are they hard-core skeptics, prone to dismissing the unusual and bizarre as merely intense dreaming? You don't discuss the underlying factors between these two scenarios, so you don't truly discuss 'free will' here at all.

They have the vision; they believe it's true; but being a heartless sociopath, they do nothing but stock up on junk food and watch the TV eagerly for the announcement of the crash.

Sick, but still an example of free will.

At least you understand why this one is not.

A fourth example? Sure. They have the vision; think it's a dream, and do absolutely nothing... and they remain ignorant that the plane crash actually happened because they don't bother watching the news that day.

Again, not an example for or against free will either.

Foreknowledge may dictate an appropriate series of actions to achieve a desired goal or effect... however, people are not under the compulsion to act accordingly. I see that every day when people indulge themselves in self-destructive behavior, knowing exactly what the results will end up being. They don't have to act that way; they choose to act that way. :)

Do they really, though? There are other compulsions involved, too, you know: addiction to self-gratification, ingrained behavior patterns, etc.

The problem is, jmercer, that you're approaching this from the point of view that all decisions are made in a vacuum, or at best, that 'all else being the same' that these are the choices offered. Yet you've neither stated this as a premise, nor implied it in the scenarios. These are incomplete examples at best. They don't prove nor disprove free will.
 

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom