There is No God (And You Know It)

Until he made the decision. But not when he made the decision.

So I am free to do anything I want until I actually want to do it.

No. More accurately, the possiblity that John would go right did exist until John actually went left, which was observed by God.

You are free to do anything you want until you actually do it.

-Bri
 
Bri said:
This is really not that difficult of a concept. Imagine that the good in the world increases by 100 points for God providing you the opportunity to do good and another 100 points for God allowing you to accept the consequences of the choice. If God makes a dude get hit by a bus in front of you -- 100 points for the world. Now you can help him (10 points) or not help him (-10 points). Whatever your choice is, if God doesn't intervene and help the dude, it's a bonus 100 points for the world for allowing your action to have consequences. God knows that pushing the dude in front of the bus will have no other affect on the net good in the world. What actions on God's part increases the net good in the world the most? What action on your part increases the net good in the world the most?
Since any event caused by God is by definition not evil then you will have to explain on what basis you are adding 10 points for preventing a non-evil event.

Let's stick to what we can infer from the premise, remember all that we can reliably know is that if God does something then it is not evil
1. For all events A if A was caused by God then A is not evil (assumed premise)
2. A was caused by God
3. A is not evil (MP1,2)
4. If A is not evil then A is neutral or good
Now assuming I am capable of preventing A what should I do? Let's apply some very basic decision theory and see the effect of each action on the greater good:
Code:
|--------------------------------------------------------|
| My Action/Effect of A   |  Neutral   |  Good           |
|-------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| Prevent A               |  No effect |  No effect      |
| Do nothing              |  No effect |  Increase Good  |
|--------------------------------------------------------|
So without second-guessing God or making unbased assumptions we can see that the best option is to do nothing and as I said our choices have no real moral consequences.

There might be some brownie points one way or the other from a 'lesser good' standpoint but as you are implying God brownie points are of at least an order of magnitude greater so we should not risk losing the possibility of an increase in the 'greater good' for the outside possibility in the increase in the lesser good.

And in any case we are intrinsically incapable of understanding God's value system so we are not even sure if we know what he would consider a lesser good.
 
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Frustrating as it may be, we have no way of testing the existance of alternate realities, God, or many other things, so it would be very difficult if not impossible to prove that they don't exist (and similarly difficult if not impossible to prove that they do). That doesn't mean that they do exist, and it doesn't mean that they don't -- it means that they possibly exist.

Then, based on our mutually-agreed definition of impossible, I concur.
 
Again, that depends on your terms. It's the difference between "can" and "will." If you're asking if John can (has the ability to choose to) go right, then the answer is yes. If you're asking if it is possible that John will actually choose to go right, then the answer is no. God already observed John's choice, and he chose left, so no, John will not choose right.

RANT!

I suppose that all depends on what definition of free will we choose. But by the "classic" definition of free will, that is, the ability to make a decision independent of the physical factors, I don't think such a thing exist.

In fact, even if souls and God exist I don't see how one could make decisions OTHER than depend upon the physical factors. What would be the basis of a decision ? Chance ? That's not free will. And, if its arbitrary, I don't know how the word "will" fits in there.

 
God cannot help in this case because the greater good is better served by him not helping. The greater good is served by allowing you to accept the consequences of your actions or lack thereof. Yes you do know that helping your fellow person is for the good, and yes you do know the consequences of your actions.


That's fine for actions that harm yourself (though many people think punishing someone for actions that only harm themselves is unethical busybodying). But what about actions that harm others?

Ok, maybe a victim is partially responsible if they are aware they're putting themselves in a dangerous situation. (But again, to punish them for that on top of the victimization?)

And what about a baby being raped? Why should the baby suffer and then have its throat slit because God wants to allow full consequences of someone else's actions to occur?

This I claim is immoral behavior on God's part. If he was a bystander who could stop it, but didn't, that would be bad enough. But since he created the potential for the situation in the first place, there's no excuse. Highly fallible and decidedly finite humans get sued all the time because they clumsily introduced a harmful situation to others. Yet it is "good" for God precisely because he could stop it, that he doesn't?!?!? And worse, he knew the outcome, or at least the potential for it, and did it anyway? That goes beyond civil liabilities and into the criminal.
 
RANT!

I suppose that all depends on what definition of free will we choose. But by the "classic" definition of free will, that is, the ability to make a decision independent of the physical factors, I don't think such a thing exist.

In fact, even if souls and God exist I don't see how one could make decisions OTHER than depend upon the physical factors. What would be the basis of a decision ? Chance ? That's not free will. And, if its arbitrary, I don't know how the word "will" fits in there.


Exactly my point. God could clone the universe identically. Forgetting quantum randomness, would separate "runs" of this universe yield different decisions by humans as "free agents"?

If not, there's determinism.

If so, how does being a "free agent" differ from random influences on things? Just what is this decision-maker that makes decisions based heavily on deterministic inputs (I'm hungry and want food as general impetus) yet may decide different things on different "runs" of the universe, yet these differences are not due to randomness? If not randomness, then what? What could it possibly be?

You are driving, and decide to go to McDonald's, yet another "run" of the universe, you decide to go to Wendy's across the street. Why? What's inside this "free actor" mind that is ticking like clockwork, yet somehow arrives at a different decision, yet said decision is not random? They saw the Wendy's a fraction of a second earlier? Bzzzzt! Sorry, the universal runs are identical. And even if that were true, it still only implies determinism, and does not require a "free agent".
 
Now assuming I am capable of preventing A what should I do?

As I said before, you are confusing events. The greater good "A" that is being caused by God is providing you the opportunity to make a choice. It is NOT the man dying or any other result that might occur.

Your entire premise of preventing "A" makes no sense. You cannot prevent "A" if God has already caused "A" to occur. By saving the man or letting him die, you would in no way be preventing "A" since "A" is God giving you the choice.

-Bri
 
RANT!

I suppose that all depends on what definition of free will we choose. But by the "classic" definition of free will, that is, the ability to make a decision independent of the physical factors, I don't think such a thing exist.

In fact, even if souls and God exist I don't see how one could make decisions OTHER than depend upon the physical factors. What would be the basis of a decision ? Chance ? That's not free will. And, if its arbitrary, I don't know how the word "will" fits in there.


Many would agree with you. Science suggests that you are correct, but cannot discount the possibility that we are more than the sum of our parts. This so-called "dualism" (if true that we are more than the sum of our parts) could allow our minds to make our own decisions independent of external causes.

-Bri
 
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That's fine for actions that harm yourself (though many people think punishing someone for actions that only harm themselves is unethical busybodying). But what about actions that harm others?

Ok, maybe a victim is partially responsible if they are aware they're putting themselves in a dangerous situation. (But again, to punish them for that on top of the victimization?)

These are the same arguments Ossai and Robin have been using.

Actions by people that harm other innocent people are evil, but unfortunatley if we are to have free will, it must be possible for us to harm others. Your question is either why wouldn't God stop someone from harming another person, or why wouldn't God help the person after they are harmed. The answer is because free will is the greater good, and consequences are necessary for free will to exist.

And what about a baby being raped? Why should the baby suffer and then have its throat slit because God wants to allow full consequences of someone else's actions to occur?

This is simply an appeal to emotion and is no different than the case of any innocent person suffering from the choices of another person.

This I claim is immoral behavior on God's part. If he was a bystander who could stop it, but didn't, that would be bad enough. But since he created the potential for the situation in the first place, there's no excuse.

The "excuse" is that a world with free will is a greater good than a world with no free will but no human suffering.

Highly fallible and decidedly finite humans get sued all the time because they clumsily introduced a harmful situation to others. Yet it is "good" for God precisely because he could stop it, that he doesn't?!?!? And worse, he knew the outcome, or at least the potential for it, and did it anyway? That goes beyond civil liabilities and into the criminal.

Humans cannot provide free will, so there is no greater good that can come from not preventing harm to others. Evil human behavior is evil. If God does something that seems evil but is actually for the greater good, then it is not evil. Humans cannot do this because they cannot know what is for the greater good and would inevitably cause more evil than good.

-Bri
 
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Exactly my point. God could clone the universe identically. Forgetting quantum randomness, would separate "runs" of this universe yield different decisions by humans as "free agents"?

If free will is true, they could yield different results.

If not, there's determinism.

If so, how does being a "free agent" differ from random influences on things?

It could be very different. It might be no different at all. We simply cannot know.

Just what is this decision-maker that makes decisions based heavily on deterministic inputs (I'm hungry and want food as general impetus) yet may decide different things on different "runs" of the universe, yet these differences are not due to randomness? If not randomness, then what? What could it possibly be?

Reasoning or personal preference, perhaps. It is possible that our brains and minds are two separate things, one physical, one not. Our minds could make decisions that are independent of outside causes (but could still potentially be influenced by them).

You are driving, and decide to go to McDonald's, yet another "run" of the universe, you decide to go to Wendy's across the street. Why? What's inside this "free actor" mind that is ticking like clockwork, yet somehow arrives at a different decision, yet said decision is not random? They saw the Wendy's a fraction of a second earlier? Bzzzzt! Sorry, the universal runs are identical. And even if that were true, it still only implies determinism, and does not require a "free agent".

Perhaps the agent desires McDonald's more, but it is farther away. On one run, the agent decides that the desire for a tasty Big Mac is more important, and the other the agent decides that it's more important to save the gas money.

-Bri
 
Many would agree with you. Science suggests that you are correct, but cannot discount the possibility that we are more than the sum of our parts. This so-called "dualism" (if true that we are more than the sum of our parts) could allow our minds to make our own decisions independent of external causes.

-Bri

Well, I, for one, would like to know exactly what could possibly influence decisions if not physical factors. Whats the added ingredient in free will, exactly ?
 
And what about a baby being raped? Why should the baby suffer and then have its throat slit because God wants to allow full consequences of someone else's actions to occur?
This is simply an appeal to emotion and is no different than the case of any innocent person suffering from the choices of another person.

Does the (im)morality of some acts rely, at least partially, on emotions like terror and pain?


The "excuse" is that a world with free will is a greater good than a world with no free will but no human suffering.

As I've said many times before, while it may be in the nature of an omnipotent and perfectly good god to create lesser beings, it does not follow one puts them in a universe where they can harm each other. Therein is the flaw in this theory about this universal design being a "greater good".



Humans cannot provide free will, so there is no greater good that can come from not preventing harm to others. Evil human behavior is evil. If God does something that seems evil but is actually for the greater good, then it is not evil. Humans cannot do this because they cannot know what is for the greater good and would inevitably cause more evil than good.

-Bri


I.e. "There are things Man was not meant to know" AKA "Mysterious are the ways of god" AKA "God is beyond human understanding".

These I reject out of hand as having no proof. To me, it seems this is just a corner into which God has been pushed philosophically, as various gods over the millenia suffered from games of one-upsmanship in a "my god can beat up your god" sort of way. The theologies evolved. Eventually one god is more powerful than all others put together (Odin), then the gods of other pantheons exist, but mine is tougher, then the other gods disappear to be replaced by angels as inferior, but otherwise created superbeings, then God is not just more powerful than all other gods, but more powerful than everything else put together. Finally, he is more powerful than anything else, even in theory.

His goodness followed a similar track, as "gooder" gods were more desireable than old-testament, capricious, murdering gods.

Finally we have evolved an infinitely good, infinitely powerful god, as none other can surpass it, both in power and in goodness. Unfortunately, nobody was paying attention to the cold, hard, murderous facts of reality. The reality created by this god.
 
Does the (im)morality of some acts rely, at least partially, on emotions like terror and pain?

I have no idea what you're asking.

As I've said many times before, while it may be in the nature of an omnipotent and perfectly good god to create lesser beings, it does not follow one puts them in a universe where they can harm each other. Therein is the flaw in this theory about this universal design being a "greater good".

Who's to say why God created us? Presumably for a greater good the exact nature of which we don't know. Just because we don't know doesn't mean our existance isn't for the greater good.

I.e. "There are things Man was not meant to know" AKA "Mysterious are the ways of god" AKA "God is beyond human understanding".

Yup!

These I reject out of hand as having no proof.

Of course they have no proof. I'm not saying that you should (or should not) believe in them. I'm simply pointing out that they are not impossible, and to state that they are impossible (as implied by the topic of the thread) is a belief based on faith rather than evidence.

To me, it seems this is just a corner into which God has been pushed philosophically, as various gods over the millenia suffered from games of one-upsmanship in a "my god can beat up your god" sort of way...

Of course atheists are not immune to this sort of bickering. "What, you're a pansy-ass weak atheist? Get an opinion, dude!" and "Well your stupid belief is based on faith, just like those irrational theists!"

I doubt that God, if he exists, could care less about any of this.

His goodness followed a similar track, as "gooder" gods were more desireable than old-testament, capricious, murdering gods.

Finally we have evolved an infinitely good, infinitely powerful god, as none other can surpass it, both in power and in goodness. Unfortunately, nobody was paying attention to the cold, hard, murderous facts of reality. The reality created by this god.

You mean the reality created by cold, hard, murderous people. Whether or not God exists, we are responsible for our own behavior.

-Bri
 
zaayrdragon said:
OK, forget 'true propositions' and all the psychobabble garbage for a minute - Prior to God creating the Universe, does God know every aspect of that universe, every possible choice that every possible being will ever make, etc? If God does, God is omniscient. If God doesn't, God isn't. If 'middle knowledge' does not exist, then God is not omniscient. "Why, why, why?" you cry, shaking your fists to the Heavens. Because if middle knowledge does NOT exist, then God cannot know the future, God cannot predict the actions of free agents, and God is restricted by Time.
If middle knowledge does not exist, then God cannot know absolutely how free agents would have acted in circumstances which are never actualized, because there is nothing to know. But I fail to see how this prevents him from knowing the future - that is, how actual free agents will behave in circumstances which do appear somewhere in the timeline of the natural universe. As you pointed out, once the initial conditions of the universe are actualized (let's call this actualization the "Big Bang" for short, without tying ourselves at all to what that term denotes in physics), the entire timeline leaps into being at once. In the absence of any actualized universe, the actions of hypothetical free agents constitute middle knowledge; there is no future to see into; no timeline at all. It would be logically impossible for an omniscient being to perceive an absent timeline. Thus, it is only in causing the Big Bang and actualizing a timeline that an omniscient God achieves an absolute guarantee of the choices of free agents. Logically, he cannot rely on such a guarantee in actualizing the initial conditions that constitute the Big Bang.

If middle knowledge is intrinsically impossible, then the foregoing is what we should reasonably expect divine omniscience to entail. Under those circumstances, I am satisfied that an omniscient being must have perfect knowledge of any actualized timeline without needing knowledge of non-actualized timelines (such "knowledge" would be meaningless).

Your instinct seems to be that the more things there are that don't constitute knowledge (for, by hypothesizing that middle knowledge is impossible, we also hypothesize accordingly that it is not a form of knowledge), the less omniscient God is. This is formally untrue, however. If there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, this fact simply modifies (indirectly) the significance of omniscience. Why theists or atheists need be troubled by this is not clear to me. The removal of some tea from China has a similar consequence on the what the expression All the tea in China signifies. Yet it has zero consequence on whether someone does or does not possess all the tea in China.

zaayrdragon said:
Again, I have to disagree with your analogy, because the two comparisons are not analogous. Here, you refer to a batting average, and the removal of 'hits'... I'm not a baseball geek, so forgive me if I have no idea what all that is about.
I will not pursue that particular argument any further, in that case.
 
As I said before, you are confusing events. The greater good "A" that is being caused by God is providing you the opportunity to make a choice. It is NOT the man dying or any other result that might occur.

Your entire premise of preventing "A" makes no sense. You cannot prevent "A" if God has already caused "A" to occur. By saving the man or letting him die, you would in no way be preventing "A" since "A" is God giving you the choice.

-Bri
No I never said A was the "greater good". Re read the example.

A is the event that God is causing to occur. For example "Man dies of asthmatic attack", "child dies from fatal disease".

I called these "natural evils" and you said no, they are not evil. So A is some non-evil event that God is causing to occur.

So my conclusion still stands - you objection was based on a poor reading of the example.
 
No. More accurately, the possiblity that John would go right did exist until John actually went left, which was observed by God.

You are free to do anything you want until you actually do it.

-Bri
So 60 seconds before John makes the turn there statement are three statements
A="At time t the statement 'John turns right' can possibly be true"
B="At time t the statement 'John turns left' is true"
C="At time t the statement 'John turns right' cannot possibly be true"

A is true because it is from the definition of free will
B is true because at that time an infallible statement from G says so
C is true because it follows from B

But C is ~A - they are mutually exclusive statements.

They cannot be true at the same time. So if J has free will G is not omnipotent.
 
ceo_esq said:
But I fail to see how this prevents him from knowing the future - that is, how actual free agents will behave in circumstances which do appear somewhere in the timeline of the natural universe. As you pointed out, once the initial conditions of the universe are actualized (let's call this actualization the "Big Bang" for short, without tying ourselves at all to what that term denotes in physics), the entire timeline leaps into being at once.
This, however, prevents him from being immanent in the universe, from my book in a safe example and also by considering that once God inspected the timeline he might be surprised, not only by what the humans do, but by what He does.
 
Bri said:
These are the same arguments Ossai and Robin have been using.
It is nothing even remotely like any argument I have been using. Do you read the stuff, or just assume you know what we are saying?
 
No I never said A was the "greater good". Re read the example. A is the event that God is causing to occur.

I actually re-read it several times, and it still makes no sense to me. Any event that God causes is for the greater good, so if God caused event "A" then "A" must be for the greater good!

For example "Man dies of asthmatic attack", "child dies from fatal disease".

Your post was in response to my post where a man gets hit by a bus. That is different from the examples above since God's purpose is unknown in your examples (in my example, God's purpose was to provide an opportunity to help the man).

You are now changing the premise. That's fine, but you didn't mention that in your post.

I called these "natural evils" and you said no, they are not evil. So A is some non-evil event that God is causing to occur.

OK, that part makes sense. But your entire conclusion is based on the premise that you are capable of preventing "A" from occurring. How can you prevent any of these from occurring?

So my conclusion still stands - you objection was based on a poor reading of the example.

You didn't give any example in your post, but were rather responding to my example. Your post doesn't seem to have anything to do with either my example or the ones that you gave above, since if God needs something to happen for the greater good, he would cause them to happen in such a way that you would never be able to prevent them. Your premise assumes that you're able to prevent A from occurring, which is impossible. Your premise is therefore moot.

Even if you were somehow able to prevent them, your table is wrong. Although God's actions cannot be evil, yours can. Your table is about your actions, not God's so why don't you include "Evil" in your table?

I'm afraid I don't understand the point of your post at all.

-Bri
 
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