ceo_esq said:
Short of a really compelling deductive proof, I'm not about to rule out the possibility that a timeless being's view of a timeline can include his own participation in it (timelessly, of course).
I have kept this back since I thought had provided at least one compelling deductive proof. The safe example shows that even ineffective participation in the world leads to a contradiction between the definition of omniscience and the definition of free will.
In addition I would have thought that observation would be ontologically prior to any action (unless God is flying blind). But chronologically successive events are ontologically contingent on any effective action. So effective action would invalidate the prior observation. So the possibility of participation in the universe renders any observation of it imperfect.
Another argument that occurred to me recently was along the lines of the following sketch:
Rather than a timeline it might be more useful to think of the universe as a sequence of contingent events. We select a simple example of such a sequence, for example:
Code:
A=1
B=f(A)
C=f(B)
D=f(C)
E=f(D)
F=f(E)
So for example f(x) might be 3x, in which case the sequence would be {1,3,9,27,81,243}.
But f(x) might equally be some non-deterministic operation in which case the sequence can still be evaluated.
So now we add 'foreknowledge' to the sequence:
Code:
A=1
B=f(A)
C=f(B)
D=f(C)+F
E=f(D)
F=f(E)
It may still be possible to evaluate the sequence if f(x) is a deterministic function, for example where f(x) = 3x then F=-30.375 will do just fine.
But in the case of a non-deterministic
f the sequence can't be evaluated first to last.
Now we write F as:
This can be rewritten as:
But notice that f
1 is f
-1. If
f has an inverse then it must be a function and therefore deterministic.
The generalisation of this should be fairly obvious and this has the advantage of not having to find a rigorous definition for free will.