There is No God (And You Know It)

I don't think I missed that point at all. I'm also not saying that events of free will actually happen, only that logic permits them.

Exactly, which was why I made the same comment to Belz who was demanding to know how free will works.

You are yet to show that free will is even possible, Bri. Proposing a function and a functioning would come a long way towards doing that.
 
Free will is a possibility because it's not impossible. Whether that possibility is "reasonable" is subjective, but given that many reasonable people believe it, I would say that it's a reasonable possibility.

Again, however, I don't understand how it isn't impossible. Free will implies that your decisions are NOT completely dependent upon physical, environmental factors. What else IS there besides those factors, random or not ?
 
There is no third way. I said that there are (at least) three possibilities: caused, random, or free will. The latter two might be "uncaused" by your definition.

If free will is uncaused, would it be random ? Otherwise, how could it exist ? How could "you" have control over the different decisions you could make at a point in time ?
 
Originally Posted by Bri :
You make quite an assumption that there are only two possibilities: caused or random. Free will would be a third possibility, and would be neither caused nor random.
I said that there are 2 possibilities - caused or not caused. I have described a non-caused event as random since from our perspective at least, that's what it appears to be. As I also said, an event that is not caused can, in fact be deemed to have caused itself. This does not break determinism.
Bri is right, the logical fallacy you are presenting is called a false dilemma based upon a materialistic world view. All we know is that we experience ourselves as decision makers living in a physical universe.

That we don't really make decisions is can only ever be theory and nothing more. The very idea that you can logically prove free-will is impossible is nonsense.
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HypnoPsi
 
If free will is uncaused, would it be random ? Otherwise, how could it exist ? How could "you" have control over the different decisions you could make at a point in time ?
In otherwords, how do we evaluate decisions? Do we make decisions based upon notions of good and evil? Out of self-interest or to benefit the circumstances of those important to us? Perhaps the only person we should be asking why we make the choices we make is ourselves?
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HypnoPsi
 
Again, however, I don't understand how it isn't impossible. Free will implies that your decisions are NOT completely dependent upon physical, environmental factors. What else IS there besides those factors, random or not ?
The conscious observer - call it whatever you like, self-awareness, the "I Am", the "Soul" the "central processor" or the "ego". We certainly experience it even if we can hypothesise it is a sham.

The problem with your question is that it frames the issue within eliminative materialism, thus limiting the discourse.
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HypnoPsi
 
i'd suggest that if free will means that your actions are not known beforehand then if God exists free will does not exist. But if free will means that you simply have ownership over your will, then if God exists, free will may still exist. If time is an illusion and not of necessary natural existence then perhaps it is reasonable to believe that God would be able to logically provide free will within the illusion of time and yet know what is (note the quotation marks) "going" to take place as he is outside of time.

It might depend upon your definition of free will, and I dont think there is really a universal definition of the conception. Since the word "free" is in the eye of the beholder.
 
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What would be your answer if I asked you why you chose the cheese? You would likely provide a reason such as "I had ham yesterday" or "I felt like cheese today." Or maybe if you really overthought the question, you might say "the state of my brain caused me to choose cheese." How would your answer differ if the choice was actually the result of determinism? It likely wouldn't. How would it differ if it was the result of free will? It likely wouldn't.
A very good point. We have the experience of a decision being made and the experience of a decision maker - and only limited access to the unconscious decision making process. (Try it - you'll find it's very, very, difficult to bring to awareness the thoughts that lead to making a decision.)

We can elect to believe in what we experience or to believe that we, and all that we choose and think of, are just the result of neural activity. We can't claim we don't experience ourselves though.
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HypnoPsi
 
I never said otherwise. I said that it's possible that free will is uncaused.
-Bri

We are not asking questions about the cause of free will (why would we do so when we can clearly show it does not exist). Rather, we are looking at individual events of the conscious will and for each one saying 'how could that event have come about?'

Clearly (as you yourself have suggested) there are 2 possibilities - that a given event was caused or that it was not caused.

If we were to find that all events were caused then there would be no free will since every event happening now would be predetermined via a long chain of cause and effect.

However - let's allow for the other logical possibility - that some events might not be caused, they just happen for no reason, effectively they are random events. Given that we can neither predict nor prevent the random events from taking place, they are, to all intents and purposes just as predetermined as the caused events.

For this argument to get anywhere you need to point out what is wrong with this logic because this is basically our proof that free will does not exist.
 
Bri is right, the logical fallacy you are presenting is called a false dilemma based upon a materialistic world view.

That's not true. Earlier in the thread I explicitly stated that the argument is one of logic and has nothing to do with the spiritual v material etc.... As I said before, even if the universe is just an illusion beheld by my spiritual consciousness there is still no free will.

Rather than special pleading based on the spiritual realm, please help Bri in addressing the logic of the no-free-will argument and show what is wrong with it - point out the place where the logic breaks down.
 
The problem with your question is that it frames the issue within eliminative materialism, thus limiting the discourse.
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HypnoPsi

You want us to frame questions in the material because it provides you with the convenient intellectual bolt-hole to avoid logic by invoking the spiritual argument. However - as I pointed out I have deliberately avoided that because I knew the someone would exploit it. I'm saying that even God can't have free will.
 
There is no third way. I said that there are (at least) three possibilities: caused, random, or free will. The latter two might be "uncaused" by your definition.

Please can you answer this question:

If there is an event in the conscious will (say, a choice), do you think it can be considered to represent [/i]free will[/i] if it was caused by something(s)?

We'll take it from there depending on how you answer.

Let's assume for a moment that your decision to have a cheese sandwich instead of ham was in fact random, but you didn't know it was random. Like all decisions, your brain was telling you that there was a reason you made the decision you made. What would be your answer if I asked you why you chose the cheese? You would likely provide a reason such as "I had ham yesterday" or "I felt like cheese today." Or maybe if you really overthought the question, you might say "the state of my brain caused me to choose cheese." How would your answer differ if the choice was actually the result of determinism? It likely wouldn't. How would it differ if it was the result of free will? It likely wouldn't.

The point is that any of these are possibilities, but your answer would likely still be the same and your experience would likely be the same. So I understand your reason for asking me the question, but the answer would be irrelevant as to whether one or more of causation, randomness, or free will are in fact reality.

-Bri

Look - it's a hypothetical cheese sandwich. I am not asking you to actually give me a breakdown of all the interacting causes that might or might not have led to you making that choice in reality.

Do you accept that the 'state of your brain' (or, to avoid the spiritual special pleading, 'your consciousness') was what gave rise to the decision?
 
You are yet to show that free will is even possible, Bri. Proposing a function and a functioning would come a long way towards doing that.

Free will is possible unless it can be proven impossible. Since it has yet to be proven that free will is impossible, it is assumed to be possible.

Proposing a function for free will would have very little to do with whether it is possible. What is the function of randomness? In addition, it is not necessary to know how it functions in order to theorize as to whether it is possible. Can you tell me how randomness functions?

-Bri
 
Again, however, I don't understand how it isn't impossible. Free will implies that your decisions are NOT completely dependent upon physical, environmental factors. What else IS there besides those factors, random or not ?

Why can you accept that uncaused randomness is possible but you cannot accept that uncaused free will is possible? Randomness, if uncaused, does not depend on physical, environmental factors either, so why do you assume that randomness exists but that free will cannot?

-Bri
 
We are not asking questions about the cause of free will

Yes you were.

(why would we do so when we can clearly show it does not exist).

We cannot show that free will doesn't exist any more than we can show that it does exist, clearly or otherwise.

Rather, we are looking at individual events of the conscious will and for each one saying 'how could that event have come about?'

Uh...you just stated that we're not asking questions about the cause of free will, and then asked about the cause of free will!

Clearly (as you yourself have suggested) there are 2 possibilities - that a given event was caused or that it was not caused.

Sure, just like something can be purple or not-purple. Or a combination of purple and not-purple. In the case of causation, something is usually considered "caused" only if it is completely caused.

If we were to find that all events were caused then there would be no free will since every event happening now would be predetermined via a long chain of cause and effect.

Yes, if we were somehow able to find that all events are caused.

However - let's allow for the other logical possibility - that some events might not be caused, they just happen for no reason, effectively they are random events.

WRONG! You keep making the same assumption in your logic. Uncaused does NOT necessarily mean random, it simply means not completely determined by prior events.

Given that we can neither predict nor prevent the random events from taking place, they are, to all intents and purposes just as predetermined as the caused events.

No, random events are not predetermined or caused. If they were, they wouldn't be random.

For this argument to get anywhere you need to point out what is wrong with this logic because this is basically our proof that free will does not exist.

See above. You made the assumption that all uncaused events must be random.

-Bri
 
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Please can you answer this question:

If there is an event in the conscious will (say, a choice), do you think it can be considered to represent [/i]free will[/i] if it was caused by something(s)?

In order for an event to be the result of free will, it cannot be entirely caused by prior events, but could be influenced by prior events.

We'll take it from there depending on how you answer.

OK.

Look - it's a hypothetical cheese sandwich. I am not asking you to actually give me a breakdown of all the interacting causes that might or might not have led to you making that choice in reality.

Do you accept that the 'state of your brain' (or, to avoid the spiritual special pleading, 'your consciousness') was what gave rise to the decision?

In my example, randomness gave rise to the decision and it had nothing to do with the state of the brain. If determinism is true, then yes perhaps the state of the brain may be the cause of the decision. If free will is true, then perhaps free will may be the cause of the decision. All could seem exactly the same to us, and we have no way to know which is true.

-Bri
 
i'd suggest that if free will means that your actions are not known beforehand then if God exists free will does not exist.

I've never heard of this definition of free will, but of course it follows that the existance of a being who knows all actions beforehand would preclude the possibility of actions that are unknown beforehand.

Of course, very few theists would accept both this definition of free will and this definition of God.

-Bri
 
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The calculation of the timeline begins the instant the simulation is started. The actual amount of time it takes to perform this calculation is irrelevant (and limited only by the speed of the computer) since it isn't related to the simulated timeline.
I agree, so why bring it up? You set the pattern was set in an instant, but you meant the programmatic loop that set the pattern was started in an instant. What was the relevance in either case?

There is only one "run" of the program, and only one calculation of the timeline given the scenario you provided.
The "run" of the program is a loop within the operating system of your computer. It is external to the logic of your program and therefore irrelevant
This is a fair analogy from the perspective of a timeless God (though inaccurate as ceo_esq has already pointed out).
It was an analogy for your program, not for a timeless God.
So now prove that the man didn't have free will when choosing which path to take through the maze.
I don't need to since the titles did not predict his behaviour, they predicted the behaviour of an on screen image. I can easily show that the on-screen image did not have free will. Yet again we find that the foreknowledge can only exist in the context of a deterministic (or inexorably determined) system.
There is nothing to prevent God from changing the timeline and thereby participating in the world.
Nothing at all, I never said there was. But logic shows us that if he can do so then either we do not have free will or God's observation of the universe is imperfect.
Changes made might affect our decisions from that point forward, but so what? God would still have perfect foreknowledge of our "new" future by timelessly observing any changes made.
Then his foreknowledge prior to the change cannot have been perfect can it? And this foreknowledge cannot be perfect unless he is done making changes.

You have simply reinforced my argument. God cannot infallibly observe the whole of the universe from beginning to end and also participate in it.

Any participation in the universe invalidates his prior observation.
God could also make changes that don't affect free agents at all, as in your scenario.

In your scenario, there is nothing to prevent God from inserting the "prediction" into the world in such a way that it will never affect John's decision, and thereby will always remain true.
And there are two cases here:

1. The changes are not in the timeline of the free agent and therefore are not foreknowledge.
2. The changes are in the timeline of the agent and therefore there are two versions of the agent's history.

The logic shows us (and your program illustrates) that our free choice was made in the context of the history without foreknowledge.

And in the context of the version of history with foreknowledge we either did not have free will or the foreknowledge was fallible.
 
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ceo_esq said:
Short of a really compelling deductive proof, I'm not about to rule out the possibility that a timeless being's view of a timeline can include his own participation in it (timelessly, of course).
I have kept this back since I thought had provided at least one compelling deductive proof. The safe example shows that even ineffective participation in the world leads to a contradiction between the definition of omniscience and the definition of free will.

In addition I would have thought that observation would be ontologically prior to any action (unless God is flying blind). But chronologically successive events are ontologically contingent on any effective action. So effective action would invalidate the prior observation. So the possibility of participation in the universe renders any observation of it imperfect.

Another argument that occurred to me recently was along the lines of the following sketch:

Rather than a timeline it might be more useful to think of the universe as a sequence of contingent events. We select a simple example of such a sequence, for example:
Code:
	A=1
	B=f(A)
	C=f(B)
	D=f(C)
	E=f(D)
	F=f(E)
So for example f(x) might be 3x, in which case the sequence would be {1,3,9,27,81,243}.

But f(x) might equally be some non-deterministic operation in which case the sequence can still be evaluated.

So now we add 'foreknowledge' to the sequence:
Code:
	A=1
	B=f(A)
	C=f(B)
	D=f(C)+F
	E=f(D)
	F=f(E)
It may still be possible to evaluate the sequence if f(x) is a deterministic function, for example where f(x) = 3x then F=-30.375 will do just fine.

But in the case of a non-deterministic f the sequence can't be evaluated first to last.

Now we write F as:
Code:
	F=f(f(f(f(f(1)))+F))
This can be rewritten as:
Code:
	F=f(f[sub]1[/sub](F))
But notice that f1 is f-1. If f has an inverse then it must be a function and therefore deterministic.

The generalisation of this should be fairly obvious and this has the advantage of not having to find a rigorous definition for free will.
 
Free will is possible unless it can be proven impossible. Since it has yet to be proven that free will is impossible, it is assumed to be possible.

Talk about shifting the burden of proof! Everything is possible, then, and knowledge is useless.

Proposing a function for free will would have very little to do with whether it is possible. What is the function of randomness? In addition, it is not necessary to know how it functions in order to theorize as to whether it is possible. Can you tell me how randomness functions?

The point is that your point would be much more credible if you could provide an explanation for free will's existence, or an effect it has on the universe that it (the universe, that is) wouldn't have without it.

Without randomness, there WOULD be no universe.
 

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