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Tags Amanda Knox , Italy cases , Meredith Kercher , murder cases , Raffaele Sollecito

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Old 13th October 2021, 07:03 AM   #1521
Numbers
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Originally Posted by Bill Williams View Post
Massei's reasoning (in his 2010 motivations report, emanating from the 2009 conviction) in this regard is just bizarre.

First off, Massei writes that the pillow must have been placed under the victim's hips for no other purpose than to facilitate the assault. (Page 166)

Massei then simply quote Stefanoni's words that, "Analysis was not done on the pillow because it was considered more useful to use it for print analysis, whether of shoeprints or handprints." (Page 231) Neither Massei nor Stefanoni offered a reason why all tests could not be done.

But on page 232, Massei offers the most bizarre reason for not testing for a genetic investigation of the presumed-sperm stain.... namely, that such an investigation might I.D. someone, but the sample could not be dated as to the time of deposit.

A pillow under a sexual assaults' victim's hips!!!! Remember, the severed bra-clasp had been initially found under that pillow, and Massei reasoned that Sollecito's partial profile, mixed in with the victim's COULD BE DATED.

Massei is not even interested. He implies that the victim's boyfriend could have left this sample on a previous occasion. The very pillow a murderer decided to place under the victim's hips during an assault.

Such was the reasoning used by a judge who'd convicted the pair in 2009.
Originally Posted by Stacyhs View Post
Massei was illogical, that's for sure. If the semen had proved to be Sollecito, that would have been evidence pointing to guilt as he was not having relationship with Meredith. If had turned out to be Silenzi's, it would have meant nothing as it was known he was having sex with her. If it had turned out to be of unknown origin, it still would have meant nothing as it could have been left by someone she slept with unknown to anyone else.

But I think the creme de la creme was his conclusion that the TMB and DNA negative footprints in the hallway were Amanda's in blood. Just nuts!
Originally Posted by TruthCalls View Post
That was a good 'creme de la creme', but I think how Massei and Nencini reasoned that Curatolo, Quintavalle and Capezzali were all credible and reliable witnesses might be even better. Oh wait, on second thought.... how can one top a sample that was TMB negative, human species negative and DNA negative becoming a sample of Meredith's DNA?

At the end of the day I find it really hard to know which I am most incredulous over because there are just so many to choose from.
I'll suggest that all these arbitrary "reasonings" have several causes or motivations:

1. The Italian judge first assumes that the accused are guilty. The the judge creates a "reasoning" or explanation of the evidence, even if arbitrary or absurd, to support that conclusion.

2. Specifically for the Knox - Sollecito case, the convicting judges sought to avoid placing responsibility or blame on the police or prosecution for any of their errors or misdeeds.

3. Specifically for the Knox - Sollecito case, the convicting judges sought to limit the admission of evidence, and align their interpretation of the alleged evidence, to minimize Guede's involvement in the crimes against Kercher so that their interpretations were not too inconsistent with Guede's statements.

There's another case, Stasi v. Italy 2693/17, recently communicated by the ECHR, that appears to illustrate how the Italian judicial system can function unfairly.

In that case, the alleged unfairness relates to the judges refusing to allow a critically important witness to testify at the most important stages of the trial proceedings. See (Communication in French):

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-212426

It took about 4 years and 9 months for the ECHR to Communicate the Stasi case after the application was lodged. In contrast, it took the ECHR about 2 years and 5 months to Communicate the Knox case after the application was lodged. See (Communication in French):

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163098
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Old 13th October 2021, 11:03 AM   #1522
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I'm not sure I agree with #1...that the judges assumed guilt from the start. At least, not intentionally. I think most people, either consciously or subconsciously, do assume anyone arrested for a crime is most likely guilty.

But I do agree with #2 and #3. I think the police, and by extension prosecutors, in Italy are protected. The very fact that they can charge a suspect or defendant with criminal calunnia for accusing them of damaging their "honor" by saying they were mistreated during an interrogation that is not video or audio recorded is absurd. These lawsuits are used as threats against anyone criticizing them. We saw this with Mignini and his numerous actual lawsuits or threats of lawsuits. As far as I'm aware, he never won any of those he actually lodged connected to the Kercher murder. Of course, there is that one against Sollecito and Gumbel for their book that they had to make a public apology to Mignini for!
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Old 13th October 2021, 01:22 PM   #1523
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Originally Posted by Stacyhs View Post
I'm not sure I agree with #1...that the judges assumed guilt from the start. At least, not intentionally. I think most people, either consciously or subconsciously, do assume anyone arrested for a crime is most likely guilty.

I don't think this is about judges "pre-judging" people in quite the way you describe.

Rather, this is more about the strange - and fundamentally anti-judicial - way in which trials used to take place in Italy under the previous inquisitorial system, and specifically wrt the fact that even though Italy has now switched to the adversarial model of justice, it appears clear that there's still a reactionary inquisitorial mindset among the Italian judiciary.

Under the inquisitorial model, the PM was, on paper at least, an impartial servant of the state. He/she was (again, on paper) tasked with overseeing the investigation of a crime, and using all his/her skill and experience to determine "what had happened" - which obviously also included determining who had committed the crime. The trial was a means of testing the PM's theory of the crime, as well as giving the accused the (notional) chance to offer his/her own defence.

The huge systemic problem with this approach is that it almost totally reverses the burden of proof. Because in effect the court is being asked by the PM to accept his/her theory of the crime, unless there's compelling evidence that this theory is not correct. So in a very real sense, Italian courts in the inquisitorial system did start with a certain presumption of the guilt of whomever the PM had brought to trial.

The modern-day issue is this: even though by 2007 Italy had moved to the adversarial system, there's some fairly robust evidence that Italian criminal courts simply couldn't shake off their old ways of thinking and of doing things. It's therefore not a great stretch (IMO) to think that, for example, the Massei court judges started with at least a subconscious feeling a) that Mignini was a diligent, experienced and scrupulously fair/impartial/disinterested PM; and therefore b) that if he (Mignini) was bringing them a case in which he believed Knox and Sollecito were guilty of murder, he'd come to that conclusion for all the right/noble reasons; and therefore c) that their "starting point" in the trial ought to be to consider Knox & Sollecito guilty themselves.
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Old 13th October 2021, 01:37 PM   #1524
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Originally Posted by LondonJohn View Post
I don't think this is about judges "pre-judging" people in quite the way you describe.

Rather, this is more about the strange - and fundamentally anti-judicial - way in which trials used to take place in Italy under the previous inquisitorial system, and specifically wrt the fact that even though Italy has now switched to the adversarial model of justice, it appears clear that there's still a reactionary inquisitorial mindset among the Italian judiciary.

Under the inquisitorial model, the PM was, on paper at least, an impartial servant of the state. He/she was (again, on paper) tasked with overseeing the investigation of a crime, and using all his/her skill and experience to determine "what had happened" - which obviously also included determining who had committed the crime. The trial was a means of testing the PM's theory of the crime, as well as giving the accused the (notional) chance to offer his/her own defence.

The huge systemic problem with this approach is that it almost totally reverses the burden of proof. Because in effect the court is being asked by the PM to accept his/her theory of the crime, unless there's compelling evidence that this theory is not correct. So in a very real sense, Italian courts in the inquisitorial system did start with a certain presumption of the guilt of whomever the PM had brought to trial.

The modern-day issue is this: even though by 2007 Italy had moved to the adversarial system, there's some fairly robust evidence that Italian criminal courts simply couldn't shake off their old ways of thinking and of doing things. It's therefore not a great stretch (IMO) to think that, for example, the Massei court judges started with at least a subconscious feeling a) that Mignini was a diligent, experienced and scrupulously fair/impartial/disinterested PM; and therefore b) that if he (Mignini) was bringing them a case in which he believed Knox and Sollecito were guilty of murder, he'd come to that conclusion for all the right/noble reasons; and therefore c) that their "starting point" in the trial ought to be to consider Knox & Sollecito guilty themselves.
I think we're in violent agreement here. Numbers wrote:

Quote:
1. The Italian judge first assumes that the accused are guilty.
When the defense has to basically prove the defendant is not guilty rather than the prosecution prove they are guilty, I think the judges almost have to assume their guilt and have to be proven otherwise.
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Old 13th October 2021, 03:38 PM   #1525
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Originally Posted by Stacyhs View Post
I think we're in violent agreement here. Numbers wrote:



When the defense has to basically prove the defendant is not guilty rather than the prosecution prove they are guilty, I think the judges almost have to assume their guilt and have to be proven otherwise.
I'm having a hard time finding any significant differences in what the three of you wrote (relative to #1).

What I struggle with is why the courts bent over backwards trying to make the prosecution's case work. I don't believe Massei, Nencini or any of the other professional judges sitting on those to courts were stupid, yet they made countless rulings that flew in the face of basic common sense. I can accept they started out with the assumption of guilt, but they still are professional judges who are supposed to listen to the evidence, evaluate the arguments and form logical conclusions, yet they consistently did just the opposite. Something was motivating them to side with the prosecution, even when the arguments were clearly unsubstantiated. I must have read Nencini's MR regarding Curatolo a dozen times and every time I did I came away with the same thought - they couldn't possibly be this stupid so what the hell is going on here. This was something more than just remnants of the old inquisitorial system.
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Old 13th October 2021, 05:02 PM   #1526
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Originally Posted by Stacyhs View Post
I'm not sure I agree with #1...that the judges assumed guilt from the start. At least, not intentionally. I think most people, either consciously or subconsciously, do assume anyone arrested for a crime is most likely guilty.

But I do agree with #2 and #3. I think the police, and by extension prosecutors, in Italy are protected. The very fact that they can charge a suspect or defendant with criminal calunnia for accusing them of damaging their "honor" by saying they were mistreated during an interrogation that is not video or audio recorded is absurd. These lawsuits are used as threats against anyone criticizing them. We saw this with Mignini and his numerous actual lawsuits or threats of lawsuits. As far as I'm aware, he never won any of those he actually lodged connected to the Kercher murder. Of course, there is that one against Sollecito and Gumbel for their book that they had to make a public apology to Mignini for!
Originally Posted by Stacyhs View Post
I think we're in violent agreement here. Numbers wrote:



When the defense has to basically prove the defendant is not guilty rather than the prosecution prove they are guilty, I think the judges almost have to assume their guilt and have to be proven otherwise.
Originally Posted by TruthCalls View Post
I'm having a hard time finding any significant differences in what the three of you wrote (relative to #1).

What I struggle with is why the courts bent over backwards trying to make the prosecution's case work. I don't believe Massei, Nencini or any of the other professional judges sitting on those to courts were stupid, yet they made countless rulings that flew in the face of basic common sense. I can accept they started out with the assumption of guilt, but they still are professional judges who are supposed to listen to the evidence, evaluate the arguments and form logical conclusions, yet they consistently did just the opposite. Something was motivating them to side with the prosecution, even when the arguments were clearly unsubstantiated. I must have read Nencini's MR regarding Curatolo a dozen times and every time I did I came away with the same thought - they couldn't possibly be this stupid so what the hell is going on here. This was something more than just remnants of the old inquisitorial system.
I should clarify that when I wrote:

1. The Italian judge first assumes that the accused are guilty. The the judge creates a "reasoning" or explanation of the evidence, even if arbitrary or absurd, to support that conclusion.

I did not intend to specify exactly at what time in the trial the (inquisitorial - style) Italian judge makes the assumption that the accused is guilty. It may not be the first day. But at some time during the trial that (inquisitorial - style) judge decides or assumes that the accused is guilty, perhaps relying on personal feelings or an (inquisitorial) respect for the broad judgment of the prosecution (even if, perhaps, not agreeing with every detail of the prosecution case).

Then, at the conclusion of the trial, the judge pronounces a sentence of conviction based upon the judge's subjective perspective.

At some point after the (inquisitorial - style) judge has decided or assumed the guilt of the accused, up to the publication of the motivation report, that judge constructs a "reasoning" which may include arbitrary or absurd elements which, presumably in the sincere but subjective opinion of the judge, combines the alleged evidence and the judge's speculations in a "rationale" to justify the conviction. Of course, objective observers cannot be sure whether or not a judge whose MR clearly includes absurd or arbitrary reasoning is truly sincere.

In contrast, the objective judge critically and skeptically evaluates the alleged evidence, does not favor the prosecution over the defense, enforces fairness in the trial, including respect for defense rights, and in the MR uses reasoning that is objectively reasonable.

However, in the Knox - Sollecito case, there are examples of judges who were mostly objective but departed into a more inquisitorial or subjective mode at certain points, perhaps to maintain the impunity of the police and prosecutor. I believe this is true for Hellmann in the MR reasoning convicting Knox of calunnia against Lumumba, and for Marasca in the MR reasoning defending the calunnia conviction against the suggestion that the ECHR would find that conviction based upon an unfair trial.
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Old 13th October 2021, 08:58 PM   #1527
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Originally Posted by Numbers View Post
I should clarify that when I wrote:

....
At some point after the (inquisitorial - style) judge has decided or assumed the guilt of the accused, up to the publication of the motivation report, that judge constructs a "reasoning" which may include arbitrary or absurd elements which, presumably in the sincere but subjective opinion of the judge, combines the alleged evidence and the judge's speculations in a "rationale" to justify the conviction. Of course, objective observers cannot be sure whether or not a judge whose MR clearly includes absurd or arbitrary reasoning is truly sincere.

....
I am returning to this because I wish to suggest that the arbitrary or absurd elements of "reasoning" found in such Italian court motivation reports, as seen in the Knox - Sollecito case, are in reality not given in sincerity. I suggest that they are, even if perhaps obvious and clumsy, efforts to force a particular outcome which the judge knows is unfair and unjust, but meets some perceived need, such as, for example, providing impunity for the police and prosecutor, or enforcing an authoritarian approach to the functioning of the judicial system. That is, the prosecutor - a member of the judiciary - must be shown to be right even in the face of contrary objective evidence.

I suggest it is not that unusual for persons who believe they need to support a false premise to adopt false "reasoning" to give that support. In situations where there is little or no penalty if the false "reasoning" is detected, clearly arbitrary or absurd elements may be "safely" included in the "reasoning". And perhaps the false "reasoning" is sufficient to convince or satisfy some of the audience to which it is directed.

There are some examples from the final ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy of the Italian government providing obviously false "reasoning" in a seeming attempt to "convince" the ECHR that Italy had not violated Knox's Convention rights in the trial convicting her calunnia against Lumumba.

One example is Italy's comments to the ECHR claiming that Knox had been convicted of calunnia against Lumumba based not only on her statements during the interrogation and "spontaneous" statement to Mignini, but on the basis of a "multitude of other circumstances" as described in the Massei court motivation report. And Italy noted that under CSC case-law (jurisprudence), "spontaneous statements made by a person subjected to investigations in the absence of a lawyer may in any case be used when they constitute an offense in themselves, as in this case." (See paragraphs 142 - 143)

Of course, none of Italy's statements in paragraphs 142 - 143 were germane to the issue of the Convention rights under examination. And the "multitude of other circumstances" were not detailed by Italy in the ECHR judgment and indeed were falsehoods or misinterpretations of fact in the Massei court MR.

ECHR case-law and Italy's practices were the relevant factors in establishing whether or not there was a violation of the Convention. In its argument as in its practices, Italy totally ignored ECHR case-law, and the ECHR found it in violation of Convention Articles 6.1 with 6.3c (unfair trial by denial of legal representation [of a suspect under interrogation]). (See paragraphs 146 - 167)

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Old 14th October 2021, 09:25 AM   #1528
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Originally Posted by Numbers View Post
....
There are some examples from the final ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy of the Italian government providing obviously false "reasoning" in a seeming attempt to "convince" the ECHR that Italy had not violated Knox's Convention rights in the trial convicting her calunnia against Lumumba.

One example is Italy's comments to the ECHR claiming that Knox had been convicted of calunnia against Lumumba based not only on her statements during the interrogation and "spontaneous" statement to Mignini, but on the basis of a "multitude of other circumstances" as described in the Massei court motivation report. And Italy noted that under CSC case-law (jurisprudence), "spontaneous statements made by a person subjected to investigations in the absence of a lawyer may in any case be used when they constitute an offense in themselves, as in this case." (See paragraphs 142 - 143)

Of course, none of Italy's statements in paragraphs 142 - 143 were germane to the issue of the Convention rights under examination. And the "multitude of other circumstances" were not detailed by Italy in the ECHR judgment and indeed were falsehoods or misinterpretations of fact in the Massei court MR.

ECHR case-law and Italy's practices were the relevant factors in establishing whether or not there was a violation of the Convention. In its argument as in its practices, Italy totally ignored ECHR case-law, and the ECHR found it in violation of Convention Articles 6.1 with 6.3c (unfair trial by denial of legal representation [of a suspect under interrogation]). (See paragraphs 146 - 167)
It may be of interest to examine in some detail the ECHR judgment in paragraphs 146 - 167 to understand that in response to Italy's irrelevant argument, the ECHR focused on the Convention and its case-law. The ECHR did not descend into mere contradiction of the irrelevant parts of Italy's argument.

Here's the first section (consisting of one paragraph) of the ECHR legal analysis of Knox's claim that her rights under Convention Article 6.1 and 6.3c were violated, and Italy's counter argument. It is the ECHR's statement of the general principles. Because the ECHR follows precedent and the Convention, its rulings are largely predictable.*

Quote:
146. The general principles concerning the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention under its criminal law aspect, the right to the assistance of a lawyer and the overall fairness of criminal proceedings, the temporary restriction of access to a lawyer for compelling reasons and the impact of procedural shortcomings at the investigative stage on the overall fairness of the criminal trial are established, in whole or in part, in Simeonovi v. Bulgaria ([GC], no.21980 / 04, 110-120, 12 May 2017), Ibrahim and others v. The United Kingdom ([GC], nos.50541/08 and 3 others, 249-274, 13 September 2016), Salduz v. Turkey ([GC], no.36391 / 02, 50-55, ECHR 2008) and Beuze v. Belgium ([GC], no.71409 / 10, 119-150, 9 November 2018).
In the second section, paragraphs 147 - 152, the judgment follows a logical chain of reasoning to establish that Knox was indeed a suspect during the relevant events under ECHR case-law.

The ECHR raises the question, based on the behavior of the police toward Knox and their initiation of questioning even before Knox was in an interrogation room, whether Knox was a suspect in the crimes against Kercher at the very beginning of the 5 - 6 November interrogation. In any case, Italy itself acknowledges that Knox was formally a suspect following her 1:45 am statement during the interrogation. Thus, at the latest, she was a suspect when she made her second statement at 5:45 am to the prosecutor. She had not been told her procedural rights at that time nor in the previous interrogation.

The ECHR points out that under its international law, a person is a suspect if he or she is under a criminal charge as defined by its case-law. "There is a “criminal charge” when a person is officially indicted by the competent authorities or when the acts carried out by them because of the suspicions weighing against him have significant repercussions on his situation. The ECHR implication (paragraph 149) is that this certainly applies to Knox at the time or preceeding her 1:45 am statement. Italy acknowledges that Knox became a suspect after that statement. Therefore, Convention Article 6.1 with 6.3c and associated case-law apply in this case (paragraph 152).

In the third section, paragraphs 153 - 157, the ECHR analyzes whether Italy had any justification under ECHR case-law in denying Knox a lawyer during the relevant time, when she was a suspect.

The ECHR first notes that the Italian courts stated that the statements made by Knox during 5 - 6 November questionings could not be used (under Italian law) in her trial for the crimes against Kercher. However, according to the Italian Government, these same statements, made in the absence of legal counsel, could be used against Knox in a trial for the crime of calunnia (malicious false accusation), based upon Italian case-law, insofar as they were in themselves a criminal offense. (Paragraph 153)

However, under ECHR case-law, restrictions on access to a lawyer in the pre-trial phase are allowed only under compelling circumstances and in exceptional cases; they must be temporary and based upon an individual assessment of the particular circumstances of that specific case.

Yet, the Italian Government argues that the trial and conviction of Knox for calunnia was justified under a general Italian case-law interpretation that spontaneous statements made by a person subjected to investigations (questioning or interrogation) in the absence of a lawyer may be used against that person insofar as the statements were in themselves criminal acts.

As established by ECHR case-law, the general nature of this exception to established ECHR case-law as claimed by Italy invalidates it. The Italian Government provided no exceptional circumstances to justify its use of the statements to try and to convict Knox. The ECHR therefore finds no compelling reason to justify the restrictions on the right to a lawyer in this case.

In the fourth section, paragraphs 158 to 165, the ECHR reviews whether or not the proceedings (questionings and trial) can be considered "fair" under the Convention and its case-law.

The ECHR states that under its case-law, for the circumstances (of interrogations without a lawyer leading to a conviction), it must carry out a strict review. Under ECHR case-law, the Italian Government is thus obligated to prove, in a convincing demonstration, that despite the applicant Knox being denied her rights under the Convention during the interrogations, the criminal trial (including the pre-trial interrogations) which convicted her of calunnia was nevertheless fair overall. "The failure of the Government to establish compelling reasons weighs heavily in the balance and may tip the Court [ECHR] in the direction of [finding] a violation of Article 6 1 and 3 (c)...."

The ECHR points out Knox's state of vulnerability as "a young foreign girl aged twenty at the material time who had been in Italy for a short time and did not speak Italian fluently...."

The ECHR also notes that "just a few hours after the impugned hearings, the applicant [Knox] promptly retracted her statements, in particular by means of a text drafted on her initiative on 6 November 2007 at around 1 p.m. and handed over to the police ..., another text drafted on November 9, 2007 for the attention of her lawyers ..., and the telephone call to her mother on November 10, 2007 while the line was bugged. The Court notes that, however, six months later, on May 14, 2008, the applicant was indicted for calunnia [malicious false accusation]."

The ECHR notes that the Boninsegna court established that Knox's statements were taken "in a context of strong psychological pressure".

The ECHR notes that "the impugned statements in themselves constituted the offense with which the applicant [Knox] was charged and, therefore, the material evidence for her verdict of guilty of calunnia [malicious false accusation]." {This is significant since if this were not found to be a violation of international law, abusive authorities could coerce persons to make statements that were then unfairly judged to be criminal acts.}

Furthermore, the ECHR notes that the circumstances under which the impugned statetments were obtained were never investigated, although as pointed out elsewhere in the ECHR judgment, Knox and her lawyers had repeatedly credibly claimed before the Italian court that they were coerced. [According to ECHR case-law, failure to investigate such credible claims is a violation of Convention Aricle 3, procedural limb, as found in another section of the judgment.]

The ECHR notes again that Knox was not informed of her procedural rights, in particular during the 5:45 am statement; there is no record of her being informed of her rights in the case file.

In the Conclusion, paragraphs 166 - 167, the ECHR states that the Italian Government had not shown that the restriction on Knox's right to legal counsel during the hearing that lead to the 5:45 am statement had not irreparably damaged the fairness of the trial for calunnia as a whole. Therefore, there was a violation of Convention Articles 6.1 with 6.3c by Italy in this case.


* Google translation with my help; "GC" in an ECHR case citation means a ruling made by the Grand Chamber of the ECHR.

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Old 15th October 2021, 08:23 AM   #1529
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Originally Posted by Numbers View Post
....
There are some examples from the final ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy of the Italian government providing obviously false "reasoning" in a seeming attempt to "convince" the ECHR that Italy had not violated Knox's Convention rights in the trial convicting her calunnia against Lumumba.

....
I suggest that when Italy or other respondent states present arbitrary or absurd arguments in a seeming attempt to "convince" the ECHR of the legality of practices obviously contrary to the Convention or ECHR case-law, the real motivation of the respondent state is to satisfy a domestic audience.

For example, in the ECHR case Knox v. Italy, the Italian Government argued that Knox's conviction for calunnia against Lumumba was not a violation of Convention Articles 6.1 with 6.3c because, although under Italian law (CPP Article 63; the statements could not be used under Italian law because they were made without a lawyer and without the proper procedural warnings) her 6 November 2007 statements could not be used against her, the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation (CSC) case-law (jurisprudence) allowed the statements to be used against her in the calunnia trial because the statements in themselves were criminal acts, but the statements were to be excluded from the trial for the crimes against Kercher.

The Italian Government, having presented that argument (and others) fruitlessly in the ECHR case before the Chamber, then attempted to have the case heard by the Grand Chamber. That request for referral was denied by the ECHR review panel.

Thus, the Italian Government is able to say to the proponents of the CSC case-law exception that that exception is indeed and without any question not allowed under the international law that Italy has agreed, in its Constitution and the Council of Europe treaty, to accept. It therefore cannot be used in the future based on international law, but Italy has not stated that it has changed the practice.

The Italian Government has acknowledged the ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy in its 10 January 2020 communication to the Council of Europe. What is lacking, so far, is the Italian Government's Action Plan describing how it proposes to change its future practices and to redress its violations of Knox's rights.

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Old Yesterday, 08:05 PM   #1530
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Originally Posted by Numbers View Post
....

The Italian Government has acknowledged the ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy in its 10 January 2020 communication to the Council of Europe. What is lacking, so far, is the Italian Government's Action Plan describing how it proposes to change its future practices and to redress its violations of Knox's rights.
Much attention has been focused in this forum and elsewhere on details of the alleged evidence in the case or on the real or imagined behavior of Knox and Sollecito.

In terms of international (Council of Europe) and Italian law, however, the lasting focus will be on the violations of human rights of legal defense by Italy and the way Italy addresses those violations.

For example, the case Knox v. Italy is cited as important illustrative ECHR case-law in the current edition of the ECHR's Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights - Right to a fair trial (criminal limb) (revised 31 August 2021).*

The citations occur in paragraph 443 (p. 80 - 81) in the section on the right to a lawyer (Article 6.3c) and in paragraph 555 (p. 101) on the right to an interpreter (Article 6.3e).

Knox v. Italy also is cited in the Italian language edition of the Guide (revised 30 April 2020), but in paragraphs 421 (p. 103) and 531 (p. 130).*

* Sources:

https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/G...iminal_ENG.pdf

https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/G...iminal_ITA.pdf

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