hard Problem of Consciousness , special pleading? - Page 2

Belz... · 10th April 2018, 08:59 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

Which types would you not use, and why?

I would not use one that creates a copy of me and simultaneously kills the original, because I, the original, don't want to die. Doesn't mean I think HPC is a thing.

jrhowell · 10th April 2018, 09:48 AM

Originally Posted by Darat

Any of them that destructively scans me (DaratA). Yes the person (DaratB) recreated at t'other end will feel the same way I did at the time of scan, but he won't be me, DaratA was killed and reduced to a pile of ash!

I am at the other end of the spectrum. I think that both would be me equally.

One instance of me would die so that the other instance could go on to have experiences that would otherwise not be possible. I am fine with that idea.

8Sime8 · 11th April 2018, 02:09 AM

For the solipsistic presentist, entering the quantum teleporter is a no-brainer, even if the quantum teleporter doesn't produce identical clones.

This is because for the solipsistic presentist his notion of spatio-temporality is resolutely empirical and pertains only to the structure of his observations and not to any unverifiable "subject" of experience, which for him is a mere figure of speech rather than a meaningful hypothesis.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 02:13 AM

Originally Posted by jrhowell

I am at the other end of the spectrum. I think that both would be me equally.

One instance of me would die so that the other instance could go on to have experiences that would otherwise not be possible. I am fine with that idea.

What if it could create another you without destroying the first you (aka, "the you" reading this right now)?

Tommy Jeppesen · 11th April 2018, 02:20 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

What if it could create another you without destroying the first you (aka, "the you" reading this right now)?

They would be the same at the moment at creation and then diverge because of different paths.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 02:21 AM

Originally Posted by 8Sime8

For the solipsistic presentist, entering the quantum teleporter is a no-brainer, even if the quantum teleporter doesn't produce identical clones.

This is because for the solipsistic presentist his notion of spatio-temporality is resolutely empirical and pertains only to the structure of his observations and not to any unverifiable "subject" of experience, which for him is a mere figure of speech rather than a meaningful hypothesis.

Is it possible to be a solipsistic non-presentist?

Also, most people who stand by solipsism only take it a little seriously. I'm "virtually certain" of all sorts of things besides my own existence, just not as much as I am of the fact that I exist.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 02:24 AM

Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen

They would be the same at the moment at creation and then diverge because of different paths.

Even at the moment of creation they would exist at different points in space, though.

That's why I've always felt like "the duplicator" thought experiments violate the nature of how minds exist in spacetime.

Tommy Jeppesen · 11th April 2018, 02:30 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

Even at the moment of creation they would exist at different points in space, though.

That's why I've always felt like "the duplicator" thought experiments violate the nature of how minds exist in spacetime.

You are caught up in "existence". If existence is a process in time, space and other senses, then different space doesn't necessarily mean different senses.
At the time of duplication the time and other senses are the same, hence at the moment they (A and B) are same.

A is A or A = A, yet in time and space when you read A is A time passes so the first A is not the second A, so A is not A. Nice

8Sime8 · 11th April 2018, 02:31 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

Is it possible to be a solipsistic non-presentist?

Also, most people who stand by solipsism only take it a little seriously. I'm "virtually certain" of all sorts of things besides my own existence, just not as much as I am of the fact that I exist.

Yes, in the sense that solipsism really designates a diverse family of ontological and epistemological positions, where the main thing they have in common is that first-person experiential verification chairs their tribunal of reason, as opposed to third-person testimony.

Originally Posted by 8Sime8

For the solipsistic presentist, entering the quantum teleporter is a no-brainer, even if the quantum teleporter doesn't produce identical clones.

Actually this is nonsense, since the solipsist might be of the opinion that the outcome of entering a quantum teleporter isn't meaningful to imagine.

Perhaps i should have said that the solipsistic presentist would have no reason to fear quantum teleportation for the same reason he has no metaphysical reason to fear actions that precipitate his own death, yet in both cases he still needs a good reason for bringing about either state.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 02:36 AM

Originally Posted by 8Sime8

Perhaps i should have said that the solipsistic presentist would have no reason to fear quantum teleportation for the same reason he has no metaphysical reason to fear actions that precipitate his own death, yet in both cases he still needs a good reason for bringing about either state.

Fair enough. It's not so much that I fear being dead, but that I have a survival instinct whether I like it or not.

The Great Zaganza · 11th April 2018, 02:38 AM

The problem is the killing, not the duplication.

Darat · 11th April 2018, 02:38 AM

Originally Posted by jrhowell

I am at the other end of the spectrum. I think that both would be me equally.

One instance of me would die so that the other instance could go on to have experiences that would otherwise not be possible. I am fine with that idea.

Let's say a mistake happens and for whatever reason jrhowellA survives the scan so we now have JrhowellA and jrhowellB - who owns the house?

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 02:45 AM

Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen

You are caught up in "existence". If existence is a process in time, space and other senses, then different space doesn't necessarily mean different senses.
At the time of duplication the time and other senses are the same, hence at the moment they (A and B) are same.

A is A or A = A, yet in time and space when you read A is A time passes so the first A is not the second A, so A is not A. Nice

No, I think of A as just a point traveling through spacetime. A = A as long as A exists.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 02:48 AM

Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza

The problem is the killing, not the duplication.

I'd let myself get duplicated, but the duplicate wouldn't be me. There would be two entities that thought they were me, but whichever one was not the duplicate would be the only actual me.

Tommy Jeppesen · 11th April 2018, 02:50 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

No, I think of A as just a point traveling through spacetime. A = A as long as A exists.

Yes, so me TommyA moves through spacetime and splits into TommyA and TommyB. For all other senses in spacetime than spacetime both A and B are the same. Now spacetime passes and they start to differ.
I don't exist in only spacetime.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 03:10 AM

Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen

Yes, so me TommyA moves through spacetime and splits into TommyA and TommyB. For all other senses in spacetime than spacetime both A and B are the same. Now spacetime passes and they start to differ.
I don't exist in only spacetime.

Your perspective, TommyA's, is still TommyA's, though. Not TommyB. That's all I'm saying.

Tommy Jeppesen · 11th April 2018, 07:47 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

Your perspective, TommyA's, is still TommyA's, though. Not TommyB. That's all I'm saying.

What is a "you"?

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 08:47 AM

Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen

What is a "you"?

Your consciousness, specifically experiencing a first person perspective.

The Great Zaganza · 11th April 2018, 09:32 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

I'd let myself get duplicated, but the duplicate wouldn't be me. There would be two entities that thought they were me, but whichever one was not the duplicate would be the only actual me.

I would say that is inaccurate: they both would be you, but no longer a single you.

JoeMorgue · 11th April 2018, 09:39 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

I'd let myself get duplicated, but the duplicate wouldn't be me. There would be two entities that thought they were me, but whichever one was not the duplicate would be the only actual me.

*Cough* Hi Jabba *Cough*

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 09:41 AM

Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza

I would say that is inaccurate: they both would be you, but no longer a single you.

In that hypothetical scenario, I, the me that's typing this, would have one or the other's first person perspective, not both of them. Right?

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 09:43 AM

Originally Posted by JoeMorgue

*Cough* Hi Jabba *Cough*

Do you think if your brain was scanned and your consciousness replicated/duplicated in a computer, that consciousness in a computer would be you?

JoeMorgue · 11th April 2018, 09:45 AM

*Shrugs* Sure.

Two "me's" isn't the existential crisis for me it is for others.

Right now "Me" is a useful concept to have to describe the 190lb meat sack with the 3lb sack of grey matter in its skull that maintains my mental process.

If this thing was replicated exactly I don't exactly get why I would get to be "me" and the other wouldn't.

But again... we've been literally trying to get this concept across to Jabba for 5 years now so...

The Great Zaganza · 11th April 2018, 09:47 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

In that hypothetical scenario, I, the me that's typing this, would have one or the other's first person perspective, not both of them. Right?

Both would be a you, but of course there would be no overlap of perspective.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 09:50 AM

Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza

Both would be a you, but of course there would be no overlap of perspective.

I just think my first person perspective is going to "stick" with my physical brain.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 09:54 AM

Originally Posted by JoeMorgue

*Shrugs* Sure.

Two "me's" isn't the existential crisis for me it is for others.

Right now "Me" is a useful concept to have to describe the 190lb meat sack with the 3lb sack of grey matter in its skull that maintains my mental process.

If this thing was replicated exactly I don't exactly get why I would get to be "me" and the other wouldn't.

But again... we've been literally trying to get this concept across to Jabba for 5 years now so...

Nobody's talking about an existential crisis. And it's not a matter of "getting to be" in one body/format/whatever or another. If I COULD "get to be" a duplicate I would, if the body or "format" or whatever was a marked improvement.

The Great Zaganza · 11th April 2018, 09:55 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

I just think my first person perspective is going to "stick" with my physical brain.

But your copy would think the same thing with the same justification.

Tommy Jeppesen · 11th April 2018, 10:00 AM

Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza

But your copy would think the same thing with the same justification.

If the brain/body with memories, cognition, emotions are the same at the duplication they are the same person expect for spacetime being different. Over time they can diverge and become more like identical twins, but for some of their memories and so on, they are the same.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 10:01 AM

Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza

But your copy would think the same thing with the same justification.

Of course.

I can imagine a scenario where, from my perspective, I was setting myself up in a blue room to get duplicated, and I was told my duplicate will awaken in a yellow room, and I "come to" in a yellow room myself, and I can meet "the other me" who never left the blue room. In that situation, I'd be the duplicate, and my existence actually started with "coming to" in the yellow room. It would be disturbing, but true that I was "just" a duplicate.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 10:02 AM

Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen

If the brain/body with memories, cognition, emotions are the same at the duplication they are the same person expect for spacetime being different. Over time they can diverge and become more like identical twins, but for some of their memories and so on, they are the same.

Yeah, spacetime is the kicker there.

Tommy Jeppesen · 11th April 2018, 10:12 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

Yeah, spacetime is the kicker there.

If you mean that one(A) retain the before duplication self and the other (B) not, then no. There is no self without being caused by a brain. And since what causes the self is not spacetime as such but the brain, at the time of the duplication you have 2 versions of the self separated in spacetime, but the same self because the brains are same for memories, cognition and so on.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 10:20 AM

Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen

If you mean that one(A) retain the before duplication self and the other (B) not, then no. There is no self without being caused by a brain. And since what causes the self is not spacetime as such but the brain, at the time of the duplication you have 2 versions of the self separated in spacetime, but the same self because the brains are same for memories, cognition and so on.

The self would be duplicated, but the first person perspective you have now would stick with the physical body you're in now.

Hell, for all we know, aliens are making copies of us and sticking the copies on distant planets all the time and we here are none the wiser. Or maybe during the night last night earth was destroyed and we were cloned and stuck in a simulation and we're the clones and don't know it, and the real versions of us are dead. lol

Tommy Jeppesen · 11th April 2018, 10:27 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

The self would be duplicated, but the first person perspective you have now would stick with the physical body you're in now.

Hell, for all we know, aliens are making copies of us and sticking the copies on distant planets all the time and we here are none the wiser. Or maybe during the night last night earth was destroyed and we were cloned and stuck in a simulation and we're the clones and don't know it, and the real versions of us are dead. lol

You could also be a Boltzmann brain.

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 10:30 AM

Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen

You could also be a Boltzmann brain.

I guess...I really don't know enough about physics to say either way.

Giz · 11th April 2018, 11:08 AM

Originally Posted by kellyb

Of course.

I can imagine a scenario where, from my perspective, I was setting myself up in a blue room to get duplicated, and I was told my duplicate will awaken in a yellow room, and I "come to" in a yellow room myself, and I can meet "the other me" who never left the blue room. In that situation, I'd be the duplicate, and my existence actually started with "coming to" in the yellow room. It would be disturbing, but true that I was "just" a duplicate.

But if you are sedated as part of the scan and the 'original' and 'clone' you are switched so that clone-you wakes up in the blue room and original-you wakes up in the yellow room...

MRC_Hans · 11th April 2018, 11:12 AM

Originally Posted by theprestige

The more I'm exposed to the "hard problems" of philosophy, the more I'm inclined to think that something doesn't become a problem until it needs to be solved.

Nothing about the "hard problem" of consciousness in philosophy suggests to me that there's something there that needs to be solved.

The hard problem of earthquakes, on the other hand, is a real problem.

The hard problem of consciousness is right up there with the hard problem of Star Wars hyperdrive, in terms of things that are interesting to a certain kind of nerd, but pose no real problem, nor offer any practical result.

Oh, how I agree!

Hans

MRC_Hans · 11th April 2018, 11:15 AM

I realize I'm late here, but ...

Originally Posted by Fudbucker

Would you go through a transporter, or do you think it's suicide?

I would not go through the first transporter. Just as I wouldn't test the first parachute. But an established, tested technology? Sure!

Hans

MRC_Hans · 11th April 2018, 11:16 AM

Originally Posted by Fudbucker

It's kind of interesting, though, isn't it? And the hard problem does have practical applications. How are we going to treat AI when it reaches our level?

I expect we'll have to negotiate that with the AI. Let's hope it's grateful for our creating it.

Hans

kellyb · 11th April 2018, 11:16 AM

Originally Posted by Giz

But if you are sedated as part of the scan and the 'original' and 'clone' you are switched so that clone-you wakes up in the blue room and original-you wakes up in the yellow room...

That would make an interesting sci fi mystery plot only if the original had to be sedated for the scan. Or thought they would have to be.

MRC_Hans · 11th April 2018, 11:22 AM

Originally Posted by Fudbucker

Because they're similar creatures to us. AI is a whole nother thing.

Of course it is. For one thing it is science fiction for now. So how can we know how we will interact with it?

Quote:

It we encounter biological entities, we'll assume they're conscious. If we encounter machine intelligences who assure us they're conscious, we'll wonder.

Of course we will wonder. Till they can convince us. So what?

Quote:

We have experience dealing with conscious biological beings. We have no experience dealing with conscious machines.

There has been plenty of things we had no experience dealing with. Generally, we eventually coped.

Really, what exactly is your point?

Hans

10th April 2018, 08:59 AM	#41
Belz... Fiend God Join Date: Oct 2005 Location: In the details Posts: 74,711	Originally Posted by kellyb Which types would you not use, and why? I would not use one that creates a copy of me and simultaneously kills the original, because I, the original, don't want to die. Doesn't mean I think HPC is a thing.
	__________________ Master of the Shining Darkness

10th April 2018, 09:48 AM	#42
jrhowell Muse Join Date: Jun 2009 Posts: 509	Originally Posted by Darat Any of them that destructively scans me (DaratA). Yes the person (DaratB) recreated at t'other end will feel the same way I did at the time of scan, but he won't be me, DaratA was killed and reduced to a pile of ash! I am at the other end of the spectrum. I think that both would be me equally. One instance of me would die so that the other instance could go on to have experiences that would otherwise not be possible. I am fine with that idea.
jrhowell Muse Join Date: Jun 2009 Posts: 509

11th April 2018, 02:09 AM	#43
8Sime8 Scholar Join Date: Jun 2016 Posts: 68	For the solipsistic presentist, entering the quantum teleporter is a no-brainer, even if the quantum teleporter doesn't produce identical clones. This is because for the solipsistic presentist his notion of spatio-temporality is resolutely empirical and pertains only to the structure of his observations and not to any unverifiable "subject" of experience, which for him is a mere figure of speech rather than a meaningful hypothesis.
8Sime8 Scholar Join Date: Jun 2016 Posts: 68

11th April 2018, 02:13 AM	#44
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by jrhowell I am at the other end of the spectrum. I think that both would be me equally. One instance of me would die so that the other instance could go on to have experiences that would otherwise not be possible. I am fine with that idea. What if it could create another you without destroying the first you (aka, "the you" reading this right now)?
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 02:20 AM	#45
Tommy Jeppesen Master Poster Join Date: Nov 2008 Posts: 2,842	Originally Posted by kellyb What if it could create another you without destroying the first you (aka, "the you" reading this right now)? They would be the same at the moment at creation and then diverge because of different paths.
	__________________ I don't believe in God and all the rest outside of methodological naturalism But I am a cognitive and ethical relativist/subjectivist and skeptic. #JeSuisAhmed

11th April 2018, 02:21 AM	#46
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by 8Sime8 For the solipsistic presentist, entering the quantum teleporter is a no-brainer, even if the quantum teleporter doesn't produce identical clones. This is because for the solipsistic presentist his notion of spatio-temporality is resolutely empirical and pertains only to the structure of his observations and not to any unverifiable "subject" of experience, which for him is a mere figure of speech rather than a meaningful hypothesis. Is it possible to be a solipsistic non-presentist? Also, most people who stand by solipsism only take it a little seriously. I'm "virtually certain" of all sorts of things besides my own existence, just not as much as I am of the fact that I exist.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 02:24 AM	#47
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen They would be the same at the moment at creation and then diverge because of different paths. Even at the moment of creation they would exist at different points in space, though. That's why I've always felt like "the duplicator" thought experiments violate the nature of how minds exist in spacetime.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 02:30 AM	#48
Tommy Jeppesen Master Poster Join Date: Nov 2008 Posts: 2,842	Originally Posted by kellyb Even at the moment of creation they would exist at different points in space, though. That's why I've always felt like "the duplicator" thought experiments violate the nature of how minds exist in spacetime. You are caught up in "existence". If existence is a process in time, space and other senses, then different space doesn't necessarily mean different senses. At the time of duplication the time and other senses are the same, hence at the moment they (A and B) are same. A is A or A = A, yet in time and space when you read A is A time passes so the first A is not the second A, so A is not A. Nice
	__________________ I don't believe in God and all the rest outside of methodological naturalism But I am a cognitive and ethical relativist/subjectivist and skeptic. #JeSuisAhmed

11th April 2018, 02:31 AM	#49
8Sime8 Scholar Join Date: Jun 2016 Posts: 68	Originally Posted by kellyb Is it possible to be a solipsistic non-presentist? Also, most people who stand by solipsism only take it a little seriously. I'm "virtually certain" of all sorts of things besides my own existence, just not as much as I am of the fact that I exist. Yes, in the sense that solipsism really designates a diverse family of ontological and epistemological positions, where the main thing they have in common is that first-person experiential verification chairs their tribunal of reason, as opposed to third-person testimony. Originally Posted by 8Sime8 For the solipsistic presentist, entering the quantum teleporter is a no-brainer, even if the quantum teleporter doesn't produce identical clones. Actually this is nonsense, since the solipsist might be of the opinion that the outcome of entering a quantum teleporter isn't meaningful to imagine. Perhaps i should have said that the solipsistic presentist would have no reason to fear quantum teleportation for the same reason he has no metaphysical reason to fear actions that precipitate his own death, yet in both cases he still needs a good reason for bringing about either state.
8Sime8 Scholar Join Date: Jun 2016 Posts: 68

11th April 2018, 02:36 AM	#50
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by 8Sime8 Perhaps i should have said that the solipsistic presentist would have no reason to fear quantum teleportation for the same reason he has no metaphysical reason to fear actions that precipitate his own death, yet in both cases he still needs a good reason for bringing about either state. Fair enough. It's not so much that I fear being dead, but that I have a survival instinct whether I like it or not.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 02:38 AM	#51
The Great Zaganza Philosopher Join Date: Aug 2016 Posts: 5,331	The problem is the killing, not the duplication.
	__________________ Opinion is divided on the subject. All the others say it is; I say it isn’t.

11th April 2018, 02:38 AM	#52
Darat Lackey Administrator Join Date: Aug 2001 Location: South East, UK Posts: 83,439	Originally Posted by jrhowell I am at the other end of the spectrum. I think that both would be me equally. One instance of me would die so that the other instance could go on to have experiences that would otherwise not be possible. I am fine with that idea. Let's say a mistake happens and for whatever reason jrhowellA survives the scan so we now have JrhowellA and jrhowellB - who owns the house?
	__________________ I wish I knew how to quit you

11th April 2018, 02:45 AM	#53
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen You are caught up in "existence". If existence is a process in time, space and other senses, then different space doesn't necessarily mean different senses. At the time of duplication the time and other senses are the same, hence at the moment they (A and B) are same. A is A or A = A, yet in time and space when you read A is A time passes so the first A is not the second A, so A is not A. Nice No, I think of A as just a point traveling through spacetime. A = A as long as A exists.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 02:48 AM	#54
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza The problem is the killing, not the duplication. I'd let myself get duplicated, but the duplicate wouldn't be me. There would be two entities that thought they were me, but whichever one was not the duplicate would be the only actual me.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 02:50 AM	#55
Tommy Jeppesen Master Poster Join Date: Nov 2008 Posts: 2,842	Originally Posted by kellyb No, I think of A as just a point traveling through spacetime. A = A as long as A exists. Yes, so me TommyA moves through spacetime and splits into TommyA and TommyB. For all other senses in spacetime than spacetime both A and B are the same. Now spacetime passes and they start to differ. I don't exist in only spacetime.
	__________________ I don't believe in God and all the rest outside of methodological naturalism But I am a cognitive and ethical relativist/subjectivist and skeptic. #JeSuisAhmed

11th April 2018, 03:10 AM	#56
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen Yes, so me TommyA moves through spacetime and splits into TommyA and TommyB. For all other senses in spacetime than spacetime both A and B are the same. Now spacetime passes and they start to differ. I don't exist in only spacetime. Your perspective, TommyA's, is still TommyA's, though. Not TommyB. That's all I'm saying.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 07:47 AM	#57
Tommy Jeppesen Master Poster Join Date: Nov 2008 Posts: 2,842	Originally Posted by kellyb Your perspective, TommyA's, is still TommyA's, though. Not TommyB. That's all I'm saying. What is a "you"?
	__________________ I don't believe in God and all the rest outside of methodological naturalism But I am a cognitive and ethical relativist/subjectivist and skeptic. #JeSuisAhmed

11th April 2018, 08:47 AM	#58
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen What is a "you"? Your consciousness, specifically experiencing a first person perspective.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 09:32 AM	#59
The Great Zaganza Philosopher Join Date: Aug 2016 Posts: 5,331	Originally Posted by kellyb I'd let myself get duplicated, but the duplicate wouldn't be me. There would be two entities that thought they were me, but whichever one was not the duplicate would be the only actual me. I would say that is inaccurate: they both would be you, but no longer a single you.
	__________________ Opinion is divided on the subject. All the others say it is; I say it isn’t.

11th April 2018, 09:39 AM	#60
JoeMorgue Self Employed Remittance Man Join Date: Nov 2009 Location: Florida Posts: 13,160	Originally Posted by kellyb I'd let myself get duplicated, but the duplicate wouldn't be me. There would be two entities that thought they were me, but whichever one was not the duplicate would be the only actual me. Cough Hi Jabba Cough
	__________________ "Ernest Hemingway once wrote that the world is a fine place and worth fighting for. I agree with the second part." - Detective Sommerset, Se7en

11th April 2018, 09:41 AM	#61
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza I would say that is inaccurate: they both would be you, but no longer a single you. In that hypothetical scenario, I, the me that's typing this, would have one or the other's first person perspective, not both of them. Right?
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 09:43 AM	#62
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by JoeMorgue Cough Hi Jabba Cough Do you think if your brain was scanned and your consciousness replicated/duplicated in a computer, that consciousness in a computer would be you?
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 09:45 AM	#63
JoeMorgue Self Employed Remittance Man Join Date: Nov 2009 Location: Florida Posts: 13,160	Shrugs Sure. Two "me's" isn't the existential crisis for me it is for others. Right now "Me" is a useful concept to have to describe the 190lb meat sack with the 3lb sack of grey matter in its skull that maintains my mental process. If this thing was replicated exactly I don't exactly get why I would get to be "me" and the other wouldn't. But again... we've been literally trying to get this concept across to Jabba for 5 years now so...
	__________________ "Ernest Hemingway once wrote that the world is a fine place and worth fighting for. I agree with the second part." - Detective Sommerset, Se7en

11th April 2018, 09:47 AM	#64
The Great Zaganza Philosopher Join Date: Aug 2016 Posts: 5,331	Originally Posted by kellyb In that hypothetical scenario, I, the me that's typing this, would have one or the other's first person perspective, not both of them. Right? Both would be a you, but of course there would be no overlap of perspective.
	__________________ Opinion is divided on the subject. All the others say it is; I say it isn’t.

11th April 2018, 09:50 AM	#65
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza Both would be a you, but of course there would be no overlap of perspective. I just think my first person perspective is going to "stick" with my physical brain.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 09:54 AM	#66
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by JoeMorgue Shrugs Sure. Two "me's" isn't the existential crisis for me it is for others. Right now "Me" is a useful concept to have to describe the 190lb meat sack with the 3lb sack of grey matter in its skull that maintains my mental process. If this thing was replicated exactly I don't exactly get why I would get to be "me" and the other wouldn't. But again... we've been literally trying to get this concept across to Jabba for 5 years now so... Nobody's talking about an existential crisis. And it's not a matter of "getting to be" in one body/format/whatever or another. If I COULD "get to be" a duplicate I would, if the body or "format" or whatever was a marked improvement.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 09:55 AM	#67
The Great Zaganza Philosopher Join Date: Aug 2016 Posts: 5,331	Originally Posted by kellyb I just think my first person perspective is going to "stick" with my physical brain. But your copy would think the same thing with the same justification.
	__________________ Opinion is divided on the subject. All the others say it is; I say it isn’t.

11th April 2018, 10:00 AM	#68
Tommy Jeppesen Master Poster Join Date: Nov 2008 Posts: 2,842	Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza But your copy would think the same thing with the same justification. If the brain/body with memories, cognition, emotions are the same at the duplication they are the same person expect for spacetime being different. Over time they can diverge and become more like identical twins, but for some of their memories and so on, they are the same.
	__________________ I don't believe in God and all the rest outside of methodological naturalism But I am a cognitive and ethical relativist/subjectivist and skeptic. #JeSuisAhmed

11th April 2018, 10:01 AM	#69
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by The Great Zaganza But your copy would think the same thing with the same justification. Of course. I can imagine a scenario where, from my perspective, I was setting myself up in a blue room to get duplicated, and I was told my duplicate will awaken in a yellow room, and I "come to" in a yellow room myself, and I can meet "the other me" who never left the blue room. In that situation, I'd be the duplicate, and my existence actually started with "coming to" in the yellow room. It would be disturbing, but true that I was "just" a duplicate.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 10:02 AM	#70
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen If the brain/body with memories, cognition, emotions are the same at the duplication they are the same person expect for spacetime being different. Over time they can diverge and become more like identical twins, but for some of their memories and so on, they are the same. Yeah, spacetime is the kicker there.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 10:12 AM	#71
Tommy Jeppesen Master Poster Join Date: Nov 2008 Posts: 2,842	Originally Posted by kellyb Yeah, spacetime is the kicker there. If you mean that one(A) retain the before duplication self and the other (B) not, then no. There is no self without being caused by a brain. And since what causes the self is not spacetime as such but the brain, at the time of the duplication you have 2 versions of the self separated in spacetime, but the same self because the brains are same for memories, cognition and so on.
	__________________ I don't believe in God and all the rest outside of methodological naturalism But I am a cognitive and ethical relativist/subjectivist and skeptic. #JeSuisAhmed

11th April 2018, 10:20 AM	#72
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen If you mean that one(A) retain the before duplication self and the other (B) not, then no. There is no self without being caused by a brain. And since what causes the self is not spacetime as such but the brain, at the time of the duplication you have 2 versions of the self separated in spacetime, but the same self because the brains are same for memories, cognition and so on. The self would be duplicated, but the first person perspective you have now would stick with the physical body you're in now. Hell, for all we know, aliens are making copies of us and sticking the copies on distant planets all the time and we here are none the wiser. Or maybe during the night last night earth was destroyed and we were cloned and stuck in a simulation and we're the clones and don't know it, and the real versions of us are dead. lol
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 10:27 AM	#73
Tommy Jeppesen Master Poster Join Date: Nov 2008 Posts: 2,842	Originally Posted by kellyb The self would be duplicated, but the first person perspective you have now would stick with the physical body you're in now. Hell, for all we know, aliens are making copies of us and sticking the copies on distant planets all the time and we here are none the wiser. Or maybe during the night last night earth was destroyed and we were cloned and stuck in a simulation and we're the clones and don't know it, and the real versions of us are dead. lol You could also be a Boltzmann brain.
	__________________ I don't believe in God and all the rest outside of methodological naturalism But I am a cognitive and ethical relativist/subjectivist and skeptic. #JeSuisAhmed

11th April 2018, 10:30 AM	#74
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	Originally Posted by Tommy Jeppesen You could also be a Boltzmann brain. I guess...I really don't know enough about physics to say either way.
kellyb Philosopher Join Date: Jan 2006 Posts: 9,102	__________________ The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts ~ Bertrand Russell I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend.

11th April 2018, 11:08 AM	#75
Giz Philosopher Join Date: Jul 2002 Posts: 8,252	Originally Posted by kellyb Of course. I can imagine a scenario where, from my perspective, I was setting myself up in a blue room to get duplicated, and I was told my duplicate will awaken in a yellow room, and I "come to" in a yellow room myself, and I can meet "the other me" who never left the blue room. In that situation, I'd be the duplicate, and my existence actually started with "coming to" in the yellow room. It would be disturbing, but true that I was "just" a duplicate. But if you are sedated as part of the scan and the 'original' and 'clone' you are switched so that clone-you wakes up in the blue room and original-you wakes up in the yellow room...
Giz Philosopher Join Date: Jul 2002 Posts: 8,252