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#161 |
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I'm not sure what you're getting at but I think I was trying to say the same thing. Germany didn't have (much) oil which is one of the reasons Hitler wanted Russia. But it wasn't just oil, it was iron ore and a whole lot of other metals that were vital to industrial economies. However, I do remember reading somewhere (I apologise, it's been a while since I've read this stuff but I can check the bookshelf if I have to although Mien Kampf went in the bin years ago), that Hitler saw the Ukraine as a potential food source for Greater Germany in the future. But I'd be more than happy to be corrected/educated on that. |
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#162 |
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"Even among men lacking all distinction he inevitably stood out as a man lacking more distinction than all the rest, and people who met him were always impressed by how unimpressive he was." |
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#163 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: Jun 2010
Posts: 15,379
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It relied on the RAF and the Royal Navy doing nothing. Even wity the RAF neutralised the RN would still have destroyed the invasion ships and the idea of acpuring a major port intact is rediculous. When the Allies landed in Normandy they took with them their own prefabricated harbours the 'Mulberries'. they knew it might be months before they had a port both captured and opened and able to take large ships. Plus in addition the othe landing craft that took the troops and tanks ashore in the first wave there were huge landing Ships that allowed the stores to be driven straight out and up the beach. Plus there was a direct pipeline laid from England to France to pump fuel direct to the beach. In the early 70s a large 'War game' was played out at Sandhurst. Surviving commanders from both Britain and germany took part. . They allowed the Germans to have local air superiority on day one and also delayed the RN from arriving in force for 24 hours. this allowed the Germans to get their 'first wave' onto the beach. They had no heavy armour and only armoure cars motorcycles and some light vehicles for transport as per the plan. Although they did make some headway off the beaches they were stopped a few miles inland and never got near any ports. The ports were minded and harbour entrances cloes with scuttled 'blockships' anyway. On the second day the RAF had air superiority and the RN got into the invasion fleet. Those forces ashore were pushed back to the beaches and either surrendered or made their way off in what boats they still had. |
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#164 |
Graduate Poster
Join Date: Sep 2011
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I knew this much. Also, as the German's began their lame attempt at assembling the invasion craft the RAF were bombing the crap out of them while they were in harbours and rivers.
Had no idea about this. Was there a name for it so I can look it up? Sounds really interesting! |
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"Even among men lacking all distinction he inevitably stood out as a man lacking more distinction than all the rest, and people who met him were always impressed by how unimpressive he was." |
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#165 |
Illuminator
Join Date: Sep 2011
Posts: 4,054
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No it just makes you ill informed and wrong, and off topic for that matter. As far as the OP goes your only proposal appears to be that the British and French sit on their hands while Hitler conquers Poland; quite unlikely after the German occupation of the remaining Czech territory.
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#166 |
Master Poster
Join Date: Nov 2011
Posts: 2,313
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I think your referring to the "Hunger Plan", in which the Nazi's were planning to starve off all "excess" urban civilian population in eastern Europe, so there would be a surplus of food for ethnic Germans. Which itself was part of "Generalplan Ost", maybe the largest genocide ever conceived in human history.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunger_Plan http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalplan_Ost |
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#167 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: May 2011
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No, there's a real dispute here, although it's not in doubt that the collectivisation famine was responsible for millions of deaths, and that it was brought about by Stalin's agrarian policies, and made worse by his callous disregard for human life. But whether he set out to create a famine as such, and conducted collectivisation for the purpose of causing the deaths of these millions, or as a device to commit genocide against the Ukrainians, is more open to argument.
There is something that makes me a little nervous of the Holodomor and the figure of seven million Ukrainian victims. Some (not most, let alone all) of the proponents of this model of events are anti Semites. They use a word resembling Holocaust - although it is a perfectly reasonable Ukrainian word - and they claim the high figure of seven million ... The Jews suffered six million deaths. But I must stress: Stalin was an unspeakable tyrant who particularly oppressed the Ukrainians, and whose outrageous agrarian policies were responsible for the deaths of millions in Ukraine, and in other parts of the USSR. This is quite beyond any doubt. |
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#168 |
Graduate Poster
Join Date: Sep 2008
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Just google sealion wargame sandhurst or similar.
There is a fictionalised novel based on it but I cant remember its name. I do have a gripe with it though, and we had a thread about it some while ago, but the whole thing starts with "And so the Germans, they land on the beaches, yeh?" which neatly misses out the principle difficulty the Germans would have faced which was actually getting across the channel. As Captain_Swoop mentioned, they were going to try and cross the channel in few hundred Rhine barges. Most of which were unpowered so would have to be towed. It would have taken well over 12 hours to cross meaning at least a portion of the journey would have to have been undertaken in daylight. And crossing the channel with its currents, sandbanks, shoals and tides with that motley collection of barges at night is just insane in any case. The whole concept is ludicrous beyond belief. |
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#169 |
Master Poster
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: United Kingdom
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It's true if you have only a basic understanding of the Eastern Front you might well conclude that the Wehrmacht's logistics were poor. But this was not in fact the case.
In 1941/2, Army Groups North and South held virtually all of their ground and were able to ward off numerous Soviet offensives from December 1941 onwards without real difficulty. Both army groups had to withdraw overextended salients (to Tikhvin and Rostov), but this was largely because of a shortage of forces and the strength of the opposing Red Army forces, not because of logistics. Army Group North benefited considerably from not only sea transport but also the shorter rail links through the Baltic states to the Leningrad front, and had little difficulty in maintaining the siege until January 1944. Certainly no real logistical difficulties. Soviet offensives on the southern flank of Army Group North, advancing in parallel to offensives against the northern flank of Army Group Centre - and achieving their original penetration more or less along the army group boundary - succeeded in temporarily encircling II Corps at Demyansk, which was then supplied by air. That was the very first time aerial resupply was used on a major scale in military history, and the success of the operation led to a fatal overestimation of Luftwaffe capabilities at Stalingrad. Don't get me wrong, I'm not one of those glide-over-maps alternative history morons like RHS Stolfi who thinks that the Wehrmacht could have taken Moscow in 1941 "if only" they'd done X. They clearly bit off more than they could chew in 1941, but the same would apply to any other army of the era. The distances, environment and climatic conditions were just that bad in Russia. (And they also affected the Red Army quite seriously, with large numbers of Soviet soldiers freezing to death, too. Greatcoats were also standard issue for the Red Army that year.) The defeat before Moscow was extremely serious, and was in part caused by overextended supply lines which were very close to breaking point in November 1941. Undoubtedly, the Wehrmacht suffered heavier losses than it needed to because of the failure to provide winter uniforms, and it was unable to resist the Soviet winter offensive as well as it might have done. But it did resist, it resupplied and it reinforced (using rail, road and air transport) successfully, stopping the offensive in its tracks. The Wehrmacht was in fact better at logistics than its opponents until mid-war. Certainly better than the BEF and British forces in Greece, and better also than the British forces in North Africa early on. Massively better than the Red Army on a tactical and operational level. Observing the efficiency of German maintenance units led directly to the establishment of REME in 1942. The British became very good at logistics, but never figured out operations, and British strategy was influenced by another politician-amateur, with frequently disastrous results. Wehrmacht logistics on the Eastern Front in 1942/43 functioned very well for Army Groups North, Centre and A; it was only Army Group B, and more specifically 6th Army plus the flanking Axis forces, which experienced problems, and then only in the immediate context of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad. General Wagner, the Quartermaster-General, warned about the overextended supply lines earlier in the autumn, and was extremely worried about what might ensue. Obviously, Halder also warned Hitler about the impending disaster and was sacked for his pains. Wagner and Halder worked extremely well together and generally had a very good understanding of the significance of logistics, the exception being the vabanque move towards Moscow in late 1941 when Halder's usual good sense deserted him. Despite the disaster at Stalingrad, Wehrmacht logistics were more than capable of moving a very sizeable force from western Europe to plug the hole, and restabilise the frontline. Some other general measures of logistical efficiency would be things like ammunition supply and expenditure. The figures show that munitions expenditures increased year on year on the Eastern Front. See Gerhard Donat, Der Munitionsverbrauch im Zweiten Weltkrieg im operativen und taktischen Rahmen. Osnabrück, 1992. From 1942, too, one also finds proper winter clothing provided, and the number of pictures showing Wehrmacht soldiers in decent winter kit from 1942/3 and 1943/44 proves that they reached the troops - the exception really does seem to have been Stalingrad, and even there one can find evidence of winter uniforms being worn in some cases. By 1944, however, attrition was starting to cause problems, as were the demands of stockpiling ammunition for other theatres, despite overall increased production. Moreover, in the winter of 1943-44, we see the start of a slow breakdown in virtually all aspects of the Wehrmacht, in logistics we see poorer maintenance rates, an increased loss of vehicles and inability to recover vehicles, which became critical on the retreat. The progressive demotorisation of the Wehrmacht is well known, although a lot of that was down to the massive overexpansion of the army between 1941-44 which distributed more vehicles overall among even more formations, reducing each division's share of the vehicle park (et cetera). Since more than half of the Eastern Front as well as the entire Western Front collapsed in the summer of 1944, then I think I'm entitled to say that the Wehrmacht fell apart. It stitched itself back together again in a very fragile condition, only to fall apart once more in January 1945. Because so many army groups and armies were effectively wiped out in 1944, this affected their rear area services severely, so that many logistic units were destroyed without being replaced. Although in 1944-45 there were shorter supply lines coupled with increased production of weapons and ammunition, the logistic situation deteriorated dramatically due to the effects of the combined bomber offensive's raids on German oil plants and the loss of Romania. This eventually caused the Wehrmacht to grind to a halt for lack of fuel, and caused massive losses in 1945. If you want to be pernickety, you can of course accuse the Germans of not 'getting' something they didn't even have a word for in this era. Logistik only comes into use after 1945 in the Bundeswehr (dunno about the NVA), the Wehrmacht thought in terms of Heeresversorgung. But they had evolved a very sophisticated supply doctrine, one that stressed 'supply is a part of warfare' according to the field manual, and which integrated the narrower sphere of military rear area services with the use of railways together with economic exploitation and most of all, living off the land. German "logistics" made use of a wide range of military, paramilitary and civilian organisations. This is why flicking through Der Vierjahresplan for the war years is basically like reading a lengthy paean to the achievements of Nazi logisticians. Considering that in 1941, Army Group Centre harvested more potatoes and grain than it expended in ammunition, saving on vast quantities of rail capacity in the process, German supply doctrine was as geared to Eastern Front conditions as it was possible to achieve. Oh, and that 'lean Wehrmacht' image? Total myth. Teeth/tail ratios were skewed heavily in favour of tail, virtually until the end of the war (by which time any able-bodied younger soldier had been sent to a rifle company). To my mind, the fact that Wehrmacht quartermasters (Ib, Qu, OQu) were always General Staff officers whereas the intelligence branch was turned over to reservists and other line officers at lower levels sums up where the Wehrmacht placed its priorities. Operations first, then supply, finally intelligence. |
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Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka. Holocaust Denial and Operation Reinhard. A Critique of the Falsehoods of Mattogno, Graf and Kues. (biggest ever skeptical debunking of conspiracy theorists; PDF available) Everytime one asks you holocaust deniers for positive evidence you just put your finger in the ears, dance around and sing lalala - Kevin Silbstedt |
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#170 |
Philosopher
Join Date: Jun 2007
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#171 |
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#172 |
Master Poster
Join Date: Nov 2011
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The Soviets were always Hitler's #1 enemy, however I think he wanted to conquer France right from the onset. He saw it as revenge for WW1, and the Treaty of Versailles I believe. He did not see Britain as a "natural enemy" however and hoped they would come to terms after the fall of France.
Someone else can probably elaborate much better. @Nick Terry, amazingly well written post. To sum up, Germany took logistics very seriously, were quite good at them, but the distances, harsh conditions, and lack of infrastructure in the USSR was just too much for anyone to overcome? Also their lack of intelligence bit them in the ass. They were counting on highways they saw on captured maps, that turned out to be dirt tracks etc. |
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#173 |
Master Poster
Join Date: Dec 2006
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Very little has been written about Wehrmacht logistics, probably because it's not a very glamorous field of study even for Allied armies. But it became clear to me when researching my PhD that we have somewhat underestimated the logistical efforts exerted by the Wehrmacht in WWII.
Moreover, those logistical efforts connect directly to war crimes and genocide, not least via the Hunger Plan in its "operational" guise, but also encompassing how the Jews of Vilnius were put to work in Heereskraftfahrpark 562. I'm of the opinion that there were fundamental limits to German economic and manpower mobilisation which could never have been overcome no matter how 'cleverly' they organised the economy or administered the occupied territories. The Nazi war effort ran up against those limits from a fairly early stage. This applies even to 'Barbarossa' which involved a fairly significant overmobilisation of the Army to a size beyond which it could be sustained at 'Allied' levels of replenished manpower and materiel on a consistent basis. Is it more critical that the divisions of Army Group Centre had lost men and equipment or that they couldn't be supplied? Arguably, the former could be seen as more critical, since tactical defeats were often caused by the failure of understrength battalions down to the size of companies or platoons. In which case, a critical bottleneck wasn't logistics, but the replacement system, which in many respects functioned with astonishing efficiency, yet had to cope with a fundamentally oversized army, thereby leaving formations undermanned and underequipped at the crucial moments of decision, even though the Wehrmacht's powers of regeneration are generally regarded as legendary. FYI, my doctoral supervisor was Richard Overy, and I'm an inside-cover-listed contributor to Occupied Economies: An Economic History of Nazi-Occupied Europe 1939-1945. |
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Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka. Holocaust Denial and Operation Reinhard. A Critique of the Falsehoods of Mattogno, Graf and Kues. (biggest ever skeptical debunking of conspiracy theorists; PDF available) Everytime one asks you holocaust deniers for positive evidence you just put your finger in the ears, dance around and sing lalala - Kevin Silbstedt |
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#174 |
Penultimate Amazing
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#175 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: Nov 2006
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battleplan that may hav worked imho
Germany begins the war exactly as it did but continues fighting England until it air force cannot mount a viable defence. While keeping the RAF ineffective the Luftwaffe and Navy then concentrate on shipping within 100 miles of GB taking out both Royale Navy and all supply ships from USA/Canada that are in British waters. Germany blockades GB by sea and air. Bombs only airfields, ports and factories until England sues for peace. This gives less reason for USA to engage in Europe, and if Germany can delay Pearl Harbour by 6 - 10 months they can consolidate their position in Europe. This would also take the heat off the Italians in Africa until Germany has England surrender at which time more resources can be sent to Africa to again secure the entire Meditrranean. Now a propeganda campaign targets Ukraine and wester USSR states decrying the abuses of Stalin. The USA is occupied in the Pacific and thir is little pressure to come to the aid of the British colonies if a English govt in exile is asking for it. If Russia attacks Japan then Germany goes further into Russia and strikes for Moscow, "liberates Moscow". |
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#176 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: Apr 2007
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The bolded is one tall order. The RAF was fighting a defensive battle over its own territory, and just as in land battles, that conferred a considerable advantage. Moreover, the RAF was actually outproducing the Luftwaffe in fighter aircraft. While certainly the RAF lost many aircraft and pilots, so did the Luftwaffe. Any process by which the RAF was reduced to a force too small to offer meaningful resistance would have likewise reduced the Luftwaffe to an ineffective force. |
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"We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things not because they are easy, but because they are hard. Because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our abilities and skills, because that challenge is one we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win." |
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#177 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: 40 miles north of the border
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I thought the conventional take was that the RAF was on its last legs when Germany swiched from targetting RAF to targeting population
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#178 |
Master Poster
Join Date: Nov 2011
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I dunno. I've always heard the story goes as Fighter Command was pretty close to being defeated, they were not able to produce enough planes to match losses, when the Luftwaffe changed tactics to terror bombing.
But in any case, Germany certainly had a much greater industrial capacity than Britain in the years leading up to the war and in 1940. So had they concentrated more on building an air force to defeat the UK, could they have done so? Edit: According the Churchill's own estimates only 50 of the planes Germany lost were Bf-109's! What if Germany had many more of them? http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Mag...808battle.aspx see the chart |
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#179 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: Apr 2007
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"We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things not because they are easy, but because they are hard. Because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our abilities and skills, because that challenge is one we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win." |
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#180 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: Apr 2007
Posts: 14,519
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Britain was actually outproducing Germany in fighters, so available aircraft was never really a problem for Fighter Command. The Germans did not realize this as they were plagued with bad intelligence throughout the battle. Many times the Luftwaffe wasn't even bombing the right airfields—it was hitting Coastal Command, training, or secondary airfields rather that the important sector stations. And even then airfields were rarely put out of action for long. Relatively few Fighter Command aircraft were destroyed on the ground throughout the battle. There was some issue with a shortage of pilots in the latter part of August 1940—but much of that is at least as attributable to administrative inefficiencies as an actual a lack of pilots. It makes a great story to say that the RAF was on the edge of defeat and was only saved by the German switch to London as a priority target—but it is only just a story. The reality was that the Battle of Britain was never really that close. The odds were stacked against the Luftwaffe from the beginning. Most modern analysis I've read says that the best chance for the Luftwaffe to prevail would have been to make the radar stations a priority target and knock them out as they were a key component in the British defence. But these were difficult pinpoint targets. Medium bombers were too inaccurate, and the Stuka too vulnerable if RAF fighters were in the area. The best bet would have been low-level fighter-bomber attacks by squadrons specifically created and trained for this purpose. But the Luftwaffe only had one of those, and it was an experimental one. The others things the Germans would have needed to do is have drop tanks for their Me 109s so as to extend their range and give them more combat time over southern England, as well as leave their fighters in the free-chasing role. The problem with the latter is that it means higher bomber losses. As it was, the bomber crews screamed for more support so the fighters were ordered to stay in close escort on the bombers which gave the advantage to the RAF. (The USAAF in Europe later in the war had to learn the same lesson—it was the unleashing of the escort fighters from close escort which decimated the Luftwaffe in the early months of 1944.) |
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"We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things not because they are easy, but because they are hard. Because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our abilities and skills, because that challenge is one we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win." |
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#181 |
Banned
Join Date: Oct 2012
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Not to mention that replacement radar could have been installed in relatively short order. I believe that mobile radar systems were already in production before the Luftwaffe focused on London as the primary bombing target.
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#182 |
121.92-meter mutant fire-breathing lizard-thingy
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Guns that are instantly available for use are instantly available for misuse. World War II Diplomatic and Political Resources Hyperwar, WWII Military History Buying conspiracy books is a voluntary tax on stupid. |
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#183 |
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__________________
"Even among men lacking all distinction he inevitably stood out as a man lacking more distinction than all the rest, and people who met him were always impressed by how unimpressive he was." |
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#184 |
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Join Date: Nov 2003
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After the Second World war, maqny of the surviving German generals in interviews and in their memoirs blamed Hitler for losing the war. The talked about "Lost Victories" and such.
Their position boiled down to "If it wasn't for Hitler, we would have won the war for him!". And sad regret that they did not do so. This surviving memoir literature has been shown to be self derving and frankly frequently full of lies. It frankly massively distorted the real story. One of things ignored was just how much Many German Generals agreed with and accepted Nazi belifs and "morality". In point of fact Hitler was more responsible for Germanies Run of victories early in the war, and that after December 1941 only a miracle could have given Germany victory. THe German generals complained mightidy after the War about huitler refusing withdrawls etc, carefully ignoring the with drawls Hitler did agree too and the fact that on many occassions Hitler had support from generals for his refussal to withdraw. Many German generals after the war down played and ignored and in fact denied after the war the fact that they were complicit up to their eyeballs in the Nazi regime. In trial after trial they lied under oath about their involvement in atrocities. What the they also ignored was that so many of the Generals were the recipients of massive secret monthly payments, i.e, bribes in return for their loyalty. It became convienent after the war to blame Hitler for losing it. Hitler being dead could not deny it. The simple fact is that Hitler more than any single person was responsible for the success of the German military in 1939-1941. After that victory was impossible. Defeat could only be prolonged not averted after that. The German generals , most of them stayed loyal to the regime right to the end mainly because in the end they shared a similar belief system to the Nazi regime. That they were dragging Germany into the abyess didn't appear to be a huge [roblem for them. (The july 1944 coup attempt was the effort of small minority.) The German generals after the war basically wanted to have their cake and eat too.
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Many of the German generals shared the dream of capturing "living space" and virtually all thought that the Soviet Union would be desposed off in the few months. The staff planning Barbarrossa thought it extremely unlikely the campaign would last int winter. If Hitler undersestimated the Russians so did the grerat majority of German generals. The option of concentrating on Britain was considered but dropped on the grounds it would take far too long and enabled the Soviet Union to become a real danger aside from being basically unworkable and useless so long as the USA supported Britain with eco0nomic aid. This wasn't just Hitler's opinion it was the opinion of the German general staff.
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The fact is the conquest of western Europe gave Germany immense resources and enabled Hitler to massively build up his forces. Any army that Hitler would have built up by the Spring of 1940 would have much smaller than what was hurled against Russia in 1941. The result would have been a much quicker German defeat in 1940 than was in fact the case. Further Hitler would have had to leave forces in the west anyway. As for Japan attacking. possible but not likely. In the late 1930's Russia had throughly thrashed Japan in a border war and Japan was up to her eyeballs in China adding the Soviet Union to her enemies would have been considered a very ricky move. This senario is unlikely.
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The speculation of using Soviet POW's by the millions in combat goes back to hoary old myths that if H8itler had come as a liberator the Soviet Union would have collapsed. Well that is similar to saying if rained in the desert we would have more flowers. All this speculation requires is that Hitler not be Hitler, ( And the German Generals not have posionious anti-slave attitudes) and all would be well. It is fantasy.
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#185 |
121.92-meter mutant fire-breathing lizard-thingy
Join Date: Nov 2009
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Guns that are instantly available for use are instantly available for misuse. World War II Diplomatic and Political Resources Hyperwar, WWII Military History Buying conspiracy books is a voluntary tax on stupid. |
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#186 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: May 2011
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Has anyone mentioned that as the fighting was in the skies over the UK, RAF pilots who survived being shot down were soon back in action, often the same day, while Luftwaffe ones were taken prisoner? And of course planes can be built faster than pilots can be trained.
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#187 |
Graduate Poster
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#188 |
No longer the 1
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Try here, here and here. It was run by Paddy Griffith.
The novel is Richard Cox's Operation Sealion.
Originally Posted by Sealion
Few of the studies or wargames of Sealion factor in Churchill's enthusiasm about chemical weapons; the landing beaches would likely have been drenched with Britain's limited stocks of phosgene and sulphur mustard. |
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As human right is always something given, it always in reality reduces to the right which men give, "concede," to each other. If the right to existence is conceded to new-born children, then they have the right; if it is not conceded to them, as was the case among the Spartans and ancient Romans, then they do not have it. For only society can give or concede it to them; they themselves cannot take it, or give it to themselves. |
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#189 |
No longer the 1
Join Date: Apr 2007
Posts: 19,198
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Not really, I suggest you look over this symposium on the BoB for a good overview.
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As human right is always something given, it always in reality reduces to the right which men give, "concede," to each other. If the right to existence is conceded to new-born children, then they have the right; if it is not conceded to them, as was the case among the Spartans and ancient Romans, then they do not have it. For only society can give or concede it to them; they themselves cannot take it, or give it to themselves. |
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#190 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: Jun 2010
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Germany wasn't realy aware of the Chain Home rader system. Mention has been made of the Zeppelin mission before the war. An Airship with scientists and electronics aboard flew up and down the North Sea listening for British Radar. they were however expecting it to resemble their own systems. Chain Home was on a lot longer wavelength and it had a frequency that was the same as the Power grid. It also used a 'Phased Array' rather than a rotating Antenna.
they did detect the transmissions but thought they were seeing interference from the electricity power grid and discounted it. Attack on the radar Stations was expected and provision had been made for it. If the radar stations had been hit they had good overlap and there were portable sets ready to fill any gaps while repairs were made. Ventnor for example had a semi portable backup station all of its own as it was in a voulnerable location. Chain Home stations were also well hardened against attack with widely distributed backup generators etc. Good links http://www.subbrit.org.uk/sb-sites/s...or/index.shtml Ventnor Chain Home Station as it is now and then. http://www.radarpages.co.uk/ History of RAF Radar. Don't forget the British captured a German Radar station in a commando raid. Scientists went on the raid to identify and seize the important equipment. |
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#191 |
Banned
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: Guilford
Posts: 13,037
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And if the Germans had landed then they would have been totally confused and demoralised by the cunning removal of all the road signs before being picked off by the Home Guard.
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#192 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: May 2011
Posts: 22,194
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#193 |
Master Poster
Join Date: Nov 2011
Posts: 2,313
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I've skimmed through that article (I'll read in full when I have time), and even it states "And, whilst talking of civilians, let us not forget those who suffered in the bombing of towns and cities, as Hitler's forces were directed away from a potentially winning strategy. It may not have been generally realised, at the time, that their prolonged period of trial was in fact a consequence of Nazy Germany's first major defeat." - pg 97
Was the battle on a "knife edge" with the RAF ready to collapse any day in late summer 1940? No. It seems newer research on the battle generally concludes that it was never even close to being lost, but older histories make a case that it was much closer. I'll quote a paragraph from wikipedia: Other scholars assert that this period was the most dangerous of all. In The Narrow Margin, published in 1961, historians Derek Wood and Derek Dempster believed that the two weeks from 24 August to 6 September represented a real danger. According to them, from 24 August to 6 September 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. They assert that 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just fewer than 1,000. They conclude that during August no more than 260 fighter pilots were turned out by OTUs and casualties in the same month were just over 300. A full squadron establishment was 26 pilots whereas the average in August was 16. In their assessment, the RAF was losing the battle.[170] Denis Richards, in his 1953 contribution to the official British account History of the Second World War, agreed that lack of pilots, especially experienced ones, was the RAF's greatest problem. He states that between 8 and 18 August 154 RAF pilots were killed, severely wounded, or missing, while only 63 new pilots were trained. Available aircraft was also a serious issue. While its reserves during the Battle of Britain never declined to a half dozen planes as some later claimed, Richards describes 24 August to 6 September as the critical period because during these two weeks Germany destroyed far more aircraft through its attacks on 11 Group's southeast bases than Britain was producing. Three more weeks of such a pace would indeed have exhausted aircraft reserves. Germany had seen heavy losses of pilots and aircraft as well, however, thus its shift to nighttime attacks in September. On 7 September RAF aircraft losses fell below British production and remained so until the end of the war. I maintain that with better pre-war planning and production, it's not beyond the realm of possibility, that Germany defeats the RAF. |
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#194 |
Master Poster
Join Date: Nov 2011
Posts: 2,313
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The men of the Home Guard were a tough, capable, well oiled, deadly fighting force, more than capable of defeating the Fallschirmjäger.
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#195 |
Illuminator
Join Date: Sep 2011
Posts: 4,054
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As has been pointed out that's much harder than it looks and again it falls down on the same problem that Hitler wasn't planning for war with Britain. Even if the Luftwaffe gained air superiority over Southern England for a while the Heer and Kriegsmarine didn't have the means to exploit it. Hitler hoped Britain would see reason(from his perspective) and come to terms.
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#196 |
Master Poster
Join Date: Nov 2011
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#197 |
Master Poster
Join Date: Jul 2011
Posts: 2,231
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One thing I have read is that the Battle of Moscow was won when the Soviets transported troops from the far east back to Moscow. These troops were well trained and equipped (by Soviet standards, at least); relativily fresh and organized. Those were a big component of the troops that held the line and pushed the Germans back from Moscow.
If Japan had avoided war with the U.S. for a bit longer, and maintained a threatening posture towards the Soviet far east for a while longer, would those far-eastern troops have been delayed from reaching Moscow? If so, would the Soviets still be able to hold on to Moscow - and if not, would the loss of Moscow make the collapse of the Soviet government or military more likely? |
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#198 |
Banned
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: Guilford
Posts: 13,037
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I suspect this is where they went wrong. Had they removed the signs pointing to Berlin the Allies would have wandered endlessly in circles once they crossed into the Reich.
But seriously, I can't conjour up a scene of bemused tank commanders staring fixedly at the crossroads, shaking their heads in disbelief at the enemy's resourcefulness. |
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#199 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: May 2011
Posts: 22,194
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#200 |
Penultimate Amazing
Join Date: Apr 2007
Posts: 14,519
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The advantage of fighting defensively over one's own territory. The heavy fighting on August 18, 1940, is representative of the kind of losses endured by both sides during the battle. On that day 38 RAF fighters were destroyed while the Luftwaffe lost 69. In terms of aircrew, the RAF had 30 casualties (11 killed, 19 wounded) while the Luftwaffe had 159 (94 killed, 40 captured, 25 wounded). Thus for every four RAF fighters destroyed the Luftwaffe lost seven aircraft, and for every one RAF casualty inflicted the Luftwaffe suffered five. If the Luftwaffe had managed to break the back of Fighter Command, it would have been itself broken—a Pyrrhic victory. |
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"We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things not because they are easy, but because they are hard. Because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our abilities and skills, because that challenge is one we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win." |
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