Huge fire in London

Question: Does all this cladding have anything other than a decorative and insulating function? Are there any potential bad effects (except maybe higher utility bills) from just ripping it all off?....

That would leave the windows in an odd position, outside of the line of the original concrete walls.

I keep on saying this, but the junction between the windows and the cladding has moved the windows out from their original position, and thus created a path for fire into and out of every flat. Removing the cladding and leaving the windows where they are will leave the flats open to the weather...........and open to fire.

This, in my view, may be the crux of the problem, and why the fire spread so quickly throughout the building.
 
It was more than that. She was in the government that had "a clear new year's resolution: to kill off the health and safety culture for good."

The Telegraph has also pointed out that current government policy is to require the removal of three old building regulations for every new building regulation.
Ministers in abrupt U-turn over fire safety in schools

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news...chools?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Copy_to_clipboard

It seems deregulation may be off the agenda in fire safety for schools.
 
That would leave the windows in an odd position, outside of the line of the original concrete walls.

I keep on saying this, but the junction between the windows and the cladding has moved the windows out from their original position, and thus created a path for fire into and out of every flat.
.....

So the windows, in effect, were mounted within the cladding? That seems like a major structural alteration. Was the whole assembly -- windows, cladding, insulation, mounting hardware, etc. -- ever tested as a unit? (Based on the outcome, I suspect it wasn't.)
 
Another one who thinks the fire brigade fire risk assessments should be ignored.

Not at all. However, I will qualify that to say in the context the tenants have lived in these conditions since at least the fire at Grenfell Tower alert two weeks ago, one would have thought Camden had ample time to at least secure alternate, albeit temporary, accommodation for young families, the disabled and the elderly, who no way can be expected to bed down on a public airbed on the floor.

Forcing people to leave between 8:30pm and 3:00 am with no place to go, together with 4,000 others, smacks of unpleasant officialdom and a complete lack of common sense.
 
An alternative view - the fire risk of some of these cladding materials was little understood for years or (much worse) knowingly downplayed or even ignored.

In the face of a disaster those ultimately responsible for overseeing such safety issues are ******** bricks and playing ultra-safe. No seeking of "kudos" involved at all, especially as the police have mentioned the possibility of manslaughter charges. Perhaps 'the authorities' have finally realised the true nature of the dangers that might lurk in some of these buildings?

Just a thought.

So they can listen to a threat of 'manslaughter charges' but can completely ignore tenants who know what the hazards are, and have been reporting them for years.

Pure hysteria. And a typical condescending attitude to working class people on benefits.

A 'you will do what you are told' attitude.
 
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Not at all. However, I will qualify that to say in the context the tenants have lived in these conditions since at least the fire at Grenfell Tower alert two weeks ago, one would have thought Camden had ample time to at least secure alternate, albeit temporary, accommodation for young families, the disabled and the elderly, who no way can be expected to bed down on a public airbed on the floor.

Forcing people to leave between 8:30pm and 3:00 am with no place to go, together with 4,000 others, smacks of unpleasant officialdom and a complete lack of common sense.
When was the fire risk assessment completed, how long did discussions with the fire brigade take?
 


This article is a little puzzling.

The major focus of the article is the idea that the insulation board installed behind the Reynobond PE panels might be flammable;
Experts said that perhaps of even greater concern is the failure to order the testing of the insulating material which lies behind the panels and is potentially even more flammable.
But then goes on to cite in support an article which doesn't even mention the insulation board at all;
The danger of insulating material was confirmed by early tests on the panels used to clad Grenfell Tower ordered by the Metropolitan Police, as part of their criminal investigation into the disaster.
That article discusses the polyethylene core of the Reynobond PE panels, and the danger from it, and nothing else. Certainly nothing at all about the insulation board behind the panels.



To add to the confusion that second article specifically indicates that the rain shield panels had a core comprised of Celotex RS5000.

This is the product which has been reported to have been used for the insulation board which was being shielded by the Reynobond PE panels, but the panels themselves do not contain it.

Celotex RS5000 is a polyisocyanurate which while combustible, is rated as fire retardant and as compliant with regulations regarding installation in high-rise buildings. In fact, it was developed specifically for such applications. Even as a core material for ACM rain shield panels. Fire retardant ones.

Not that it matters, since it isn't what was in the Reynobond PE panels. It isn't even what is used in the Reynobond FR fire retardant panels (if those had been used, which sadly doesn't seem to be the case). Alcoa makes their own product for use in their FR panels.

It looks like some writers may have gotten confused about which insulation was doing what where.

The idea that the Celotex RS5000 polyisocyanurate insulation board is "potentially even more flammable" (my emphasis) than the polyethylene core of the Reynobond PE panels isn't one that stands up well to scrutiny.

It is certainly a problem when adjacent to something which burns as vigorously as polyethylene, but that gets into the approved installation issue. It isn't supposed to be used with something like the Reynobond PE panels.
 
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And to place those "killer fridges" into the appropriate context:

There are currently approx 3 million households in London* that fall under the operation of the London Fire Brigade. It's fair to assume that pretty much every one of those households has a refrigerator.

So, assuming that each of the refrigerator fires mentioned in the article involved a separate fridge in a separate household, this means that that probability of any London household experiencing a fridge fire in the past five years was 260/3,000,000. That's 0.009% (or, to put it another way, less than one in 10,000 chance).

And, given that the population of London covered by the London Fire Brigade is around 8.5 million*, the probability of any given Londoner dying from a refrigerator-linked fire over the past five years (per the statistics in that Daily Mail article quoted**) was 7/8,500,000 - or 0.00008%.

And that's before one considers the possibility that many of these refrigerator fires could well have been initiated and/or propagated by improper acts on the part of the householder(s). Refrigerator compressors and pumps - almost without exception placed on the back face of the unit - get hot (by necessity - it's fundamental to the very heat exchange principle upon which refrigeration works***). All fridges/freezers require clear space around the rear of the unit and the unfettered flow of air (convection will aid in removing heat from the condenser and pump). If a fridge is, say, pushed tight up against a back wall, and paper/clothing items/other inflammable materials fall down the gap, this would hugely increase the possibility of an otherwise well-functioning fridge overheating and then igniting the adjacent inflammable materials.

And lastly, one also has to consider that of the 3 million London households, a fair amount of them could have fridges/freezers that are over (say) 25 years old. In a liquid refrigeration unit, it's important that the volume of refrigerant within the sealed system is adequate, in order to ensure efficient and safe refrigeration. Unfortunately, over time the volume of refrigerant slowly decreases - even in a sealed unit. There are microscopic gaps in joint seals and even the pipes themselves. And the refrigerant itself changes from liquid to pressurised gaseous state (then back to liquid) as part of the refrigeration process; refrigerant in pressurised gaseous form can slow-leak far more easily than when it's in its liquid form. (As a simplistic comparator, nobody would ever need to check and top up the tyre (tire) pressures over the life of their car were it not for the fact that pressurised air within the tyre slow-leaks through microscopic gaps in the valve assembly, tiny gaps at the rim of the tyre, and microscopic porous gaps in the rubber of the tyre itself).

So, in summary, it's a highly complicated situation with myriad potential complicators. And, as usual, certain sections of the media (hello Daily Mail in particular - the only UK mainstream media outlet to be struck off as a reliable source by Wikipedia) are more interested in scaremongering and quoting statistics out of any sort of qualifying context.


* https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/housing_in_london_2015.pdf

** Obviously this predates and excludes the awful events and outcomes of the Grenfell Tower fire (presuming that the investigations by the fire service and police, and the official inquiry, come to the conclusion that the fire was indeed caused by a refrigerator fire). But, horrific as the Grenfell Tower tragedy was, and the shocking loss of life in a single incident, this too needs to be placed in correct context vis-a-vis total London households and population.

*** I remember a school physics exam question when I was about 12-13 which asked whether one could cool down a closed room with an ambient temperature of around 25C by placing a fridge or freezer into the room, switching it on, and leaving the door open. The correct answer, of course, was that this course of action would actually result in a net overall INCREASE in the room temperature: the refrigeration of the interior compartment of the unit would be exactly cancelled out by the other end of the refrigerant compression/evaporation cycle at the outer rear of the machine, plus that process itself is not (and can never be) 100% efficient (leading to further net heat generation), plus the compressor pump itself will give off heat.
 
To add further statistical context:

Approximately 3.5 people per year in London die from accidental carbon monoxide poisoning within the residence*

Around 150 Londoners per year die as a a direct result of falling down stairs within the home**

Some 38 Londoners die per year as a result of accidental hanging or strangulation***

Around 210 London residents die per year from accidental poisoning***

Approximately 30 Londoners die each year as a result of accidental drowning***

And, lest we forget, lung cancer (a majority proportion of which is caused by long-term voluntary exposure to cigarette smoke) kills around 4,500 (that's FOUR AND A HALF THOUSAND) Londoners per year***


* https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopula...ofdeathsfromaccidentalcarbonmonoxidepoisoning (Total 2015 accidental residential CO deaths for England & Wales was 24 - and London constitutes around 15% of the total population of E&W (8.5m/56m))

** http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/790609.stm

*** https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1HUbeksH1HI63e2lgj_ZmfnVYc0S4tP0pauXqSfOeh2I/edit#gid=13
 
(Please note that none of this is intended to minimise the terrible tragedy of the Grenfell Tower fire in any way. Rather, it's intended to add contextual reference, and to place relevant risk factors in a more appropriate landscape)
 
OK, asked the Bellevue fire fighter I saw tonight about water on an electrical fire. He said two things. One, they use water. Unless it is confined to an electrical box or something, the room's on fire, you use the hoses.

Then his second comment was, think about it, in what apartment or house fire are there not going to be live wires? If it mattered the fire was in an electrical appliance, what about all the other appliances in the room? They could never use water, every residential fire would have the potential to involve an electrical fire.

For reference, Bellevue is the 5th largest city in WA State and our fire department is one of the many in the country that sought out and obtained accreditation.
Bellevue Fire Chief Michael Eisner and Battalion Chief Bruce Kroon have accepted the fire department's re-accreditation at the International Association of Fire Chiefs conference being held in Chicago.
It's no Podunk fire department.
 
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So the windows, in effect, were mounted within the cladding? That seems like a major structural alteration.

Yes, yes, yes.*

Was the whole assembly -- windows, cladding, insulation, mounting hardware, etc. -- ever tested as a unit? (Based on the outcome, I suspect it wasn't.)

I don't know, but I do know that my experience suggests that to be vanishingly unlikely.

This detail is why the knee-jerk "the cladding is flammable......whose fault is that?" response we have had here from a whole lot of "don't talk down to me" types in this thread was so frustrating. Getting through to people that it shouldn't matter (in terms of the safety of the occupants of the building) whether the cladding was flammable, so long as everything else was detailed properly, has been virtually impossible. That's one of the reasons why, I assume, most of the people who know what they are talking about have left the thread. That and the overt hostility.

*ETA:
I don't know this to be the case for buildings other than Grenfell tower, of course.
 
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For those who missed it last time I said it, I'll say this again, in a different way. The original building was solid concrete, making it fireproof by any standard on the planet. You could in theory smear napalm over the outside of the entire building and set it on fire, and still have plenty of time to get all of the occupants out safely. OK?

So, given the above, adding some cladding onto the outside of the building shouldn't make any difference to the fire safety of the building and its occupants, whatever the flammability of that cladding. And if that is only what they had done, then we wouldn't be having this discussion, I'm sure. But it wasn't all they did. They replaced the windows, and put them outside the line of the concrete. That one decision could be the most important of the whole saga.

Even then, that shouldn't necessarily have caused the fire to engulf the interior of the building, because if the window/ concrete interface had been properly fire-sealed then the building should have remained safe. The drawing I have seen doesn't show any such fire-stopping. That isn't to say that it wasn't there, but the drawing shows Celotex insulation there, not firestopping material, so if it was built as per the drawing then the window board (erroneously called cill) becomes effectively the only fire barrier. Understanding the window surround detail could be the most important technical thing the Public Inquiry reports on, and the hysteria over the flammability of the cladding will come to be seen as a side issue.
 
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.......It seems deregulation may be off the agenda in fire safety for schools.

Why do you keep repeating this red herring? Unless you can point to a proposal to remove or reduce Building Regulations and their associated testing regimes then you are just unnecessarily playing politics. I've never heard of any such proposals, (and you'd think I would have done, wouldn't you). Can you substantiate the allegation that such a change is under consideration? If you can't, could you undertake to not repeat it?
 
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That would leave the windows in an odd position, outside of the line of the original concrete walls.

I keep on saying this, but the junction between the windows and the cladding has moved the windows out from their original position, and thus created a path for fire into and out of every flat. Removing the cladding and leaving the windows where they are will leave the flats open to the weather...........and open to fire.

This, in my view, may be the crux of the problem, and why the fire spread so quickly throughout the building.

I don't think I expressed it, but I was quite surprised to see that the section through the window I linked to from the Telegraph showed the windows had been moved from what must have been the original position, and how much the new ones were integrated into the cladding. Someone else (not sure if it was you) clarified that the everything would have been fitted before the original windows were removed. It strikes me that it would be practically impossible to remove the cladding where it's fitted in this way, unless that process were reversed. Would leaving the new windows just sticking out even carry the risk of them being sheered off in high winds, as presumably the frames alone wouldn't be designed to withstand that?

ETA: I see you've pretty much covered all of this subsequently.
 
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.......Would leaving the new windows just sticking out even carry the risk of them being sheered off in high winds, as presumably the frames alone wouldn't be designed to withstand that?

I guess there might be that risk, in that the winds could (would) get in behind the window. That section you refer to shows a bevel to the concrete at the cill (amusingly, it shows Celotex nicely shaped around the bevel, which is all-but impossible in real life). If that bevel is repeated around the sides of the concrete opening then there would be a huge gap around at least 3 sides of the window, (it could be the top, too, for all we know), meaning that not only would there be a big gap for wind and rain to pour through if the cladding were removed, but a rather extended bracket to hold the window in place. This could leave the windows vulnerable to being removed by severe weather.

Let me stress again, we have no reason to believe that this detail applies to any building other than Grenfell tower. All those bods rushing around taking panels off to fire test them would better employed, in my view, checking the junction detail between the windows and the concrete of the original tower structure.
 
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I don't think I expressed it, but I was quite surprised to see that the section through the window I linked to from the Telegraph showed the windows had been moved from what must have been the original position, and how much the new ones were integrated into the cladding........

You did to me.
Some of the more interesting discussions related to this thread have been by PM. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of some posters in this thread that we have been forced into communicating that way.
 
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Ministers in abrupt U-turn over fire safety in schools

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news...chools?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Copy_to_clipboard

It seems deregulation may be off the agenda in fire safety for schools.

From that

And why May is on the hook in a way that Corbyn isn't


Fire safety experts, backed by senior MPs, expressed deep alarm over the past year at the plans and warned ministers repeatedly that they could have disastrous results.

Part of the revised draft guidance – which the Observer has learned will now be dropped – removed the requirement that sprinklers be included in the design of new schools and stated, instead, that “school buildings do not need to be sprinkler protected to achieve a reasonable standard of life safety”. It also said it “no longer includes an expectation that most new school buildings will be fitted with them”.

In a letter to schools minister Nick Gibb last August, London fire commissioner Ron Dobson said such changes could have “potentially devastating consequences”.
 
You did to me.
Some of the more interesting discussions related to this thread have been by PM. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of some posters in this thread that we have been forced into communicating that way.

If you want to have your super-private super-perfect (ETA) super-secret super-discussion without any super-dissent or counter-voices, whatever. Or maybe it doesn't even exist for all we know...

Frankly, some reactions by some posters were odd as if they had stake in that WTF...
 
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Why do you keep repeating this red herring? Unless you can point to a proposal to remove or reduce Building Regulations and their associated testing regimes then you are just unnecessarily playing politics. I've never heard of any such proposals, (and you'd think I would have done, wouldn't you). Can you substantiate the allegation that such a change is under consideration? If you can't, could you undertake to not repeat it?
Read the article MikeG.
 
And to place those "killer fridges" into the appropriate context:

There are currently approx 3 million households in London* that fall under the operation of the London Fire Brigade. It's fair to assume that pretty much every one of those households has a refrigerator.

So, assuming that each of the refrigerator fires mentioned in the article involved a separate fridge in a separate household, this means that that probability of any London household experiencing a fridge fire in the past five years was 260/3,000,000. That's 0.009% (or, to put it another way, less than one in 10,000 chance).

<snip>


This is all very interesting. But you do not seem to be paying attention to the fact that we are not discussing the the class of 'all refridgerators'.

We are discussing the class of 'refrigerators with plastic rear panels', a class which is not used in many other countries exactly because of the substantially increased danger of catastrophic failure, and a class which has been shown, by those statistics you are so enamored of, to cause seven times as many serious injuries when they do fail catastrophically.

A class which the U.K.s own fire safety authorities have voiced their serious fears about.

A problem which can be addressed simply by making the back panels out of metal, or at least something non-combustible, instead of a highly combustible plastic.


To add further statistical context:

Approximately 3.5 people per year in London die from accidental carbon monoxide poisoning within the residence*

Around 150 Londoners per year die as a a direct result of falling down stairs within the home**

Some 38 Londoners die per year as a result of accidental hanging or strangulation***

Around 210 London residents die per year from accidental poisoning***

Approximately 30 Londoners die each year as a result of accidental drowning***

And, lest we forget, lung cancer (a majority proportion of which is caused by long-term voluntary exposure to cigarette smoke) kills around 4,500 (that's FOUR AND A HALF THOUSAND) Londoners per year***


* https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopula...ofdeathsfromaccidentalcarbonmonoxidepoisoning (Total 2015 accidental residential CO deaths for England & Wales was 24 - and London constitutes around 15% of the total population of E&W (8.5m/56m))

** http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/790609.stm

*** https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1HUbeksH1HI63e2lgj_ZmfnVYc0S4tP0pauXqSfOeh2I/edit#gid=13


I am disappointed in you.

This is a tired, old sort of argument. "Why should we pay any attention to this when so many more people die of that?"

"Why should we insist that automobiles have seat belts and that people use them when so many people die from tobacco?"

Really? That's your argument?

One reason, the simplest, is that this problem, refrigerators which become columns of flame because of plastic back panels when, for whatever reason, they have an electrical problem, is easily addressed, and has been, has been shown to be, in other places.

The real question is, "Why does this even continue to be an issue in the U.K., even after we have been shown that the problem exists, when the solution is simple, straightforward, not costly, and has been demonstrated to be effective in so many other parts of the world?

I couldn't buy a refrigerator with a flammable plastic back panel in the U.S. even if I wanted to. Even if the (possibly as much as a couple of dollars for a $1K plus appliance) difference in cost meant that much to me.

What reasonable protection of my rights is served by allowing me to? In comparison to the potential danger which it might expose others to?
 
Yes, yes, yes.*



I don't know, but I do know that my experience suggests that to be vanishingly unlikely.

This detail is why the knee-jerk "the cladding is flammable......whose fault is that?" response we have had here from a whole lot of "don't talk down to me" types in this thread was so frustrating. Getting through to people that it shouldn't matter (in terms of the safety of the occupants of the building) whether the cladding was flammable, so long as everything else was detailed properly, has been virtually impossible. That's one of the reasons why, I assume, most of the people who know what they are talking about have left the thread. That and the overt hostility.

*ETA:
I don't know this to be the case for buildings other than Grenfell tower, of course.


If the panels used on Grenfell had not been Reynobond PE, in direct disregard of the manufacturer's recommended practice (regardless of installation details, it should be noted) and all other installation and design procedures had been exactly the same, do you think that the fire would have been as catastrophic?

Do you think that the building would have gone up like a Roman candle anyway if they had used Reynobond FR (one of the manufacturer's recommended products for that sort of building) instead of Reynobond PE, all other things being the same?

Do you believe that the ban against the use of Reynobond PE (and similar ACM products with equally flammable cores) in buildings over 40' high in the U.S. and elsewhere is completely spurious and without merit? And that it would be perfectly okay to use that product anywhere if only the installation details were properly attended to?
 
This is a tired, old sort of argument. "Why should we pay any attention to this when so many more people die of that?"

"Why should we insist that automobiles have seat belts and that people use them when so many people die from tobacco?"

Really? That's your argument?

I didn't see that argument being made, except in your imagination.
 
I didn't see that argument being made, except in your imagination.
I did.

You have two things, the fire spreading into and throughout the building and the fire spreading rapidly up and around the exterior surface.

Sure, if the fire spread up and around the building but couldn't move into the interior, loss of life would have been less.

But at the same time, if the building hadn't had a flammable covering the fire would not have spread so rapidly.
 
For those who missed it last time I said it, I'll say this again, in a different way. The original building was solid concrete, making it fireproof by any standard on the planet. You could in theory smear napalm over the outside of the entire building and set it on fire, and still have plenty of time to get all of the occupants out safely. OK?

So, given the above, adding some cladding onto the outside of the building shouldn't make any difference to the fire safety of the building and its occupants, whatever the flammability of that cladding. And if that is only what they had done, then we wouldn't be having this discussion, I'm sure. But it wasn't all they did. They replaced the windows, and put them outside the line of the concrete. That one decision could be the most important of the whole saga.

Even then, that shouldn't necessarily have caused the fire to engulf the interior of the building, because if the window/ concrete interface had been properly fire-sealed then the building should have remained safe. The drawing I have seen doesn't show any such fire-stopping. That isn't to say that it wasn't there, but the drawing shows Celotex insulation there, not firestopping material, so if it was built as per the drawing then the window board (erroneously called cill) becomes effectively the only fire barrier. Understanding the window surround detail could be the most important technical thing the Public Inquiry reports on, and the hysteria over the flammability of the cladding will come to be seen as a side issue.


Assume the windows hadn't been changed, and this flammable cladding had just been tacked on around them. Wouldn't fire pretty quickly crack the windows and spread into the units? That's one way wildfires in the U.S. get inside houses. And what happens when the windows are open, as apparently many of them were on a warm night? Fire goes straight to the curtains and walls. Considering how fast the fire spread across the entire building, it's hard to see concern about the cladding as "hysteria."
 
Assume the windows hadn't been changed, and this flammable cladding had just been tacked on around them. Wouldn't fire pretty quickly crack the windows and spread into the units? That's one way wildfires in the U.S. get inside houses. And what happens when the windows are open, as apparently many of them were on a warm night? Fire goes straight to the curtains and walls. Considering how fast the fire spread across the entire building, it's hard to see concern about the cladding as "hysteria."

You beat me to it. I was going to make the same observation. It's odd that the manufacturer and several other countries can determine that a product is not appropriate for particular applications even if correctly installed, but apparently in this country we can't.
 
Assume the windows hadn't been changed, and this flammable cladding had just been tacked on around them. Wouldn't fire pretty quickly crack the windows and spread into the units?........

Surprisingly not.

I'll use an anecdote, but there is plenty of evidence out there of the fire resistance of windows.

I built a house, many years ago, and lived in it for a couple of years whilst building another on the same site. I sold the first one, and moved into the other, and became good friends with our new neighbour in our old house. One day he rang me from work and told me that something had gone wrong with the plumbing in the en suite bathroom, there was some sort of flood, and could I help out. I went around and mopped up, took up some floorboards to dry out in the floorspace, and put an electric fan heater in there to help dry things out.

An hour later, I went back to check on things, and found the fan heater had melted and caused an intense fire in the bathroom. It was so intense that the hand basin had exploded, literally, and the ceramic shower tray had also shattered. The light switch and fittings had melted. (Oh, and for whoever thought that timber should be banned in buildings, this house was entirely timber framed, the timber joists of the floor were exposed and the wall framing within the floor depth too.......no structural damage whatever). Anyway....

The timber window in that room was blackened, and completely intact. There wasn't a hint of any smoke escaping past it. The fire brigade remained on site for 3 hours watching through thermal imaging equipment as temperatures fell below critical levels. (And yes, they'd used a foam extinguisher on the source.)

"Hi, Graham. It's Mike. I've set fire to your house.........."
 
Apologies for abandoning the thread, but I'm on a cruise around the Med on the Queen Victoria and, as I sit looking out over Gibraltar from the Commodore Bar, I really can't be arsed. But back next week.
 
Surprisingly not.

I'll use an anecdote, but there is plenty of evidence out there of the fire resistance of windows.
....


I suspect it might depend on how close the actual fire source is to the window pane (like burning plastic insulation two inches away), and apparently radiant heat can pass through window glass and ignite material on the other side.
Heat traveling via electromagnetic waves, without objects or gases carrying it along. Radiated heat goes out in all directions, unnoticed until it strikes an object. Burning buildings can radiate heat to surrounding structures, sometimes even passing through glass windows and igniting objects inside
http://www.nfpa.org/news-and-resear...porters-guide-to-fire-and-nfpa/all-about-fire

But what happens when many of the windows are open, as was apparently the case here?
 

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