There is No God (And You Know It)

In fact I have only made two claims in total in this thread. Is that really too many for you to remember?

1. That an omniscient being cannot participate in a universe that contains free will (3 deductive proofs provided, no refutation received to date)
2. That the libertarian definition of free will is internally inconsistent (2 deductive arguments provided)

Despite discussion of whether any of the arguments could be arranged into a valid formal proof, I don't recall seeing it done. I think I would remember, but this thread has been going on for so long that it's hard to recall even what all the arguments were.

Would any of the offerors of such deductive arguments be so kind as to put the arguments into proof form (numbered steps, premises and interim/final conclusions identified, definitions offered, etc.)? It may seem fussy of me, but I really think it would save time in the long run. It would, among other things, become much easier to refer back to specific steps, propositions, etc. by number.
 
Yeah but that principle doesn't say that photons are all over the place and then, suddenly, are in one given spot. They are in one given spot all the time. It's just that we don't KNOW what that spot is. Same diff with our "choices" they're choices to use because we're not aware of all the factors. To an omniscient god who, for the sake of argument, knows ALL the factors, even if he can't "see" the future per se, your choices are all determined in advance.



I'm not talking about God. My position on that subject should be known, by now. What I'm saying is that nothing "determines" our choices, because they are not choices to begin with. Just particles moving around in a clockwork manner.
To be clear, both of our postions on the existance of God is the same. He's as real as the Furmious Bandersnatch., or an honest politition ;).


Okay, that's not what I meant. According to theory, there are a number of quantum fluctuations going off all the time. These are supposed to be truly random. That is, they have no actual cause. Now, assuming these can have an impact on actual particles and stuff, then they can affect your decisions, in theory. But even so, this wouldn't help the free will argument, because it's random. So your choices are either determined in advance by fixed factors or by random factors. Either way, no choice at all.

Ahh, but if we accept the idea that particles can be "totally random" why not motivations/choices? I mean, from my POV, it's perfectly fine if you want to have everything perfectly scripted out, since neither of us is going to use it as a proof that God exists or not. We're just coming at it from differing POVs.


Where ? Where's your definition ?
since you must have missed it, here it is:
My definintion of Free Will
by Kenneth J. Mortis

Well, you see, every person is born with a certain genetic code, right? And they live their lives up to a point where a decision has to be made (ok, they will probably live PAST a goodly portion of their choises, but that's another story). These moments happen quite frequently, some would argue that a person lives their lives moment to moment making choices, I don't know about that, and that's beyond the scope of this missive.

So, the choice has to be made. All the events leading up to The Choicetm (genetic code, life events, mood etc et al) factor into reducing the total number of likely possible outcomes from a nigh infinite to a limited number. From this number (personal experience has led me to believe that on average this number is three, but I could be wrong) the person chooses one of them. Granted, it is still possible to choose an option that isn't in the limited set of highly possible, it's just <ahem> less likely.

Is this clear? Questions? Comments? Ken, yer a jerk?

Oh, and FYI, I'm going to take a break from this thread for a couple of days while I suffer from a cold. I have a hard enough time reading through some of these philosophical writings on a good day. When my head gets packed with cotton, I'm at a total loss...Just wanted to let you know that I'm not intentionally ignoring any questions/statements/Ken-yer-a-jerks leveled at me.
 
To be clear, both of our postions on the existance of God is the same. He's as real as the Furmious Bandersnatch., or an honest politition ;).

Sorry, boy. I already know of at least ONE honest politician.

Ahh, but if we accept the idea that particles can be "totally random" why not motivations/choices? I mean, from my POV, it's perfectly fine if you want to have everything perfectly scripted out, since neither of us is going to use it as a proof that God exists or not. We're just coming at it from differing POVs.

I didn't say particles were totally random. I said that totally random events could happen that can affect particles. But either way, it doesn't mean your choice is a choice. Think about it: if your "choice" is brought about by random chance, how much of a choice is it ?

Well, you see, every person is born with a certain genetic code, right? And they live their lives up to a point where a decision has to be made [...] These moments happen quite frequently, some would argue that a person lives their lives moment to moment making choices [...]

So, the choice has to be made. All the events leading up to The Choicetm (genetic code, life events, mood etc et al) factor into reducing the total number of likely possible outcomes from a nigh infinite to a limited number. From this number (personal experience has led me to believe that on average this number is three, but I could be wrong) the person chooses one of them. Granted, it is still possible to choose an option that isn't in the limited set of highly possible, it's just <ahem> less likely.

I'm sorry, but I don't see how this defines free will. From where I stand, free will is the ability to make choices that are not merely the result of chance or purely physical factors. I.E. free will is a supernatural claim, because no mechanism exists to allow anything beyond these two sources (random or determined.)

Oh, and FYI, I'm going to take a break from this thread for a couple of days while I suffer from a cold.

Pfah! Weakling. ;)
 
Despite discussion of whether any of the arguments could be arranged into a valid formal proof, I don't recall seeing it done. I think I would remember, but this thread has been going on for so long that it's hard to recall even what all the arguments were.

Would any of the offerors of such deductive arguments be so kind as to put the arguments into proof form (numbered steps, premises and interim/final conclusions identified, definitions offered, etc.)? It may seem fussy of me, but I really think it would save time in the long run. It would, among other things, become much easier to refer back to specific steps, propositions, etc. by number.
Not so much fussy as inconsistent. When you offered the argument by Beilby et al you seemed to think it had validity in spite of not having any of these features.

And basically my arguments have had all these features except the numbered steps.

However when I offered by refutation an example of how the Rowe premise (and more) could be derived deductively it at least had premise, argument and conclusion. But you are now implying that my arguments did not contain these features.

Naturally I am juggling correct form with readability in a forum like this, but as far as I can my arguments follow the rules of deduction:

1. Refutation of the Agnostic Thesis
a. Deductive argument for PoE premise
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=1240374#post1240374

b. If natural evil is not evil then inactivity is the morally best course of action:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=1243446#post1243446
​
2. An omniscient being cannot participate in a universe with free will
a. The "safe" example
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=1239967#post1239967

b. Out of sequence information in a system of states contingent on
prior states implies a deterministic system:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=1284427#post1284427
​
 
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At this point I could review the definitions we have so far and see if we are at least on the same page with those:
Definitions:
  1. Free will : A has free will if for at least on action voluntarily performed by A at time t the possibility existed before t that A had the ability to perform that action but did not.
  2. Free choice : A choice can said to be free if it could not (even theoretically) be deduced from causal antecedents
  3. Will (1) : the ability to form intentions and follow through on them
  4. Omniscient : Knows every true proposition and does not believe any proposition that is not true.
  5. God : Creator of all things that has at least the properties of omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence
  6. Predictable (1): Predictable(f) means that (a=f(x)&b=f(y))->(x==y->a==b)
  7. Predictable (2): Can (at least theoretically) be deduced from causal antecedents

So here again are the arguments that an omniscient being cannot participate in a universe that contains free will:
Argument 1 (semi-formalisation of my safe example):
  1. An omniscient being participates in the universe in which at least one agent has free will (Assumption)
  2. G can make a true statement (s) about the world in the world (Def 1, Arg 1)
  3. A true statement made about the world in the world exists at a specific time (t) (Hyp logically possible from Arg 1)
  4. The statement at time t can be about an action at time t1 where t1 > t (Def 4)
  5. Let A be a free agent (Hyp from 1)
  6. Let a(A,t) be an action performed by free agent A at time t. (Hyp from 1)
  7. Let a1 and a2 be the possible actions for A at time t (Hyp)
  8. A statement s exists at time t and says that a(A,t1) == a1 (Hyp)
  9. The probability given t<t1 that a(A,t1) == a1 is 1 (Ded Def 4, Arg 1,5)
  10. The probability given t<t1 that a(A,t1) == a1 is not 1 (Ded Def 3, Arg 5,6)
  11. We reject the hypothesis (RAA 1,6,7)
And the argument about observing contingent free will prior to action:
Argument 2 - effective temporal action by a timeless omniscient being in a universe that contains free will is impossible
Definitions
  1. Omniscience: An omniscient being has an infallible timeless view of every event in the universe
  2. Effective action : an action based on a reliable observation that has real consequences
Argument
  1. An omniscient being G participates effectively in the universe (Assumption)
  2. Let T be the set of all events in the universe observed by G(Hyp)
  3. An effective action is dependent on a prior observation (Def 1)
  4. An observation by G of any member of T implies an observation of all T (Def 2)
  5. Let b1 be the observation taken by G (ontologically) prior to the action (Hyp)
  6. Let b2 be the observation taken by G (ontologically) prior to some contingent action (Hyp)
  7. b1 == b2 == T (Ded MP 4,4 MP 4,5)
  8. If b1 != b2 then T has changed and cannot be an infallible observation (Ded MT 4, 4&5)
Conclusions:
  1. (RAA 1,7) For any two actions where the second is dependent on the first the observations upon which they depend will be identical and therefore the first action has had no effect
  2. (RAA 1,8 or MT Def 1, Arg 8) If the observation taken before and after an action differed then T has changed and both could not have been infallible observations so the being was not omniscient.
Argument 3 - Out of sequence information in a sequence of contingent states implies a deterministic system:
(for fuller discussion of steps, see http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=1284427#post1284427 )
  1. Let f be an operation accounting for the change between a state and a a successive state
  2. Let A,B,C,D,E,F be a set of contingent states defined by: A=1 B=f(A) C=f(B) D=f(C)+F E=f(D) F=f(E)
  3. F=f(f(f(f(f(1)))+F)) (rearrangment of 2)
  4. F=f(f1(F)) (rearrangement of 3)
  5. Note that f1 == f-1 (by definition of inverse)
Conclusion - since f has an inverse it is a function and therefore deterministic
Generalisation - the same will be true of any sequence of contingent states where a successive value is used in the calculation of a prior value and so any system of this sort will be deterministic.
 
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So here again are the arguments that an omniscient being cannot participate in a universe that contains free will:

Argument 1 (semi-formalisation of my safe example):
  1. An omniscient being participates in the universe in which at least one agent has free will (Assumption)
  2. G can make a true statement (s) about the world in the world (Def 1, Arg 1)
  3. A true statement made about the world in the world exists at a specific time (t) (Hyp logically possible from Arg 1)
  4. The statement at time t can be about an action at time t1 where t1 > t (Def 4)
  5. Let A be a free agent (Hyp from 1)
  6. Let a(A,t) be an action performed by free agent A at time t. (Hyp from 1)
  7. Let a1 and a2 be the possible actions for A at time t (Hyp)
  8. A statement s exists at time t and says that a(A,t1) == a1 (Hyp)
  9. The probability given t<t1 that a(A,t1) == a1 is 1 (Ded Def 4, Arg 1,5)
  10. The probability given t<t1 that a(A,t1) == a1 is not 1 (Ded Def 3, Arg 5,6)
  11. We reject the hypothesis (RAA 1,6,7)
I've read only one of the proofs yet, specifically the one quoted above. This argument doesn't come close to proving the conclusion you made from it. Even if it were irrefutable (it's not) it would at most show only that if God were to insert a prediction into the world before an event the event could not be free. However, other events could still be free. In addition, this proof fails to show that an omniscient God cannot participate in the universe in other ways. A fully omniscient God could still have knowledge of all future events (free or otherwise) and interact with the world in any number of ways, but simply choose not to insert a prediction of an event into the world in order to allow that event to be free. It should also be pointed out that you are assuming a definition of omniscience that is certainly not universally accepted as many believe that God could limit his knowledge in order to allow free will.

Those are just some of the ways that your proof doesn't lead to the conclusion you claim without mentioning any possible refutations of the argument itself.

-Bri
 
Bri
Even if it were irrefutable (it's not)
Then refute it.

it would at most show only that if God were to insert a prediction into the world before an event the event could not be free.
There is no need to ‘insert a prediction’, merely the existence of the foreknowledge. Yet another attempt by you to build a straw man.

However, other events could still be free.
No, statement 1 eliminates that possibility.

A fully omniscient God could still have knowledge of all future events (free or otherwise) and interact with the world in any number of ways, but simply choose not to insert a prediction of an event into the world in order to allow that event to be free.
Adding more straw.

It should also be pointed out that you are assuming a definition of omniscience that is certainly not universally accepted as many believe that God could limit his knowledge in order to allow free will.
God could limit his omniscience so god would not be omniscient. Gee, same tactic you’ve been using throughout this thread, in order to have freewill you limit(remove) omniscience, in order to have omniscience you limit(remove) freewill. Try both omniscience and freewill at once and see the folly of your position.

Those are just some of the ways that your proof doesn't lead to the conclusion you claim without mentioning any possible refutations of the argument itself.
Just because you don’t understand it doesn’t mean the proof isn’t correct.

Ossai
 
Oh no! He's building a BRICK man!

You and Ossai throw out the term "straw man" more than a parrot in a scarecrow factory. It doesn't seem like either of you actually understand the term.

Then refute it.

Actually, I'm happy with the conclusion that can be drawn from the proof -- that God cannot insert a statement about a future event into the world without precluding that event from being free. I also doubt many people would particularly care if God chose not to insert such statements into the world in order to maintain free will.

There is no need to ‘insert a prediction’, merely the existence of the foreknowledge. Yet another attempt by you to build a straw man.

The mere existance of foreknowledge doesn't meet the assumptions of the proof, such as the statement existing at time t. God's knowledge is outside of time, which is why Robin was careful to call it a "statement" rather than simply "foreknowledge." Do you actually know what constitutes a straw man fallacy?

No, statement 1 eliminates that possibility.

Statement 1 simply says that the universe has at least one free agent in it. How does that eliminate the possiblity that other free events could occur in the world?

Adding more straw.

Children often repeat accusations when they don't like what someone says to them but can't think of a retort. Instead of using the same one over and over again, next time try "I'm rubber, you're glue -- everything you say bounces off of me and sticks to you" or maybe mix it up a little with "I know you are, but what am I?"

God could limit his omniscience so god would not be omniscient. Gee, same tactic you’ve been using throughout this thread, in order to have freewill you limit(remove) omniscience, in order to have omniscience you limit(remove) freewill. Try both omniscience and freewill at once and see the folly of your position.

I don't recall saying that. What I did say was that some people define "omniscient" as the ability to know anything that can be known (not necessarily knowing everything that can be known), just as they define "omnipotent" as the ability to do anything that can be done (not necessarily doing everything that can be done).

Just because you don’t understand it doesn’t mean the proof isn’t correct.

True, just because you don’t understand it doesn’t mean the proof isn’t correct. Also, just because you don’t understand it doesn’t mean the proof is correct.

-Bri
 
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Bri
You and Ossai throw out the term "straw man" more than a parrot in a scarecrow factory. It doesn't seem like either of you actually understand the term.

Straw Man: the author attacks an argument different from (and weaker than) the opposition's best argument.

it would at most show only that if God were to insert a prediction into the world before an event the event could not be free.
There is no need to ‘insert a prediction’, merely the existence of the foreknowledge. Yet another attempt by you to build a straw man.

Robin’s original statement was
An omniscient being participates in the universe in which at least one agent has free will (Assumption)
You’ve distinctively limited the interaction capability of god.

A fully omniscient God could still have knowledge of all future events (free or otherwise) and interact with the world in any number of ways, but simply choose not to insert a prediction of an event into the world in order to allow that event to be free.
Again you’ve got the same limitation.

Actually, I'm happy with the conclusion that can be drawn from the proof -- that God cannot insert a statement about a future event into the world without precluding that event from being free. I also doubt many people would particularly care if God chose not to insert such statements into the world in order to maintain free will.
The exclusion of the prediction does not remove the knowledge from god, nor maintain free will. The knowledge already exists; the insertion of it into the simulation is irrelevant.

Statement 1 simply says that the universe has at least one free agent in it. How does that eliminate the possibility that other free events could occur in the world?
At least one free agent, the agent is the only free acting entity within the universe, in order for the omniscient entity to interact all other agents must not have freewill.

Children often repeat accusations when they don't like what someone says to them but can't think of a retort. Instead of using the same one over and over again, next time try "I'm rubber, you're glue -- everything you say bounces off of me and sticks to you" or maybe mix it up a little with "I know you are, but what am I?"
Sorry, but I’m backing every one of my accusations up. What do you offer but more lies and attempted mockery?

Ossai
 
Straw Man: the author attacks an argument different from (and weaker than) the opposition's best argument.

You should have looked up the definition before you used the term incorrectly.

Robin’s original statement was You’ve distinctively limited the interaction capability of god.

I didn't limit it -- Robin did. If I'm mistaken in that assumption then it still wouldn't be a straw man fallacy. You quoted the definition above, you have no excuse for using it incorrectly.

The exclusion of the prediction does not remove the knowledge from god, nor maintain free will. The knowledge already exists; the insertion of it into the simulation is irrelevant.

Not according to Robin's proof. In fact, the proof depends on a statement of the prediction existing within the agent's timeline.

At least one free agent, the agent is the only free acting entity within the universe, in order for the omniscient entity to interact all other agents must not have freewill.

What part of "at least one" means "no more than one?"

Sorry, but I’m backing every one of my accusations up.

Yes, but not doing a very good job of it I'm afraid. Accusations rarely advance the discussion, so why not stop with the accusations and concentrate on the point you want to make? We're all friends here.

What do you offer but more lies and attempted mockery?

I'm rubber, you're glue -- everything you say bounces off of me and sticks to you. Try it, it'll work for you!

-Bri
 
Bri
If I'm mistaken in that assumption then it still wouldn't be a straw man fallacy. You quoted the definition above, you have no excuse for using it incorrectly.
Show where you think I’m incorrectly using the phrase.

As for the rest; you're still a liar, and I tend not to like those types of people. Or have I missed your apology on an earlier page?
 
As for the rest; you're still a liar, and I tend not to like those types of people. Or have I missed your apology on an earlier page?

You want me to apologize for you calling me a liar? OK, I'm sorry you called me a liar. All better now?

-Bri
 
I've read only one of the proofs yet, specifically the one quoted above. This argument doesn't come close to proving the conclusion you made from it. Even if it were irrefutable (it's not) it would at most show only that if God were to insert a prediction into the world before an event the event could not be free. However, other events could still be free. In addition, this proof fails to show that an omniscient God cannot participate in the universe in other ways. A fully omniscient God could still have knowledge of all future events (free or otherwise) and interact with the world in any number of ways, but simply choose not to insert a prediction of an event into the world in order to allow that event to be free. It should also be pointed out that you are assuming a definition of omniscience that is certainly not universally accepted as many believe that God could limit his knowledge in order to allow free will.

Those are just some of the ways that your proof doesn't lead to the conclusion you claim without mentioning any possible refutations of the argument itself.

-Bri
Can I classify your objections as follows:

1. The proof applies to a specific, not necessarily general definition of omniscience
2. Even if the hypotheses 2 through 8 were logically possible they would not represent actions the being was obliged to do
3. The proof only covers events directly affected by the prediction.

If this is a reasonable interpretation of your objections then I would respond:

1. Yes, the proof refers to the definition stated. But I could amend the definition to change "knows" to "is capable of knowing" and point out that "true" also implies "knowable" and the proof would still be valid and the definition would be compatible with any definition we have discussed or referred to here. I think that it would cover just about every definition. Please specify if I am mistaken.

2. I would have to say then that deductive formalism cuts both ways. I only have to show that my premises are logically possible in the terms of my premises, hypotheses, definitions or the axioms of logic. However this is a worthy objection and deserves a longer answer so I will get back to you.

3. But the statement could be about any free will event. There is no action you could take for which there could not be a chronologically prior true proposition - that is what makes it universal.
I also doubt many people would particularly care if God chose not to insert such statements into the world in order to maintain free will.
Practically every Christian in the world believes he does. However this is irrelevant - the contradiction is caused by the possibility that he can rather than any real action he might take. The fact that I choose not to predict the behaviour of a pseudo random number generator does not make it a real random number generator. The fact that I could makes this impossible.
Not according to Robin's proof. In fact, the proof depends on a statement of the prediction existing within the agent's timeline.
No - it only depends on the knowledge existing in a being capable of interacting with the universe. That makes it logically possible that the statement could exist within the agent's timeline.
What part of "at least one" means "no more than one?"
The agent mentioned in the proof could be any one of the free agents existing in the universe and for any choice they make. What is true for one is also true for all.
 
OK there is an objection that my first proof in that the hypotheses refer to actions that God could have taken and that if he did not then we would still have free will.
Bri said:
A fully omniscient God could still have knowledge of all future events (free or otherwise) and interact with the world in any number of ways, but simply choose not to insert a prediction of an event into the world in order to allow that event to be free.
The implication then is that it is the intervention of inserting the statement that has robbed us of our free will in this case and does not mean that we could not have free will without this intervention.

This seems reasonable because after all for every free will event there is something that could rob us of that free will without logically negating the possibility of free will.

Informally my response is that God did not interfere with the agent in any way, merely made a statement about some action the agent was observed to make.

Formally we could consider the case where God in the argument is replaced by Dr Mabuse's Neural Disruptor which can force particular choices on people.

First just a note on my notation. When I use a==b I mean the equivalence predicate where neither a nor b is altered, but a boolean value is returned.

Assigning a value to a term would be done by a=b, in which case the value of a is replaced by b.

So if the argument was evaluated with Dr Mabuses device replacing the omnicient being then statement 8 would have the equivalence predicate replaced by an assignment operator, so instead of:
a(A,t1) == a1 (Hyp)​
we would have
a(A,t1) = a1 (Hyp)​
In other words instead of comparing it is assigning. So statement 10 is no longer a reasonable deduction since the free will has been explicitly overriden by statement 8 in this case. The value of a(A,t1) has been explicitly altered. So there is no contradiction in this case.

In my original argument free will was never overridden and so 10 remains a valid deduction and the contradiction remains.

So the logical possibility of God making the statement in the world causes the contradiction. The logical possiblity of Dr Mabuse altering our choice does not cause the same contradiction.

So in order for this objection to stand you would have to show how a statement about an event could alter that event.

---------------
Quick note, I have seen an error in arg 1, line 9 it refers to the wrong line number. It should be:
The probability given t<t1 that a(A,t1) == a1 is 1 (Ded Def 4, Arg 1,8)
 

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